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Although the above-mentioned parties were involved in
the Lower Court litigation, and some were involved in three
separate appeals before this Court (other than the instant appeal
and cross-appeal), all of those appeals have since been
dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits. The following are
the only parties to the instant appeal and cross-appeal: Tower
Federal Savings and Loan Association (now known as First Federal
of Pittsburgh, and hereafter cited as "Tower") and Lawyers Title
Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title").
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon this
Court pursuant to UTAH CONST. Art. VIII § § 3 , 5

(1953, as

amended); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended); Rules
3 and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court; and Rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

This is an appeal from a

final Order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, Utah ("Lower Court").

The Honorable Raymond S. Uno,

District Judge, certified as final his Order granting Lawyers
Title Summary Judgment against Tower, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
on September 6, 1988.
5, 1988.

The final Order was entered

Tower filed a Notice of Appeal on October

Lawyers Title filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal on

October 20, 1988.

- 1 -

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Has Tower suffered any loss insurable under the

Title Insurance Loan Policy purchased from Lawyers Title ("Tower
Policy") due to the existence of the mechanic's liens foreclosed
by the Lower Court, since those liens have been released?
2.

Was Tower's Third Amended Cross-Claim without

merit and not brought in good faith as a matter of law, thereby
entitling Lawyers Title to its costs and reasonable attorney's
fees incurred in defending against Tower's Third Amended CrossClaim, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1953, as amended)?
If so, is Lawyers Title entitled to its costs and reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in defending against Tower's appeal and
in bringing its Cross-Appeal?
3.

Is Tower's appeal either frivolous or brought for

delay, entitling Lawyers Title to damages and single or double
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, on appeal pursuant
to Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court?

- 2 -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This litigation originated as an action for judicial
foreclosure of mechanic's liens.

The litigation expanded

quickly, through various claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, and
third-party claims, to include actions for declaratory judgment
on indemnification rights, breach of title insurance policies,
breach of payment bonds, liability on an attorney's opinion
letter, and other assorted claims.

The Lower Court trifurcated

the litigation into (i) mechanic's lien and payment bond issues,
(ii) a declaratory action on certain affidavit and indemnity
agreements allegedly executed by and between the general
contractor and the owner-developer, and (iii) the remaining
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims.
Tower's contract and tort claims against Lawyers Title, and
Lawyers Title's claim against Tower for attorney's fees and
costs, fell within the third division of the litigation.
After resolution by trial, summary judgment, or
settlement, either at the Lower Court level or on appeal, all of
the issues except for those between Tower and Lawyers Title have
been resolved and have been dismissed with prejudice, including

- 3 -

the release of all mechanic's liens.

The only remaining aspect

of the litigation is this appeal and cross-appeal.
With the addition of the foregoing, Lawyers Title
agrees generally with Tower's "Statement of Proceedings" except
as specifically noted within this Brief.
included the "Nature of the Case,"

Tower has apparently

"Course of Proceedings, and

"Disposition in the Lower Court" sections of its brief within its
"Statement of Proceedings."

As such, pursuant to Rule 24(b) of

the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Lawyers Title is not
required to make its own Statement of the Case.
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Statement of Facts1
1.
named

TV;il;"i- - r t
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- proposed

selling
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T

of Steven

'1* • > 1 r,p* - M

+

castor

*- . *

i" ;, ^

.

L^ *

-. v

•"

encio^j

— f -:

'

shofp^nj

L i i ! lm"j r a t . e r . a l n
:

*. r .* *

.

. '

-;•-

HKI 1 I

made

a~ i

- ,. r • :

L>c AJ u ,::'u: '\ . "

Construction financing was obtaine:; by tht

developer en ci al ..ut OetoLt.i

;, 19o3 trom l"t-

' rt.j.-ij-. .. .:

Corporation ("UKLC") In the amount of $4 , 900, C •.'-. The .can was
secured by a Deed ot Trust with Assignment of Rents.

UMLC

recorded the Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents with tl le Salt

I

The following abbreviations are used throughout: the
Record on Appeal, as paginated by the Court Clerk, is
designated "R;" the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, entered by the Lower Court on January 20, 198 7,
are designated as "Findings" or "Conclusions;" the
deposition exhibits, which have generally been
maintained serially throughout the Lower Court
litigation in separate bound volumes rather than
attached to each deposition, and which have not been
paginated individually as part of the Record, are
designated as "Dep. Exh.
;" some of the depositions
themselves have been paginated with only one number (on
their cover) - reference to them, will include their
"Record" number and relevant pages. The depositions
not paginated in the record will be identi fied only by
their titles and relevant pages.

Lake County Recorder on October 4, 1983.

Findings 11, 13 (R

4441-4483).
3.

The first labor was performed upon the Mall, and

the first materials were furnished to the Mall, on October 22,
1983.

Finding 6 (R 4441-4483).
4.

In or about November, 1983, the developer applied

with UMLC to expand the scope of the Mall construction project to
include a second building to be known as the "Buildmart
Distribution Center," and its attendant parking areas and other
facilities and amenities (collectively the "Distribution Center"
and the Mall shall be referred to as the "Project").

The

developer requested that the original loan be increased to
$7,750,000.

The request was approved in principal by First

Security Realty Services Corporation (as successor to UMLC)
(hereafter cited as "FSRSC") in or about December, 1983.

Finding

15 (R 4441-4483).
5.

On June 27, 1984, the loan increase was

memorialized in a Loan Modification Agreement between the
developer and FSRSC, and the Distribution Center and related
property were pledged as additional collateral.
4441-4483).
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Finding 16 (R

Ir. September, '1 ,?>A . . L . j ^ t r l : . Dcvolcrrert Feve
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Bonds ("IRBs") ::. the face arount cl $7,750,000 were sc/.d t:p r o v i d e p e r m a n e n t financing for the Project
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and used to pav off the June 2"' . 19" 4 f
loan from FSRSC,

---".^r

..,-.,.

T h e IRB Loan w a s memorialized an ; secured Ly
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A s part •-: rnt IRB Loar. i .rr* Security E 'rd- :f

Letter c: v. r^ *-t, a^t _, Setter her 2d, 1
First Security's C c r r c m r e
irJ-'-r.:,*: •' t r w t •' - -: • v *

4, :r.r thr benefir of

Trust D e p a r t m e n t
.

- ;.+ .i -

*

whic; a:tci ar
•

*

* i. *

Trust securin-j the IRL Loan ("IRB Irust Deed''; benefited th>;
bondholders , ~2rst ^ . " u r i f ; ar- t r a ^ ^ e

:r;d'-r thf Indenture .;

Trust Deed w a s recorded cr September 2 6 , 1984 in t h e Salt Lake
County R e c o r d e r ' s O f f i c e .

8.
Corporation

Findings "

•

ci , „-

At t h e r e q u e s t of Rlcnaruu-n.juaiiurn

i-n r t g a g e

("Richards-Woodbury") , Lav/yers T i t l e ' s then l o c a l

agent, Richmond Title Company ("Richmond Title") , prepared and
delivered to Richards-Woodbury a Commitment for Title Insurance
(the "Commitment") on or about November 23, 1984.

The Commitment

was dated November 23, 1984, and named Richards-Woodbury as the
proposed insured.

Deposition of Timothy Krueger, Volume I at

165-66 (R 9612); Deposition of Timothy Krueger, Volume II at 10
(R 9623).

See Addendum "D."

The Commitment provides, in

pertinent part:
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION . . .
herein called the Company . . . hereby
commits to issue its policy or policies of
title insurance, as identified in Schedule A,
in favor of the proposed Insured named in
Schedule A . . . all subject to the
provisions of Schedules A and B and to the
Conditions and Stipulations hereof.
* * *

This Commitment is preliminary to the
issuance of such policy or policies of title
insurance and all liability and obligations
hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6)
months after the effective date hereof or
when the policy or policies committed for
shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided
that the failure to issue such policy or
policies is not the fault of the Company

- 8 -

CON DITI ON S AN D S TI PI JI A T I ON S
*

i •

i•

3. Liability of n.c Company under this
Commitment shall be only to the named
proposed Insured and such parties included
under the definition of Insured in the form
of policy or policies committed for and onl y
for actual loss incurred in reliance hereon
in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply
with the requirements hereof, or (b) to
eliminate exceptions shown in Schedule B, or
(c) to acquire or create the estate or
interest orrn.ort.gagethereon, covered by this
Commitment. In no event shall such liability
exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for
the policy or policies committed for and such
liability is subject to the insuring
provisions and the Conditions and
Stipulations and the Exclusions from, Coverage
of the form of policy or policies committed
for in favor of the proposed Insured which
are hereby incorporated by reference and are
made a part of this Commitment except as
expressly modified herein.
4. Any action or actions or rights of action,
that the proposed Insured may have or may
bring against the Company arising out of the
status of the title to the estate or interest
or the status of the mortgage thereon covered
by this Commitment must be based on and are
subject to the previsions c*" this Commitment.
The. Commitment expressly excluded thr- II-B Tr^st Deed from
covf.ra';-' i ^

c:

*!.•--•:•.•< !•• - >< : .

«

; .,- -r- . correct

corny of the- Commitment is attached hereto as Addendum "A".
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9.

On or about March 20, 1985, Tower, as assignee of

Richards-Woodbury, made a loan in the principal amount of
$750,000 (the "Tower Loan") to the developer.

Finding 47 (R

4441-4483).
10.

The Tower Loan was secured by a second lien trust

deed ("Tower Trust Deed") on the Project dated March 13, 1985,
and recorded on March 20, 1985 in the Office of the Salt Lake
County Recorder.

The Tower Trust Deed was expressly made subject

to the IRB Trust Deed.

A copy of the Tower Trust Deed is

attached hereto as Addendum "B".
11.

Following the closing of the Tower Loan, Lawyers

Title, through Richmond Title, issued the Tower Policy, naming
Tower as the insured.

Finding 48 (R 4441-4483).

A copy of the

Tower Policy is attached hereto as Addendum "C".
12.

The Tower Policy specifically excluded coverage of

any loss or damage which might arise as a result of the existence
of the IRB Trust Deed as follows:
This policy does not insure against loss or damage by
reason of the following:
.

. • •

16. Deed of Trust from Buildmart Mall, a Utah
Limited Partnership, as Trustor to First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A., a National Banking Association
authorized and doing business in the State of
Utah, as Trustee and First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A., the Trustee on behalf of the holders of
- 10 -

Sandy City, Utah Industrial Development Bonds,
Series 1984, under an Indenture of Trust dated as
of July 15, 19 84; First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A., as a letter of credit bank, as Beneficiaries, to secure $7,750,000.00, dated September 2 5 ,
1984 and recorded September 26, 1984 in Book 5593,
Page 1940 as Entry N o , 3997400.
See Addendum " C " .

Tl le Tower Policy further provides on its last

page:
11

Li abi 1 ity Li mi ted to this Po 1 icy
This instrument together with a! 1
endorsements and instruments, if any,
attached hereto by the Company is the
entire policy and contract between the
insured and the Company.
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or
not based on negligence, and which
arises out of the status of the lien of
the insured mortgage or of the title to
the estate or interest covered hereby or
any action asserting such claim, shall
be restricted to the provisions and
conditions and s t i pu1at i o n s o f t h i s
policy.

1",

r

;o.-;cr and its a jc-r.tf v.rrc aware that the Tower

F:: jfy specifically e >: c I u 1 < i c^veran^ f : v
wh:.\\ :.-;:* J _-•.- J .

'

• L A . I 'iii...

1 os s or d am ag e

: ::.- I R B I rust Dee .< I.

Tower made t h ^ $75,0,' :-0 loan t- the developer knowing that the
Tower ~ r ir*- Deed was subordinate to the IRB Trust Deed.
D ep o i

;

"' i I h u t e j 111 • 111 I a t 19 2 0 , 2 <J 3 1 4 5 ; D e p o s i t i o n o f

J e f f r e y W o o d b u r y at 68-6 9; D e p o s i t i o n of D o n a l d Spagnol e at 4 4 ,

49/ 102-103.

Copies of all deposition pages cited in this brief

are attached hereto in the aggregate as Addendum "D".

See also.

Tower's Response No. 8 to Lawyers Title's Request for Admissions,
a true and correct copy of which Responses are attached hereto as
Addendum "E".
14.

Jeffrey K. Woodbury and his law firm, Woodbury,

Bettilyon & Kesler, acted as counsel for Tower and for RichardsWoodbury prior to the closing of the Tower Loan transaction in
March, 1985.

In acting as counsel for Tower and Richards-Wood-

bury, Jeffrey K. Woodbury and his firm were responsible for and
did in fact obtain from Richmond Title the Commitment as well as
the Tower Policy.

Deposition of Jeffrey K. Woodbury at 6-11;

Deposition of Earl Autenreith at 143.
15.

See Addendum "D."

At or before the Tower Loan closing, Jeffrey K.

Woodbury and his firm received from Gregory L. Seal, counsel for
the developer, a title opinion letter dated March 13, 1985,
addressed to Richards-Woodbury (a copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum "F") which disclosed a mechanic's lien in the
amount of $57,075.26 asserted by Complex Fabrications, Inc.
against the Project and discussed it at length (see pages 3 and 4
thereof), together with the litigation referred to therein as the

- 12 -
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the developer's default to foreclose its lien against the
Project.

Lawyers Title's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for

Summary Judgment against Tower ("Lawyers Title's Memorandum") at
11, ^[16 (not denied by Tower in its Memorandum in Opposition) .2
18.

Culp Construction Company ("Culp"), the

developer's primary general contractor, commenced the litigation
by filing its Complaint on or about September 3, 1985.
19.

By letter dated September 13, 1985, Tower tendered

its defense of this litigation to Lawyers Title under the Tower
Policy as required by paragraph 3(b) of the Conditions and
Stipulations.

Tower never gave Lawyers Title any notice of loss

(such notice being required by paragraph 4 of the Conditions and
Stipulations as a condition of Lawyers Title's having any
liability under the Policy as to any loss claimed).

Lawyers

Title's Memorandum at 10, <|113 (not denied by Tower) .
20.

By letter dated October 17, 1985, Lawyers Title

accepted the tender of defense from Tower subject to a
reservation of rights.

At Tower's request, the firm of Woodbury,

Bettilyon & Kesler was appointed as the counsel to independently

Lawyers Title's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment against Tower has apparently been
inadvertently left out of the Record and Record Index
prepared by the Third District Court Clerk.
- 14 -

represei 11 Tower' s Interests,
U14

Lawyers ,

(net denied iy T o w e r ) .
I: .

liie d e v e l o p e r also dr ' -in • t *-

u n d e r tnc i:-. L o a n .
F i r s t Security

c- Tm *

T

• • '<-

> r

proceeding
:. '

t

-* \.hich r^rst ;:e.ur.:\ I.J ;r *.e

sur. oi $ C , 2 0 ' " , C C J a n : acquired the Project.
-\w '

: . : : :t ; - r.s

of t r t s ~ ,

initiated r.or.-ju ileiai 1 :. rec 1 c s u r e

non-juo:cial trustee's sine,

\\t'

>* ^

•

As T r u s t e e under tr<_ inutntuit

against t h e ^rcjro* .

a".

Memoranduit* at 1 n .

-

By operation cl

A aw,

*• .- first ] i en he] d 1 : y I i rst Securi* m

including the lower "Irust Deed, were extinguished.

Tower and its

counsel faileJ to take any action to stop the foreclosure s~:ie or
t

j

c: : * : * •

;. . t* '

S e e , T o w e r ' s R e s p o n s e K;m
±-z

Admis£*.oi.L,, attached
22 .

;

;

; . ^ L -: - t ;
cl 1 ^

^f. retv do ^ ; :

_: i -. . • .

L a w y e r ^ 'I .- 1i

c: >n -. .X

m . , i. .-.*.: J ement an x u : sn. ss J _ . : .: . . , laims
exceit

for tl ie c l a i m s b e t w e e n Tr/kv " -•- % '-/ - r • " n] e

December 1 9, 1 9 8 8 ,

Al 3 c l a i m s r e m a i n . n j

C o u r t , and all p e n d i n g a p p e a l s excert t h i s o n e , were
with prejudice.

A l l out standi ng rt -,l .i1

w e r e r e l e a s e d a s p a r t of t h e settlement
9 6 0 2-09.

.equest

: Acder>du:: "3 -

"with prejudice w a s reached b e t w e e n a.: r-irties,
specifically

- : r ^ • ect.

'

. > ..

; •:. &?.~t.

oi I

, r. t .* Lower
dismissed
-'• Proje ::t
, 9598-9 6 0 1 ,

ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Tower argues that there are genuine issues of material
fact with respect to three causes of action: breach of contract,
breach of an implied contractual obligation of good faith and
fair dealing, and negligent misrepresentation.

As a matter of

law, however, there has been no breach of contract and
consequently there has been no breach of any implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.

Lawyers Title defended Tower

against the adverse mechanic's lien claims and has been
successful in obtaining their release through settlement.
Lawyers Title had the option to settle these claims under
paragraph 5 of the Conditions and Stipulations of the Tower
Policy.

Any claim for indemnity under the Tower Policy was

premature in the Lower Court given that the underlying adverse
claims were still being litigated, and any such claim is now moot
as the adverse claims have been settled.
Tower's claim for "negligent misrepresentation" is
confused.

First, Tower argues that Lawyers Title had a duty to

disclose all record information to Tower and the failure to do so
rendered Lawyers Title's actions negligent.

However, Tower does

not purport to sue Lawyers Title for "negligence."
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the IRB Loan.

Tower knew of the IRB Trust Deed and both the

Commitment and Tower Policy specifically excepted the IRB Trust
Deed from coverage.

As such, any allegedly undisclosed liens

were not the cause of Tower's loss.
Although they sought recompense for the loss they
suffered as a result of the developer's default on their loan,
Tower would not bring any action against their mortgage broker,
Richards-Woodbury, who represented to them the benefits of
entering into this loan, nor their own counsel, Earl Authenreith
and Jeffrey Woodbury, upon whom they relied to determine the
state of the title, either personally or through the obtaining of
an attorney's opinion letter.
Tower did not bring any claims against Lawyers Title
until two years into this litigation, and at that time only
asserted tort claims.

After those claims were dismissed upon

Lawyers Title's Motion, Tower amended its Cross-claim for the
third time to include contract actions against Lawyers Title.
Those claims were dismissed through Summary Judgment.
Any claims Tower asserted against Lawyers Title have
been determined by the Lower Court to be meritless.

Tower's

continuing attempt to assert baseless claim against Lawyers
Title, particularly in the context of Tower not bringing claims
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against parties against whom Tower would have legitimate factual
and legal bases, supports a finding that Tower's claims against
Lawyers Title were not brought in good faith.

Accordingly,

Lawyers Title is entitled to its costs and reasonable attorney's
fees incurred in having to defend against Tower's claims at the
Lower Court level, and having to defend this appeal, as well as
bring a Cross-appeal for its Lower Court level attorney's fees
and costs.

ARGUMENT

I*

Lawyers Title Has Not Breached A Contractual Obligation To
Tower Under Either The Commitment Or The Tower Policy.
A.

Tower has no privity of contract with Lawyers Title
under the Commitment.
The undisputed facts reflect that Richards-Woodbury,

the mortgage broker that negotiated with Tower to obtain a loan
of $750,000 to the developer in March, 1985, requested a
commitment for title insurance from Lawyers Title.

The

Commitment was prepared for and delivered to Richards-Woodbury.
The Commitment names Richards-Woodbury, not Tower, as the
proposed insured, not Tower.

See Addendum "A" hereto.

Any

contractual obligations Lawyers Title had under the Commitment

- 19 -

ran to Richards-Woodbury, not to Tower; Tower cannot assert a
breach of contract claim against Lawyers Title under the
Commitment.

Hooper v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 427

A.2d 215, 217 (Pa. 1981); Gaines v. American Title Insurance Co.,
136 Ga. App. 162, 220 S.E. 2d 469, 471 (1975).

B.

All of the liens that Tower alleges Lawyers Title
failed to disclose in the Commitment were recorded
after the Commitment was issued.
The Commitment was issued on November 23, 1984.

All of

the liens that Tower claims Lawyers Title failed to disclose in
the Commitment were recorded on December 12, 1984 or later.

This

is reflected in Exhibit "M" to Tower's Brief, the Affidavit of
Keith Ellertson.

Tower has not and cannot cite to any lien of

record as of the date of the Commitment to which the Commitment
failed to take exception.

Accordingly, even if Tower was in

privity of contract with Lawyers Title under the Commitment,
there are no facts in the record by which Tower can prove a
breach of contract under that Commitment.
issued as agreed in the Commitment.

Moreover, a policy was

All of Lawyers Title's

obligations under the Commitment were performed.

- 20 -

C.

Tower has not and cannot cite to any facts in the
record showing a breach of any express contractual
obligation by Lawyers Title to Tower under the Tower
Policy.
Tower fails to cite any provisions rr

ol ligations in

the Tower Policy which Lawyers Title has failed to fulfill.
Instead, Tower restates its tort claim as a "breach of contract"
action.

Tower claims that, prior to underwriting it^ loan to the

developer, it needed to obtain a "title abstract/' that Lawyers
Title was engaged to prepare an "abstract of title,ff

and that

Lawyers Title breached an implied contractual obligation to
abstract title by failing to exercise the skill and care
necessary to discover and report in the Tower Policy ail liens of
record relating It i\c

property.

The only contract between Tower and Lawyers Title is
the Tower Policy.

There is no provision in the Policy by which

Lawyers Title agreed to abstract title or search the public
records.

Nowhere in the Tower Policy is there any language that

expresses or implies that it is anything other than wha+ it
purports to be, an insurance policy.

Lawyers Title simply

contracted to insure Tower as follows:
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE
EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
HEREOF, LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION,
a Virginia corporation, herein called the
- 21 -

Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown
in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not
exceeding the amount of insurance stated in
Schedule A, and costs, attorneys7 fees and
expenses which the Company may become
obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or
incurred by the insured by reason of
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on
such title; . . .
See Tower Policy, attached hereto as Addendum "C."
The contract of title insurance (the Tower Policy), and
the language in the policy itself, are the sole source of the
obligations between Lawyers Title and Tower.

Brown's Tie and

Lumber v. Chicago Title Company of Idaho, 764 P.2d 423, 425-426
(Idaho 1988) ; Anderson v. Title Insurance Company, 103 Idaho 875,
655 P.2d 82, 85-86 (1982).

To impose an obligation to examine

title on the title insurer would require this Court to rewrite
the Tower Policy.

Lawyers Title did not have a contractual duty

to Tower to ". . . exercise the skill and care necessary to
discover and report all claims and/or liens of record relating to
the property."

Shotwell v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company,

91 Wash. 2d 161, 588 P.2d 208, 213 (1978) (citing Maggio v.
Abstract Title & Mortgage Corporation, 277 App. Div. 940, 98
N.Y.S. 2d 1011, 1013 (1950)).
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The Tower Policy is a contract for indemnity under
which Lawyers Title is obligated to indemnify Tower against
losses sustained in the event that an insured risk occurs.
Lawyers Title did not represent in the Tower Policy thdt an
insured risk would not occur.

Lawyers Title did not represent to

Tower, expressly or impliedly, that the title to the property was
as set forth in the Tower Policy.

Rather, Lawyers Title simply

agreed that it would pay for any losses resulting from, or would
cause the removal of, any cloud on Tower's title within the
policy provisions.
The Tower Policy was not a summary of the public
records and Lawyers Title did not purport to supply such
information.

To the contrary, Lawyers Title entered into a

contract of indemnity.

Lawrence v. Chicago Title Insurance

Company, 237 Cal. Rptr. 264, 266-7 (Cal. App. 1987).

As long as

Lawyers Title defended any adverse claim or obtained lien
releases or discharges, Lawyers Title would fulfill its
contractual obligations.

That is precisely what has happened in

this case.
It is undisputed that as soon as Tower requested that
Lawyers Title defend this litigation, Lawyers Title provided a
defense.

Throughout this litigation, Lawyers Title paid the fees
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of Tower's independent counsel.

The litigation was hard-fought

and extended over three years, resulting in a global settlement
and release of all mechanic's lien claims against the Project.
Tower has not and cannot point to any contractual obligation
under the Tower Policy that Lawyers Title has failed to fulfill.
As a matter of law, and based upon the express provisions of the
Tower Policy, Tower has no claim against Lawyers Title for breach
of contract.
Realizing that Lawyers Title has complied with its
contractual obligations under the Policy, Tower argues that
"[t]he evidence will disclose that [Lawyers Title] was retained
to prepare an abstract of title . . .."

First, Tower's mere

promise to produce such evidence, without more, fails to raise
fact issues in response to a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Second, Tower has not provided the Court with evidence of any
contractual undertaking by Lawyers Title other than the
Commitment and Policy.

For example, there is no evidence that

Lawyers Title agreed or promised to abstract title or render a
title opinion.3

Indeed, there is no evidence that either

It is doubtful that Lawyers Title could ever render an
opinion as to the state of title to the Project, as
this would probably constitute the unauthorized
practice of law.
- 24 -

Richards-Woodbury or Tower ever requested these services.

All

that was requested from Lawyers Title was a commitment and
policy.

Both were issued.

Neither has been breached.

For the Court to impose an implied contractual
obligation on Lawyers Title to abstract title would require the
Court to rewrite the insurance contract between Lawyers Title and
Tower.

There is no evidence in the record that Lawyers Title

held itself out to Tower or Richards-Woodbury as anything other
than a title insurer.

There is no evidence that Lawyers Title

represented itself to be an abstractor or an attorney.

There is

no evidence that Tower or Richards-Woodbury expressed any desire
that Lawyers Title abstract title or render an opinion as to
title.

In fact, the title opinion of Gregory Seal, an attorney

not employed by Lawyers Title, was obtained by Tower, and
subsequently Tower sued him in the Lower Court litigation because
of his faulty title opinion.

He has since settled with Tower.

There is simply no evidence that Lawyers Title contracted with
Tower to abstract title to the Project, and therefore Tower's
claim of breach of contract was correctly dismissed by the Lower
Court.
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II.

Lawyers Title Has Not Breached An Implied Covenant Of Good
Faith And Fair Dealing To Tower Under The Tower Policy.
Tower asserts that Lawyers Title's implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing required Lawyers Title to discover
and report all liens and encumbrances of record against the
Project.

Tower has cited no case law to support this argument.

The only cases Tower cites regarding any covenant of good faith
and fair dealing concern post-loss, claim matters.

None speak

even remotely of any such covenant arising prior to the time a
policy is issued.

Moreover, this covenant merely required

Lawyers Title to perform its express obligations in good faith.
There is no such express obligation to search title.

Finally, if

a title insurer has an implied obligation to search, abstract, or
examine title, the provisions of the policy become superfluous.
Any time an insured suffers a loss which is not specifically
excepted but is otherwise excluded, the insured can avoid the
policy limitation by suing on the implied covenant.

Once again,

Tower is attempting to "shoe-horn" a tort claim of abstractor's
liability into a contractual cause of action.
Tower claims that it ". . . had the right to expect
what it bargained for, that is, a complete and accurate
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Preliminary Title Report upon which it could reply [sic] in its
determination whether to loan monies to Buildmart Mall" (Tower's
Brief at 38) , However, Tower never bargained for a ''Preliminary
Title Report,"
as requested.

The Commitment was issued to Richards-Woodbury,
No request for a "preliminary title report," much

less an abstract of title, was ever made to Lawyers Title.

There

is no evidence whatsoever that Tower expected anything other than
what it got.
Despite Tower's protest that the issue of breach of an
insurer's duty to act in good faith is generally a factual issue,
it is hornbook law that when there are no genuine issues of
material fact with regard to the insurer's actions, there is no
factual issue to be submitted to the fact finder.
Tower again fails to cite any facts in the record that
support even a reasonable inference that Lawyers Title breached
its obligation of good faith and fair dealing.

Instead, Tower

makes the following bare assertion: "In the instant case,
discovery has adduced material factual issues in support: of
[Tower's] breach of contract claims against [Lawyers Title] which
must be tried, for which reason Summary Judgment was
inappropriate" (Tower's brief at 39 .
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Contrary to the bald allegations of Tower, which have
no support in the record, Lawyers Title has acted fairly and in
good faith, within the purview of the Tower Policy, toward its
insured by issuing the Policy, accepting defense of the claim
against Tower not withstanding no written claim of loss, paying
all costs of Tower's defense, and protecting Tower's security
interest in the Project (Tower's Trust Deed) subject only to the
superior first lien Trust Deed of First Security by litigating
and ultimately settling all mechanic's liens on the Project,
In light of Tower's inability to refer the Court to
material facts in the record with regard to Lawyers Title's
alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and because bald allegations of such disputes of fact
are insufficient to successfully rebut a Motion for Summary
Judgment, Tower's claim for breach of some unspecified implied
contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing must fail
as a matter of law.

Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 273, 274, 276 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 211-212 (1986);
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Caref Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264
(Utah App. 1987).
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III. Tower's Claim Of Negligent Misrepresentation Against Lawyers
Title Falls As A Matter Of Lav,

A.

There Is no evidence of any misrepresentation.
Tower demonstrates a critical misunderstanding of the

tort of negligent misrepresentation.

Negligent misrepresentation

is not a species of negligence, but fraud.

Regardless of whether

a party owes another any duty of care, a misrepresentation made
negligently may give rise to liability in certain circumstances.
The "negligent" portion of the claim simply denotes a reduction
in the scienter required for fraud.

See, Jardine v. Brunswick

Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662 n.2 (1967).

However,

under any fraud action there must be a false statement or
misrepresentation.

Tower fails to point to one in this case.

The Commitment does not purport to represent what the
status of title is, but rather the terms and conditions under
which Lawyers Title would insure title.

Lawyers Title issued the

Policy exactly as promised in the Commitment, thereby rendering
every statement in the Commitment true.
course, misrepresent itself.

The Policy cannot, of

These being the only two statements

or communications by Lawyers Title either directly or indirectly
to Tower, there are no identifiable misrepresentations.
action collapses upon itself on the facts of this case.
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This

B.

Lawyers Title did not owe a duty to Tower to abstract
title.
To the extent Tower means to prosecute a negligence

action and not a negligent misrepresentation action, it has
failed again to demonstrate error by the Lower Court.

There is a

split of authority throughout state and federal courts in the
United States with regard to whether title insurance companies
can be held liable in tort to their insureds on the basis of what
has become known as "abstractor's liability."

Quite simply, in

those states accepting such a theory, the courts have held that
the insurer owes a duty to the insured to examine title to the
insured property or estate with reasonable care.

A close study

of the subject and the opinions reveals, however, that a title
insurer is not a title abstractor nor an attorney.

Moreover,

courts in recent decisions and at least one legislature have
moved away from imposing such liability on an insurer.
Abstractors of title are different than title insurers.
Abstractors of title research the chain of title to a piece of
real property, whether in the public records or elsewhere, and
provide their customers with an orderly arrangement of the
materials and facts of record affecting title.
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See, e.g.,

OKLA. STAT. tit. 74 §273.11(1) (Supp. 1984).

Title 1 of the Utah

Code comprehensively regulates abstracts of title and those
persons engaged in that business.
seq. (1953, as amended).

See, UTAH CODE ANN. §1-1-1, et

Neither Lawyers Title nor its agent

qualified as an abstractor.

There is no evidence that Tower or

Richards-Woodbury believed they did.

In fact, Tower's own

attorney understood these differences between an abstractor and a
title insurer.

See, Dopoi it IUH ot i-,at 1 An t Jiwni e 11 h at 1 "1^-133.

In American First Abstract Co. v. Western Information
Systems, Inc., 735 P.2d 1187 (Okla. 1987), the court addressed
whether services provided by the defendant constituted an
abstract of title.

For a fee, the defendant would provide copies

of record documents to its customer.

After noting the statutory

definition set forth above the court also noted that the
definition was not in effect when the alleged acts occurred.
court then essentially adopted the Black's Law Dictionary
definition of "abstract of title," which reads, in part:
A condensed history of the title to land,
consisting of a synopsis or summary of the
material or operative portion of all the
conveyances, of whatever kind or nature,
which in any manner affect said land, or any
estate or interest therein, together with a
statement of all liens, changes, or
liabilities to which the same may be subject,
and of which it is in any way material for
purchasers to be apprised.
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The

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 10 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).

The Oklahoma

Supreme Court then held that the defendant's activities did not
constitute the abstracting of title because (1) the defendant did
not purport to compile all record information, and (2) there was
no warranty as to completeness or accuracy.

American First

Abstract Company v. Western Information Systems, Inc., 735 P.2d
at 1188-99.
Title insurance companies have historically provided,
and continue to provide, protection in the form of
indemnification against losses sustained in the event that
specific contingencies occur.

Lawrence v. Chicago Title

Insurance Company, 237 Cal. Rptr. 264, 266 (Cal. App. 1987).

Any

search a title insurance company makes is undertaken solely for
its own protection as indemnitor against losses covered by its
policy.

Horn v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 89 N.M.

709, 557 P.2d 206, 208 (1976).

This threshold distinction was

pointedly drawn in Tamburine v. Center Savings Ass'n, 583 S.W.2d
942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) as follows:
There is a vast difference in a situation
where a party employs an abstract company to
make a title investigation and a situation
where a party contracts a title insurance
company for a title policy insuring title.
The difference between abstract companies and
title insurance companies is well-defined.
It has been said that:
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"The former are concerned primarily
with the compilation of data,
affecting the title to particular
tracts of land, to enable an
examiner skilled in land law to
evaluate the title; while the
latter have evolved as corporate
insurance companies to guarantee
(with specified exceptions) the
status of such title and to insure
against existing defects which may
beset it." (citation omitted)
Title insurance is a contract of indemnity
(citations omitted). In the absence of some
special circumstances, the relationship
between the parties is limited to that of
indemnitor and indemnitee.
Id. at 947.
The only duty a title insurance company hat

to its

insured is to indemnify him against loss suffered by defects in
title pursuant to the terms of the title policy.

Mary Ellen

Sandlie Trust v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Company, 64 8
S.W. 2d 761, 762 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983).

The policy of title

insurance does not constitute a representation that defects in
title will not occur.

The insurer does not represent expressly

or impliedly that the title is as set forth in the policy; it
merely agrees that it will pay for any losses resulting from, or
it will cause the removal of, a cloud on the insured's title
within the policy provisions.

The title policy is not a summary

of the public records and the insurer is not supplying
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information.
indemnity.

To the contrary, it is giving a contract of
Lawrence v. Chicago Title Insurance Company, 237 Cal.

Rptr. at 266-67; Brown's Tie and Lumber v. Chicago Title Company
of Idaho, 764 P.2d at 426-427 (the Idaho Supreme Court noted that
it was a long-standing rule in Idaho that only abstractors of
title, not title insurers, could be found negligent);

Anderson

v. Title Insurance Company, 655 P.2d at 85-86; Arapahoe Land
Title, Inc. v. Contract Financing, Ltd., 472 P.2d 754, 756 (Colo.
App. 1970) ; Roscoe v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas, 105
N.M. 589, 734 P.2d 1272 (1987); Devlin v. Bowden, 97 N.M. 547,
641 P.2d 1094 (N.M. App. 1982); Securities Service, Ins. v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 20 Wash. App. 664, 583 P.2d 1217
(Wash. App. 1978); Horn v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation,
557 P.2d at 208.

See also, Edwards v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co.,

563 P.2d 979, 980 (Colo. App. 1977) (any liability of title
insurer to insured must rest on insurance contract).

No tort

cause of action exists against a title company for failure of the
company to discover defects in title prior to the issuance of the
title policy.

Stone v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 537

S.W. 2d 55, 65 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Prendergast v. Southern
Title Guarantee Company, Inc., 454 S.W. 2d 803, 807 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970).
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Tower cites certain cases that have painted title
insurance companies with the same broad liability brush as
abstractors of title.

The cases cited by Tower are either

distinguishable, outdated, inapposite, or miscited.

More

importantly, the adoption by this Court of their reasoning would
greatly expand the obligations of title insurers in Utah beyond
the most liberal reading of the agreements between the insurers
and their insureds.
In its attempt to persuade this Court to engraft
abstractor's liability onto a title insurance company's
contractual obligations under a title insurance policy, Tower
relies heavily on Heyd v. Chicago Title Insurance Company, 218
Neb. 296, 354 N.W. 2d 154 (1984).

The Heyd court in turn relied

upon the Kansas Supreme Court's analysis in Ford v. Guarantee
Abstract and Title Company, 220 Kan. 244, 553 P.2d 254 (1976) in
reaching its decision.

However, the Ford case is distinguishable

from the case at bar in that the title insurance company in Ford
held itself out to the public, and assumed the same duties, as an
abstractor of title.

Moreover, the title company disbursed

plaintiffs' monies to eliminate clouds on the title to the
property without taking adequate steps to ensure that the monies
would be correctly applied.

The Ford court held not so much that
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the title company was liable for its negligent failure to
discover defects in the title but that it was grossly negligent
in disbursing the purchasers' monies without obtaining clear
title.

Anderson v. Title Insurance Company, 103 Idaho 875, 655

P.2d 82, 84 (1982).

In short, the Heyd court imposed

abstractor's liability on a title insurer without understanding
the factual context in which the Kansas Supreme Court made its
determination.
Tower also relies upon the well-traveled case of
Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company, 48 Cal. App. 3d
917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975), for the proposition that title
insurers have the duty of an abstractor of title.

Jarchow was

superceded by White v. Western Title Insurance Company, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309 (1985).

White affirmed Jarchow's holding

that a title insurer has an abstractor's duty to search the
public records on behalf of a client.

However, the court in

White specifically noted that in 1982, the California Legislature
amended its Insurance Code to provide the following:
"Preliminary Report", "commitment", or
"binder" are reports furnished in connection
with an application for title insurance and
are offers to issue a title policy subject to
the state of exceptions set forth in the
reports and such other matters as may be
incorporated by reference therein. The
reports are not abstracts of title, nor are
any of the rights, duties or responsibilities
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applicable to the preparation and issuance of
an abstract of title applicable to the
issuance of any report. Any such report
shall not be construed as, nor constitute, a
representation as to, the condition of title
to real property, but shall constitute a
statement of the terms and conditions upon
which the issuer is willing to issue its
title policy, if such offer is accepted.
CAL. INS. CODE §12340.11 (West 1968, as amended).

The White

court, in applying Jarchow to the facts of the case, noted that
the commitment before the court was issued prior to the passage
of §12340.11 and that that section did not apply retroactively..
By passing §12340.11, the California Legislature squarely
rejected the court's holding and reasoning in Jarchow.
Subsequently, in a well-reasoned and thorough opinion*,,
the California Court of Appeals re-examined the concepts of tittllQB
insurer liability and abstractor's liability.

In Lawrence v.

Chicago Title Insurance Company, 237 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. App.
1987) , the court noted the White opinion as well as CAL. INS.
CODE §12340.11, and sharply criticized the California Supreme
Court's ruling in White:
Because a title insurance policy does not
constitute a representation of title, and
because a preliminary title report, as
opposed to an abstract of title, generally
constitutes no more than a statement of the
terms and conditions upon which the insurer
is willing to i^sue its title policy . . .,
liability for negligence based upon the
preliminary title report in addition to
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liability under the policy does not seem
supportable. Nevertheless, we are bound by
our Supreme Court's statement that liability
for negligence may arise from the preliminary
title report.
Id. at 268.

Of course, as discussed above, the Commitment

prepared by Lawyers Title was issued to Richards-Woodbury, not
Tower.

Further, it was a Commitment for title insurance —

title report.

not a

Finally, it is undisputed that, as of November 23,

1984, Lawyers Title correctly stated the condition of the title
in the Commitment issued to Richards-Woodbury.
Tower claims that the Washington Supreme Court has
recognized the duty of a title insurance company to use due care
in searching the public records prior to issuing title policies.
In fact, the Washington Supreme Court has refused to make a
determination either way on this issue, primarily because it
feels that " . . . the record is devoid of any evidence, factual
or empirical, of the practices, intentions, expectations or
consequences of adopting or rejecting the various theories of
liability or nonliability.

In absence of a full adversary review

of such evidence, caution is warranted when considering a
departure from long established precedent."

Transamerica Title

Insurance Company v. Johnson, 103 Wash. 2d 409, 693 P.2d 697, 700
(1985) (the long-established precedent referred to by the Court
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was that title insurers have no such duty)*

Sea also, Shotwell

v. Trans|iinerica Title Insurance Company, 91 Wash. 2d 161, 588
P,2d 208, 211 (1978),

In Securities Service, supra, the

Washington Court of Appeals seemingly rejected abstractor's
liability, preferring to uphold the terms of the contract.
Tower cites Williams v. Polqar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.
2d 149 (1974) in support of its argument to persuade this Court
to impose on title companies a duty to search the public records.
In fact, not only was Polgar an abstractor case, rather than a
title insurer case, but the court said "[I]t should be noted that
this action is premised on negligence in title search; an
abstractor is not converted into a title insurer by virtue of our
decision today.7''

Id. at 156.

Finally, Tower parades Moore v. Title Insurance Company
of Minnesota, 148 Ariz. 408, 714 P.2d 1303 (Ariz, App. 1985), as
one of its most persuasive arguments in attempting to convince
this Court to impose abstractor's liability on title insurers.
However, the Arizona Court of Appeals' dicta regarding this duty
is based upon the same shaky ground as Tower's other cited
precedent*

The Arizona Court of Appeals relied upon the Heyd

case as well as the Jarchow case.
fully ab,

For the reasons discussed more

those cases are either outdated or < ed flawed and
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patchwork reasoning in coming to their determinations.

The Moore

case is not helpful in this Court's determination of whether a
title insurer in Utah should be saddled with the duties of an
abstractor.

This is particularly true given that the case was

decided on the fact that the plaintiffs had not relied on the
preliminary title report in closing the transaction.
13 08.

Id. at

As such, the court's statements regarding abstractor's

liability were unnecessary to its determination.
Lawyers Title suggests that the analyses of the courts
in immediately-surrounding jurisdictions are sound and should be
followed by this Court.

For example, the Idaho Supreme Court

very recently faced this precise issue and determined that only
abstractors of title can be found negligent due to a flawed
search of the public record, and title insurers owe no duty to
their insureds to conduct a reasonable search of title before
issuing a policy.

This is true despite the fact that the Idaho

Insurance Code expressly compels the insurer to examine title
before issuing its commitment or policy.

Brown's Tie and Lumber

v. Chicago Title Company of Idaho, 764 P.2d 423, 427 (1988);
Anderson v. Title Insurance Company, 103 Idaho 875, 655 P.2d 82,
86 (1982).

- 40 -

It is also significant to note that in Utah, there are
separate statutory provisions and regulations for abstractors of
title and for title insurance companies.

UTAH CODE ANN. §1-1-1

et seq. (1953, as amended) sets forth an extensive scheme for the
regulation of title abstractors.

Separate and apart from the

regulation of abstractors of title is the regulation of title
insurance companies under the Utah Insurance Code.

Title

insurance is defined at UTAH CODE ANN. §31A-1-301(82) (1953, as
amended) as:
the insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying
of owners of real or personal property or the
holders of liens or encumbrances on that
property, or others interested in the
property against loss or damage suffered by
reason of liens or encumbrances upon, defects
in, or the unmarketability of the title to
the property, or invalidity or
unenforceability of any liens or encumbrances
on the property.
Other relevant provisions throughout the Utah Insurance
Code concern annual reports (§31A-23-313); authorized activities
(§31A-23-307) and underwriting rules (§31A-20-110).

In short,

the Utah State Legislature has determined that there is a
distinction between abstractors of title and title insurance
companies, a distinction which is at the heart of the rulings of
the Idaho, Washington, New Mexico, Colorado and California
Courts, as well as the California State Legislature.
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Sound

precedent and the differing principles of title insurance versus
abstracting compel the conclusion that title insurance companies
have no duty to search the public records for purposes of giving
a legal opinion with regard to the state of a proposed insured's
title.

The purpose of a title search by a title insurance

company is to determine whether it will insure title, not to
report defects of record therein.

Currently, title insurance

companies in Utah have no duty to search a title prior to issuing
a policy, and no such duty should be created.

This Court need

not suffer under the misconceptions of the California Supreme
Court in Jarchow.

Quite simply, the California Supreme Court

went too far.

C.

Even if the Court determines that Lawyers Title had a
duty to search the records for defects of title prior
to issuing the Tower Policy, there is no evidence in
the record that Tower relied upon the Tower Policy in
making its underwriting decision to fund its $750,000
loan to the developer.
Nowhere in its Brief does Tower discuss its reliance

upon the Commitment or the Tower Policy in making its
underwriting decision other than in its Statement of Facts (%% 24
and 25). There are no other citations to the record with regard
to any reliance on the part of Tower.

The citations to the

depositions of Jeffrey K. Woodbury, August F. Brand, and E. Earl
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Autenreith contain nothing more than self-serving and conclusory
statements.

In fact, none of these witnesses say anything from

which it could be inferred that they relied upon Lawyers Title to
abstract title or give a legal opinion as to its status.

If they

expected these services from Lawyers Title, why did they obtain
and rely upon a legal opinion from Gregory Seal?

On the other

hand, the extensive record before this Court shows an exceptional
nonchalance on the part of Tower in making its underwriting
decision.

As part of that nonchalance, there appeared to be no

review of either the Commitment or the Title Policy, let alone
any reliance thereon.
Tim Krueger, President of Lawyers Title's then local
agent, Richmond Title Company, testified in his deposition that
no one from Richards-Woodbury or Tower ever requested information
from him with regard to the existence of any liens on the insured
property, other than what was set out in the Commitment or the
Title Policy.

Deposition of Timothy Krueger, Volume II at 74 (R.

9623) . Jeffrey K. Woodbury, counsel for both Tower and RichardsWoodbury throughout the Tower Loan transaction process, admitted
in his deposition that he never reviewed the Tower Policy until
after the loan closed and funded, and he may not have even looked
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at the Tower Policy at that point.

Deposition of Jeffrey K.

Woodbury at 23-24.
In discussing his reliance on various documents during
the course of the Tower loan transaction, he stated that he
relied on the Tower Policy for insurance over mechanic's liens
that might be asserted against the property, and relied upon the
attorney's opinion he obtained from Gregory Seal with regard to
the state of the title of the insured property, particularly
because there might be some things that a title company may not
know that an attorney would.
Earl Authenreith at 93-94.

Id. at 14, 69-70.

Deposition of

He and Tower's Pennsylvania counsel,

Earl Authenreith, knew construction was ongoing prior to the
Tower Loan closing, and that such construction could give rise to
mechanic's liens, but their title insurance would pay them off.
Deposition of Jeffrey Woodbury at 73-74.

In retrospect, Woodbury

said that Gregory Seal's opinion letter should have recognized
the possibility of mechanic's liens arising from currently-unpaid
bills of materialmen on the project.

Deposition of Jeffrey

Woodbury at 160; Deposition of Earl Authenreith at 93.
Even if this Court adopts abstractor liability for
title insurance companies, Tower cannot successfully oppose a
Motion for Summary Judgment without citing disputed material
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facts on the issue of reliance.

In trying to persuade this Court

to adopt abstractor liability for title insurance companies,
Tower relies heavily upon Moore v. Title Insurance Company of
Minnesota, 148 Ariz. 408, 714 P.2d 1303 (Ariz. App. 1985).

While

the Arizona Court of Appeals spoke in dicta of abstractor
liability for title insurance companies, it ultimately held that
the defendant title insurer was not liable to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs' theory in the Moore case was similar to that of
Tower in this case, in that the plaintiffs claimed that had they
known of certain liens of record that the title insurer
negligently failed to reveal in the title policy, they would not
have entered the transaction at issue.

The Moore court

determined that in fact the plaintiffs did not rely upon the
title policy in making their determination of whether to enter
the transaction, and therefore any negligence on the part of the
title company was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs'
damages.

Id.

at 1307.

Similarly, in Groswird v. Hayne Investment, Inc., 184
Cal. Rptr. 123 (Cal. App. 1982), the California Court of Appeals,
still acting under Jarchow, determined that the title insurer was
not liable to the plaintiff for negligent misrepresentation in
the title policy because the plaintiff did not rely upon the
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title policy in making its transactional decision.

In so

holding, the court noted that it was necessary to show that the
title insurer's negligence contributed in some way to plaintiff's
injury, so that "but for" the defendant's negligence the injury
would not have been sustained.

If the harm would have occurred

anyway, whether the defendant was negligent or not, then the
defendant's negligence was not a cause in fact and could not be
the legal or proximate cause of that harm.

Id. at 126.

The

court went on to note that even if a title insurer's negligence
is a cause in fact of a plaintiff's damages, other causes can
supercede that cause, relieving the title insurer from liability.
Whether an intervening act is a superceding cause is usually a
question of fact; however, on undisputed facts, the question is
one of law.

Jd. at 127.

See also, Transamerica Title Ins. Co.

v. Johnson, 693 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1985); Shotwell v. Transamerica
Title Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 208 (Wash. 1978).
In the instant case, there are no facts in the record
to which Tower can point to show that they relied upon the Tower
Policy or the Commitment in making their determination to fund
the $750,000 loan, out of which they claim their damages stem.
Indeed, the undisputed facts show quite the opposite.

Tower's

local counsel testified that there were several material factors
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contributing to Tower's decision to close the Tower loan: (1)
there was a pending sale of the Project that would repay the
Tower Loan quickly; (2) First Security, the lienholder senior to
Tower, had title insurance covering potential mechanic's liens;
(3) Tower had Gregory Seal's opinion letter as to the state of
the title, which opinion had almost no exceptions in it; and (4)
First Security held a first lien trust deed which secured a loan
ten times the size of Tower's loan, and Tower believed First
Security would not allow mechanic's liens to interfere with their
first position.

Deposition of Jeffrey Woodbury at 45-47, 106-

107; Deposition of Gregory Seal at 100 (R. 9610); Deposition of
Earl Authenreith at 87. As discussed above, Tower only relied on
the Tower Policy to insure over mechanic's liens filed against
the Project, which it did.

Whether or not Lawyers Title was

negligent in searching the title prior to issuing the Tower
Policy is irrelevant, because Tower failed to rely upon anything
Lawyers Title did.
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D.

Even if Tower relied upon the Tower Policy, such
reliance was unjustifiable because Tower was well aware
of certain liens on the Project prior to the loan
closing.
As noted in the Statement of Facts above, Tower's

counsel was aware of at least one mechanic's lien against the
property prior to closing, as well as a lis pendens recorded
against the property.

Tower's local counsel, Jeffrey Woodbury,

and Tower's Pennsylvania counsel, Earl Authenreith, knew that
construction was ongoing on the Project prior to the loan
closing, and that such construction could give rise to mechanic's
liens.

Deposition of Jeffrey Woodbury at 73-74.

Notwithstanding

that knowledge, Tower decided to go ahead with the closing.
Tower felt comfortable that any liens recorded against the
Project, or that might arise in the future, would be covered by
the title policy they were purchasing from Lawyers Title. Id.
See also. Deposition of Earl Authenreith at 64-65.

This was a

reasonable expectation of their protection under the title
policy, and in fact Lawyers Title has litigated, and ultimately
paid over $1,1000,000 to obtain the release of, the liens that
were recorded against the Project.

Tower's claim that, had they

known of certain other liens that were recorded against the
property after the Commitment was issued and before the closing
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of their loan, they would have refused to close the loan, simply
is not supported by the undisputed evidence in the record and is
contrary to the testimony of Tower's own agents.

Therefore any

reliance by Tower on the Tower Policy as to the state of the
title of the Project was unjustified, in light of Tower's
knowledge of the true state of title.

E.

Even if Tower justifiably relied upon the Tower Policy
with regard to the state of the title of the Project,
any defects in the title were not the proximate cause
of Tower's loss under its loan.
Tower's damages were caused by the developer's default

on the IRB Loan, and First Security's subsequent foreclosure of
the IRB Trust Deed, not by any breach of duty by Lawyers Title
under the Tower Policy.

As noted in the Statement of Facts

above, the developer defaulted on its obligations under the IRB
and Tower loans.

Tower's security for its loan was a second lien

trust deed recorded against the Project.

When First Security

initiated its non-judicial foreclosure action on the Project,
Tower failed to take any steps to stop the foreclosure action, to
bid in at the sale of the Project during the foreclosure action,
or to in any other way protect its security interest in the
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Project.

First Security's foreclosure of the superior IRB Trust

Deed extinguished Tower's inferior second lien Trust Deed.
The possibility that Tower would suffer a loss due to
the foreclosure of the IRB Trust Deed was not a matter for which
coverage was provided to Tower under the Tower Policy.

To the

contrary, it was a risk the Policy specifically excluded from
coverage.

Any damages Tower has suffered were caused by the

developer's default on its loan obligation to Tower and First
Security's foreclosure action, which extinguished Tower's
security interest in the Project.
This very issue was faced by the Court in Schuman v.
Investors Title Ins. Co., 338 S.E.2d 611 (N.C. App. 1986). There,
the plaintiffs made a loan to "Roger Baker, Inc." to purchase a
tract of land.

The plaintiffs agreed that the deed of trust

securing repayment of the debt would be subordinate to a deed of
trust to secure a construction loan from the bank.

The deed was

inadvertently made to "Roger Baker" individually instead of the
corporation.

The corporation's attorney recorded this deed and a

deed of trust from the corporation to the plaintiffs' attorney as
trustee.

A few days later a deed from Roger Baker to the

corporation was recorded.

The deed of trust in favor of the

plaintiffs was not recorded a second time.
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The first deed of

trust securing the plaintiffs' loan was therefore outside the
chain of title.

The corporation then executed a deed of trust to

the bank to secure the construction loan.
defaulted, the bank foreclosed.

When the corporation

The foreclosure left no proceeds

for the plaintiffs, who were rendered in a second lien position.
The plaintiffs sued both attorneys and the title
insurer which issued a policy insuring that the corporation had
title and that plaintiffs7 deed of trust was a first lien.

The

court of appeals affirmed a directed verdict for the title
insurer because even "... if the record title had been as it was
insured to be the plaintiffs would be in the same position in
which they are.

They were not damaged because the record title

was not as it was insured to be."

Id. at 613. The cause of the

loss, i.e., foreclosure by the bank, was due to a matter
expressly excluded from coverage.

Id.

The cause of Tower's loss was First Security's
foreclosure of its first lien Trust Deed securing the IRB Loan.
This matter was expressly excluded from coverage under the Tower
Policy.

Tower is in the same position it would have been had

record title been as insured.

Tower has not suffered a loss

compensable under either the Policy or in tort.

See also,

Blackhawk Production Credit Ass'n v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 14 4
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Wis. 2d 68, 423 N.W. 2d 521, 525 (1987) (mortgagee must establish
its actual loss by proving that sufficient value existed in the
land upon which it held a security interest and that its value
was encumbered by the superior undisclosed lien).
Tower's local counsel (Jeffrey Woodbury) and
Pennsylvania counsel (Earl Authenreith) were aware of Tower's
risk in the event that First Security would initiate foreclosure
proceedings on its first lien Trust Deed:
Any other title problems or concerns? I
think I mentioned in my testimony yesterday
that I did have a discussion with Mr.
Authenreith regarding the nature of a second
lien in this case, wherein we discussed
generally the nature of a second lien in this
type of project and the necessity that the
only way for [Tower] to protect themselves,
other than obtaining the insurance protection
that we were obtaining and documenting the
way we were documenting was to be willing to
— the only other area of protection that
they needed was that they would be willing to
pay off the underlying encumbrance should the
underlying encumbrance feel a need to
foreclose at sometime in the future, and we
discussed that issue with him, but that was
the nature of the transaction — the risks of
the transaction, rather than any specific
problem.
Deposition of Jeffrey Woodbury at 155-56.
of Earl Authenreith at 21-22, 144-145.
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See also. Deposition

IV.

Tower's Third Amended Cross-claim Was Not Brought In Good
Faith And Is Meritless. Lawyers Title Is Therefore Entitled
To Its Costs And Reasonable Attorney's Fees Incurred In This
Litigation Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1953, As
Amended) And Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.
During the course of this extended litigation, Tower

has never brought an action against the three parties against
whom Tower would have strong factual and legal bases: RichardsWoodbury, the mortgage broker that persuaded Tower to loan
$750,000 to the developer, and Tower's own legal counsel, Jeffrey
Woodbury and Earl Authenreith.

August Brand, vice president and

manager of the commercial loan department of Richards-Woodbury,
and the person most familiar with the Tower Loan at RichardsWoodbury, testified in his deposition that in pitching the loan
to Tower, he provided Tower with a loan summary, including the
loan amount, the terms of the loan, the appraised value of the
Project, First Security's first mortgage and equity in their
loan, the financial statements and net worth of the borrowers,
pictures of the Project, and the fact that a potential sale of
the Project was in the making.

Deposition of August Brand at 14.

He told Tower that the loan was a good investment that he could
recommend without hesitation and that, as it was a second
mortgage, the interest rate at fourteen and one-half percent (14
1/2%) was an attractive return for Tower.
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Id. at 23.

Notwithstanding Richards-Woodbury's cheery representations as to
the investment, Tower has refused to bring a claim against them.
As discussed above, Tower relied entirely upon its
local counsel and Pennsylvania counsel, Jeffrey Woodbury and Earl
Authenreith, respectively, to either obtain an attorney's opinion
as to the state of title of the Project or to determine it for
themselves.

Notwithstanding that reliance, and notwithstanding

Tower's claim in their brief that had they known the state of
title at the time of the Tower Loan, they would not have made the
loan, Tower has not seen fit to sue either of their counsel.
On or about August 17, 1987, Tower filed its second
Amended Cross-claim, which for the first time asserted claims
against Lawyers Title.

This filing occurred almost two years

after the litigation had commenced.
On December 28, 1987, the Lower Court dismissed Tower's
seventh and eighth causes of action under its Second Amended
Cross-claim, which alleged fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation against Lawyers Title.
amend its Second Amended Cross-claim.

Tower than moved to

At the February 11, 1988

hearing on Tower's Motion to Amend, the Lower Court indicated
that it was persuaded that Tower did not have any cause of action
against Lawyers Title, as a matter of law.
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However, the Lower

Court noted the discovery was still ongoing in the litigation,
and he would allow Tower to amend its Second Amended Cross-claim
and utilize the remaining discovery period in an attempt to find
facts that might support the causes of action alleged in Tower's
proposed Third Amended Cross-claim,
Tower's Third Amended Cross-claim was substantially
identical to its Second Amended Cross-claim, with the addition of
a cause of action alleging breach of implied contractual
obligation of good faith and fair dealing.

Its so-called "breach

of contract" cause of action is substantially identical in its
wording to the misrepresentation allegations made against Lawyers
Title in Tower's Second Amended Cross-claim.

In fact, Tower's

seventh cause of action in its Third Amended Cross-claim is a
tortious misrepresentation claim in "breach of contract"
clothing.

Tower's negligent misrepresentation cause of action

under its Third Amended Cross-claim is identical to its negligent
misrepresentation cause of action in its Second Amended Crossclaim, which was dismissed on December 28, 1987.

In fact, at the

February 11, 1988 hearing on Tower's Motion to Amend, Tower's
counsel admitted the same.

It was meritless then, and it is

meritless now.
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Tower's cynical effort to skirt the Lower Court's
December 28, 1987 dismissal of Tower's claims in its Second
Amended Cross-claim against Lawyers Title must be recognized for
what it is.

There was no basis to its Third Amended Cross-claim

against Lawyers Title, it was brought without merit, and it was
clearly not brought in good faith.

In the seminal case on "bad

faith" attorney's fees in Utah, Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149
(Utah 1983), the court examined UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1953,
as amended), which provides for an award of attorney's fees to a
prevailing party in the event that an action was without merit
and not brought in good faith.

The court defined "without merit"

to mean either frivolous or having no basis in law or fact.
Because none of Tower's claims against Lawyers Title have any
basis in law or fact, Lawyers Title has satisfied the first prong
of §78-27-56.
The Cady court then determined that in order to
establish lack of good faith, a party must prove that one or more
of the following factors was lacking:
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the
lawsuit in question;
(2) no intent to take unconscionable
advantage of others; and
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(3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the
lawsuit in question will, hinder, delay or defraud
others.
While this prong of §78-27-56 is somewhat more intangible, it is
fulfilled by the evidence of Tower's advocacy in this litigation.
Tower refused to bring actions against the two or three
parties against whom Tower has factual and legal bases for
complaint, and instead brought suit against Lawyers Title to try
to obtain some sort of "nuisance" settlement.

In light of the

lack of merit to its claims, Tower had to lack an honest belief
in the propriety of its lawsuit, and knew that its lawsuit would
hinder or defraud Lawyers Title.

Accordingly, Lawyers Title has

satisfied the second prong of §78-27-56, and Lawyers Title is
entitled to its costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in
having to defend against Tower's Third Amended Cross-claim.

See,

Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151-152 (Utah 1983); see also,
Lutz, "Attorneys Fees In Bad Faith, Meritless Actions," 1984 UTAH
L. REV. 593.
Tower's Brief has failed to put any meat on the bones
of its Third Amended Cross-claim.

There are no citations to the

record to support Tower's claims of factual disputes with regard
to their claims of breach of contract, breach of implied
contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing, and
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negligent misrepresentation.

The case law cited in support of

their argument to support a cause of action of negligent
misrepresentation against title insurers in Utah is ill-reasoned,
outdated or inapposite.

Accordingly, Tower's appeal is

frivolous.
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Ut. App. 1987), is the
first Utah Appellate Court decision attempting to wrestle with
Rule 33(a) of either the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals or
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

The Eames court looked to

Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983), for some guidance and
then determined that in order to obtain attorney's fees and costs
on appeal pursuant to Rule 33(a), a party must show that the
appeal was frivolous as well as in bad faith.

Eames v. Eames,

735 P.2d at 397-398.
Subsequently, in O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Ut.
App. 1987), the same panel of the Utah Court of Appeals that sat
in Eames concluded that in Eames they had wrongfully required bad
faith before attorney's fees could be awarded.

The court

determined that bad faith was only required at the trial court
level, under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1953, as amended), and
that such a subjective standard was inappropriate for an
appellate court.

Accordingly, the Utah Court of Appeals
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determined in O'Brien that in order for a party to obtain
attorney's fees on appeal, it must only show that the appeal was
taken either frivolously or for delay.

The court went on to

state:
For purposes of Rule 33(a) of the Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals we define a
"frivolous appeal" as one having no
reasonable legal or factual basis as defined
in Rule 40(a) [of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals]. An appeal brought for delay is
one marked by dilatory conduct or conduct
designed to mislead the court and which
benefits only the appellant.
Id. at 310.
In light of Tower's procedural and substantive advocacy
in this litigation, Tower's appeal is frivolous, and Lawyers
Title is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant
to Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

CONCLUSION

Lawyers Title has breached neither an express nor
implied obligation under the Commitment or the Tower Policy.
Lawyers Title had neither a contractual nor common law duty to
abstract title or render a title opinion for Tower.

Lawyers

Title has made no representation either directly or indirectly to
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Tower which was false.

Tower did not rely, justifiably or

otherwise, on anything Lawyers Title did.
fulfilled all obligations to Tower.
suffered by Tower.
Title.

Lawyers Title has

No covered loss has been

No cause of action exists against Lawyers

Tower's appeal should be dismissed and the Lower Court's

Summary Judgment affirmed.

Lawyers Title is entitled to recover

its attorneys' fees and costs incurred on the Lower Court level
and on appeal, as well as its attorney's fees and costs incurred
in bringing this cross-appeal, from Tower.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 1989.

TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS

By
Jeffrey R. Oritt
FIGARI & DAVENPORT
Mark T. Davenport
Doug K. Butler
Attorneys for Respondent and CrossAppellant Lawyers Title Insurance
Corporation
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of June, 1989, I
hereby caused two true and correct copies of Respondent and
Cross-Appellant's Brief to be hand-delivered to the following
counsel of record:
John P. Ashton, Esq.
Brian S. King, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

and caused two true and correct copies of Respondent and CrossAppellant's Brief to be delivered by placing the same in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following counsel of
record:
John A. Kincaid, Jr., Esq.
John R. O'Keefe, Jr., Esq.
KINCAID & McGRATH, P.C.
2 Gateway Center, 19th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
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ADDENDUM A
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Jaujyers T^le Insurance Corporation
National Headquarters
Richmond. Virginia

C O M M I T M E N T FOR TITLE INSURANCE
SCHEDULE A

NOVEMBER 2 3 , 1984 88:00A.M.

Case hl9±±

ffective Oaie

'oficy or policies to be Issued:
Amount Sm

i)

D ALTA Owner's Policy—Form B-1970 (Rev. 10-17-70)
D ALTA Residential Title Insurance Policy—1979
roposed insured:

750,000.00/1191.00

Amount $

3) ALTA Loan Policy, 1970 (Rev. 10-17-70)
'roposed insured:

HARD3-W00DBURY MORTGAGE CORP.

Amount $.

:)
roposed injured:

itte to rESE SIMPLE
estate or interest in the land
(escribed or referred to in this Commitment is at the effeaive date hereof vested in:
LDMART MALL, A UTAH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

he land referred to in this Commitment is described as follows:

SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO

EXHIBIT NO-

Countersigned"

Commitment
3-208333
Schedule A—Page 1
Tht<

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
R I C H M O N D . VIRGINIA

SCHEDULE A - 4

g Q ntU

EXHIBIT "A" LEGAL DESCRIPTION

BEGINNING on the Northerly line of Sandy Parkway at a point which is North
0*02'25" East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Comer of
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and
running thence South S ^ S ? ^ " East 522.115 feet along said street to a point
on a 440.471 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc
distance of 361.372 feet (chord bears South 37#22,46,f East 351.322 feet; thence
continuing along said street South 12#57'35,f East 204.761 feet; thence North
72*05,59" East 108.000 feet; thence South 18#09'27" East 170.000 feet; thence
North 77•02l25l, East 263.450 feet to the Westerly line of the D. & R.G.W.
Rail-road right-of-way; thence North 08*03^l" West 859.000 feet along said
right-of-way; thence South 81#56f39,t West 30.000 feet; thence North 44 # 20 , 00 M
West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency with a 80.00 foot radius curve to the
righc; thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet (chord bears
North 22*40,00" West 59.073 feet); thence North 01#00'00M West 281.994 feet;
thence South 89*0r27" West 688.790 feet; thence South Q•28,46,, East 41.171
feet; thence North 8905O,46" West 11.724 feet to the proposed centerline
extended of Allen Street; thence South 208.519 feet to a point of tangency with
a 515.935 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc
distance of 270.506 feet; thence South S O ^ ^ S " West 25.000 feet to the Point
of BEGINNING.
Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways located on, over
and across the following described property:
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which
is North 198.544 feet land East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and
running thence North 77#02,25" East 100.00 feet; thence North 17 # 54 , 01 M West
143.611 feet; thence South 72#Q5f59" West 100.235 feet; thence South 18#09I27M
East 135.000 feet to the Point of BEGINNING.
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the aforedescribed property and
for the use of that property immediately abutting to the West.

Schedule_Al^
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National Headquarters
Richmond. Virginia
S C H E D U L E B — Section 1
Requirements
The following are the requirements
Item (a)

to be complied with:

Payment to or for the account of the grantors or mortgagors of the full consideration for the estate or interest

to be insured.
Item (b)

Proper instrument(s) creating the estate or interest to be insured must be executed and duly filed for record.

to-wit:

1.

Mortgage or Deed of Trust from Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership, to
secure your loan.

2.

Reconveyance of that Trust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as
Trustor to Richmond Title Company, as Trustee and S.B.K. Partnership and H.
Shirl Wright, as Beneficiary to secure $175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and
recorded June 28, 1984, in Book 5568, Page 2596, as Entry No. 3960987.
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded, July 18f 1984, in Book 5574, Page 1856, as
Entry No. 3969216.
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildmart Mall, a
Limited Partnership, to S.B.K., Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded
September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Book 5593 at Pae« 1977.

^7
7
(

This c o m m i t m e n t is invalid unless
the Insuring Provisions and Schedules A and 8 are attached
p.inn Mo 91 an (B

\\

Schedule 8-Section 1 Pnge 1-Commitment

NnBP~2Q8553

RICHMOND. VIRGINIA
SCHEDULE B-Section 2
Exceptions

The policy or policies to be hsued

w i l l contain exceptions to the following unless the same a r e disposed of to

the satisfaction of the C o m p a n y :
1.

Rights or claims of parties m possession not s h o w n by the public records.

2.

Easements, or claims at

easements, not shown b y the public records.

3 i ) Discrepancies, conflicts in b o u n d a r y lines, shortage in a r e a , encroachments, a n d ony facts which
o correct survey a n d inspection of the premises w o u l d disclose a n d which ore not shown by the

^

public records.
'T!] A n y lien, or right to 0 lien, for services, labor or m a t e r i a l

heretofore or hereafter furnished, i m -

posed by l a w a n d not shown by the public records.
^57}

Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first a p p e a r i n g in
the public records or attaching subsequent to the effective d a t e hereof but prior

to the date the

proposed insured acquires of record for v a l u e the estate or interest or m o r t g a g e thereon covered
by this C o m m i t m e n t .

^ ^_
^tr~
7.

-?

Taxes for the year 1984 are delinquent if they were not paid by November 30
1984 as to the following:
'
In the amount of $9,104.60 ^3 to Sidwell No* part of 21-36-377-004;
In the amount of $36.32 as to Sidwell No. part of 21-36-304-016;
In the amount of $7.75 as to Sidwell No. part of 21-36-304-017;'
and In the amount of $15.51 as to Sidwell No. part of 21-36-304-020
NOTE: Salt Lake County Treasurer
Telephone No. 535-7404.
Subject to an easement and right-of-way in favor of Utah Power and Light Company
for electric transmission and distribution facilities along a line described as
follows: Beginning 450 feet South and 760 feet West, more or less, from the
North Quarter Corner of Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; thence North 9 # 46 f West 660 feet, more or less, thence North
B*12* West 787 feet; the width of said easement is not disclosed. Contained in
that certain Easement dated July 1, 1980 and recorded November 13. 1980 in Book
'176 Page 1132 as Entry No. 3501386.

Exceptions numbererll

rhm

4

inri ,

are hereby omi»ted A s

tQ

^LTA

Loan

Policy

The O w n e r ' s Policy to be issued, if ony. shall coniom ihe following items in addition to the ones set forth above:
(1) The Deed of Trust, if any, required under Schedule B—Section 1, Item lb).
(2) U n p a t e n t e d mining claims; reservations or exceptions m patents or
thereof; w a t e r ngnts, claims or title to water.
i'3i A n y a n d all unoaid taxes, assessments and unredeemed lax sales.

in Acts authorizing

Schedule B—Section 2—Page 1—No.

issuance

R I C H M O N D . VIRGINIA
SCHEDULE J L z L _ . c o n t U

8.

Subject to a perpetual easement over the North 20 feet of Lots 5B and 6A in
favor of Salt Lake County, to bring any and all machinery and equipment upon
said property for the purpose of widening, extending, operating, maintaining,
y\ I
y
.repairing and keeping in satisfactory condition, a waterway in Salt Lake County
.v> 'Surveyor1 s Office, Midvale Storm Drain, as contained in that certain Easement
¥ / recorded March 15, 1966 in Book 2439, Page 407, said Easement affects the
v
Northerly line of that property described in Schedule MA,f hereof which is
vested in Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership.
9./ Subject to an Easement for Utilities, 14 feet in width along and immediately
/ adjoining easterly Sandy Parkway, a dedicated street, as reserved in the
dedication of said street.
10.
/%
/

11.

Trust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as Trustor to Richmond
Title Company, as Trustee and S.B.K. Partnership and H. Shirl Wright, a*s
Beneficiary to secure §175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and recorded June 28,
1984, in Book 5568, Page 2596, as Entry No. 3960987.
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded, July 18, 1984, in Book 5574, Page 1856, as
Entry No. 3969216.
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildmart Mall, a
Lixited Partnership, to S.B.K., Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded
September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Book 5593 at Page 1977.

Subject to all unrecorded leases and to the terms and conditions thereof.
Richmond Title Company is to be provided a copy of said leases prior to
closing.

12.

An Agreement dated July 10, 1984 by and between Buildmart Mall, a limited
partnership and Daw, Inc., Employees Pension and Profit Sharing Plan. Given to
v create a temporary easement for ingress and egress for the use and benefit of
V that property which lies to the North of and immediately adjoining subject
property described in Schedule "A" hereof. Said easement is 1 rod in width and
shall be located over and upon the Westerly portion of subject property. This
easement shall automatically terminate at such time zs a road is dedicated to
the public use or improvements are made to establish a road.

'7
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13.

Subject to right of way over the Westerly 25 feet of subject property described
in Schedule "A" hereof for the extension of Allen Street, being more
particularly described as follows. Said Extension is to be dedicated to the
public at a future date.
BEGIN on the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North
00 # 02 , 25 M East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Corner of
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and
running thence South 59 a 57 , 35" East 50.000 feet to a point of tangency with a
25.000 foot radius reverse curve to the right, thence along said curve for an
arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears North 14#57,35M West 35.355 feet) to a
point of tangency with a 540.935 foot radius curve to the left, thence along
said curve for an arc distance of 283.613 feet (chord bears North 15*01,12M
East 280.376 feet), thence North 225.312 feet to a point of tangency with a
25.000 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc
distance of 38.844 feet (chord bears North 4 4 # J 0 , 4 3 " East 35.053 feet), thence
/ South 89 # or27" West 38.201 feet, thence South 00a28,46H East 41.171 feet;
/
thence North 89*50'46" West 36.724 feet; thence South 208.587 feet to a point
/
of tangency with a 490.935 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said
curve for an arc distance of 257.398 feet (chord bears South 15°01,12M West
254.460 feet) to a point of tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the
right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears
South 75•02,25,, West 35.355 feet) to the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard,
thence South 59 # 57 , 35" East 50.000 feet along said Northerly line to the Point
of BEGINNING.

s>

14.

A non-exclusive Right of Way over the Easterly 30 feet and a Right of Way 30
feet in width, over and through the parking lot in the Southerly portion of
subject property, being* more particularly described as follows:
BEGIN on the Easterly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North
00*02,25H East 326.883 feet and East 1350.455 feet from the Northwest Corner of
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and
running thence North 72 # Q5 , 59" East 350.000 feet to a point of tangency with a
64.976 foot radius curve to the left, thence along said curve for an arc
distance of 90.900 feet (chord bears North 32*01,19M East 83.667 feet) to the
/ Westerly right of way line of the D.&R.G.W. Railroad, thence North 08*03,21M
f/vJ) West 517.185 feet along said right of way to a point of tangency with a 154.768
fW
foot radius curve to the left, thence along said curve for an arc distance of
Jr
97.993 feet (chord bears North 26°li,40M West 96.365 feet), thence North
44 # 20 , 00 M West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency with an 80.000 foot radius
curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet
(chord bears North 22 # 40 , 00" West 59.073 feet), thence North 01#00,00M West
257.017 feet to a point of tangency with a 55.000 foot radius curve to the
/
left, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 86.370 feet (chord bears
North 45°59l16,f West 77.765 feet), thence South 89a01,27M West 663.540 feet,
thence South 00*28'AO11 East 30.001 feet, thence North 89#01f27M East 663.801
feet to a point of tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to Che right,
thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.259 feet (chord bears South
45*59'17" East 35.348 feet), thence South 01°00,00M East 257.017 feet to a
point of tangency with a 110.000 foot radius curve Co Che left, thence
CONTINUED ON RIDER
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gQnt'd.

CONTINUED
along said curve for an arc distance of 83.194 feet (chord bears South
22*40,00" East 81.225 feet), thence South.44*20'00" East 234.704 feet to a
point of tangency with a 124.768 foot radius curve to the right, thence along
said curve for an arc distance of 78.999 feet (chord bears South 26#11,4011 East
77.686 feet), thence South 08 # 03 , 21 M East 517.185 feet to a point of tangency
with a 34.976 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an
arc distance of 48.931 feet (chord bears South 32*0i,18" West 45.037 feet),
thence South 72*05'59" West 347.407 feet to the Easterly line of Sandy
Boulevard, thence South 12*57f35" East 30.112 feet along said Easterly line to
the point of BEGINNING.

15.

A Right Of Way Easement 16 feet in width in favor of Mountain Fuel Supply
Company, a corporation of the State of Utah, it's successors and assigns, to
lay, maintain, operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace pipelines,
^
valves, valve boxes and other gas transaction and distribution facility through
l^.and across subject property described in Schedule "A" hereof along center lines
• V. as shown on the plat attached thereof.
• )
TOGETHER with all rights and privileges incident thereto, as recorded August
2*% 1984, Entry No. 3985384, Book 5585, as Page 599.
Corrective Easement dated September 11, 1984 and recorded October 23, 1984 in
Book 5600, Page 934 as Entry No. 4007245.

-?

16.

Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways on, over and
across the following described property:
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which
is North 198.544 feet~and East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and
running thence North 77*02,25,f East 100.00 feet; thence North 17*54f01H West
143.611 feet; thence South 72*05,59M West 100.235 feet; thence South 18*09,27M
East 135.000 feet to the Point of BEGINNING.
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the subject property and for
the use of that property immediately abutting to the West.

17.

Deed of Trust from Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership, as Trustor to
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., a National*Banking Association authorized
and doing business in the State of Utah, as Trustee and First Security Bank of
Utah, N.A., the Trustee on behalf of the holders of Sandy City, Utah Industrial
Development Bonds, Series 1984, under an Indenture of Trust dated as of July
15, 1984; First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as a letter of credit bank, as
Beneficiaries, to secure $7,750,000.00, dated September 25, 1984 and recorded
September 26, 1984 in Book 5593, Page 1940 as Entry No. 3997400.
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UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, appears as Debtor and First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as Trustee under an Indenture of Trust dated as of
July 15, 1984, appears as Secured Party, recorded September 26, 1984 in Book
5593, Page 1974 as Entry No. 3997401,

19•

Subjecc to terms, conditions and special assessments of the Special Improvement
District for the Southridge Industrial Development by and through Sandy City, a
Municipal corporation.

20.

Said property is located within the boundaries of Midvale City, Sandy City and
Sandy Suburban Improvement District and is subject to all assessments and
service charges levied thereunder.

Schedu}e__2__Page_
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Richmond. Virginia
C O M M I T M E N T FOR TITLE
LAWYERS

INSURANCE

TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, a Virginia corporation, herein called the Company, for valuable

consideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Schedule A. in favor of the
proposed Insured named in Schedule A. as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest covered hereby in the land
described or referred to in Schedule A. upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor all subject to the provisions
of Schedules A and B and to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof.
This Commitment shall be effective only w h e n the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the policy or
policies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the time of the issuance of this
Commitment or by subsequent endorsement.
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability and
obligations hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6) months after the effective date hereof or w h e n the policy or
policies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not the
fault of the Company. This Commitment shall not be valid or binding until countersigned by an authorized officer or agent.
IN W I T N E S S WHEREOF, the Company has caused tms commitment to oe signeo and sealed, to become valid w h e n
countersigned by an authonzed officer or agent of the Company, ail in accordance with its By-Laws. This Commitment is
effective as of the date shown in Schedule A as "Effective Date."
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
1.
2.

The t e r m "mortgage.** w h e n used herein, shall include deed of trust, trust deed, or other security instrument.
If the proposed Insured has or acquires actual knowledge of any defect. lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other
matter affecting the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment other than those shown in
Schedule B hereof, and shall fail to disclose such knowledge to the Company in writing, the Company shall be relieved
from liability for any loss or damage resulting from any act of reliance hereon to the extent the Company is prejudiced
by failure to so disclose such knowledge. If the proposed insured shall disclose such knowledge to the Company, or if
the Company otherwise acquires actual knowledge of any such defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other
matter, the Company at its option may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly, but such amendment shall
not relieve the Company from liability previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conditions and
Stipulations.

3.

Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be only to the named proposed Insured and such parties
included under the definition of Insured in the form of policy or policies committed for and only for actual loss
incurred in reliance hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements hereof, or (b) to eliminate
exceptions shown in Schedule 3. or(c) to acquire or create the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this
Commitment. In no event shall such liability exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for the policy or policies
committed for and such liability is subject to the insuring provisions and the Conditions and Stipulations and the
Exclusions from Coverage of the form of policy or policies committed for in favor of the proposed Insured which are
hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part of this Commitment except as expressly modified herein.

4.

Any action or actions or rights of action that the proposed Insured may have or may bring against the Company
arising out of the status of the title to the estate or interest or the status of the mortgage thereon covered by this
Commitment must be based on and are subject to the provisions of this Commitment.

Jaiuyers Tide Insurance (Jrporation
President
Attest:
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*

Secretary

ADDENDUM B

1325

ET^ST V T 2

SJ..—-

SJII Lake CI;)-. U:sh S-U 21

TRUST D K D

4063300

^TITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
THIS TRUST DEED, made this

.*!?]}. day of

;5r5v...

between

3UILIKAPT MnLL. a Utah l i s d t a d partnership
., u TRUSTOR,
Clan

whose address is . . . J ^ E a s c . S r o a c v ^ v ^ S u i t - 300,_SaU Late _Cit,.
I S u e * * ukd .Number)

RICHMOND TITLE

(Gt*>

()uui

3 Utah corporation. 2nd m such capacity herein uiil.-j TRUSTEE ar.d

RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORP . a Utah corporation, jnd m such car-.uy herjm c-'!sU
BENEFICIARY.
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE I \ TRUST. ~ITH
n

O^"EH OF SALE, the following described property, situated in—Sai£..L£t*3

Cou»-:y. S:a:e of TiaK:
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[: DEPOSITION ] ,
i
EXHIBIT 1

liSev,

—

T o c e i b * ' »»th »n bwiio.nei. fixture* ( w x l u d i n c bat * • * 'Waited ta heating, air c a a d m a a i a c f l u m b i n c . and t i r c t n t a l f i t t v m a a * rrwt^o«j»f).
and iinor«««rn«nu i h i r n * and »U *»at«r n t f l u . nchc* e i way. easement». rent*, i i w n , proltu. I K M M . teneramia k i ^ r t m a r d u . armiecc*. i W
appurtenance* ihereunta ^ * t o a p o { . a*** e r hereaiter esed «t cflieycd w i t h tatd prapertT. • * »«r P * « i i * j W . S U B J E C T H O W E V E R , ta ta« n c h c
p«wcr B A 4 i i a i M n t T berewaftax ftrrcn u aaW cdnteered oaaa E e a e f c u n ' ta c a l l e d * a 4 appir tvjca r t a u , tasaaa. 1 * * praOta;
FOR T H E P URP OS E O F SECURING

( I ) payw«aa • * th« iadebtcdnest «»»de«etd by » peaaataaarr aatt o i «*«« date k a r m a . Ui tkc ariacipaJ

«.„, •( j E T g T J ^ P R S D FIFTY THOUSMS) AND tTyiOQTKS
made br Truatar. payable ta the erder el Befteticiarr ec the u o «
anr eatentieaa a n d / e r renew»1» or a t e t j i c a u e n t t b c r e a l ; 12) (he
• ( such « « d u i e n « l leaat ar advmaccs »* h«r«a{ter B M T b« aiade ta
.^,> . g ( . . . . t S i t i h r » i r » . » w - ^ by this T r a x D e e d : » * ^ U l
M S * A I I A T U J 1 *.B u T ^treTM, u ^ r j i s r >nui m i M a t UMraaa *» herein

r^ _ 750.000.00 ,

tm l g
<n the meaner and «n«b latcrcac w d ether charges ea t h e m * «et farts, •••*
jcrfarmance e( eaeb tcreeaent 0/ T n n u r h e i r m n n t i i w d : ( J ) the P * T * » * M
Tm^iar. ar hts Mccrtaart t c u t f t t t . when evidenced be • aramucerr aata ar
»he p a m e s t a< ail N B I cxaeaded ar advaaee^ a« Seaef ^*anr —•<*» ar ?ar*
pravioeo.

TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED. TRUSTOR AGREES:

(•)
T a ca«amen<c canairaciiaw aea«wa«lT « a 4 ta P M U M %»»»« » u H restaaaUc
eilicaua^u M t u l a c t a r f ta Beaeftctftrr. « « •
(b)

JiU C n

ta ca«af«lrtiaa

ia are*#Uantc

*MJI

T a « I U « SeaaTtci&ry ta iaipeet u i 4 « r a r < r t 7 «< » n »'"»« d"»nn C c*«mrari:aa.

Trustee, uoaa pre*rftt»ti»n ta it »f an affI.U»«t «%c»«»«< Mr n«nr/Jc«»rf. ^tf«««c fac;r- f t n i «K«».*i c a J * f - M ! t •»* T - j « » ^ wmi»r iK.%
p a r a r r a p h . i t aathanuEd ta «cc*pt aa irae * • * * eaweiaMve * U f a a « a*»d t u i e m e m t i h r m a , ana ta aet tnerea«i KerranUer

APIM.««1 (£*m~-m*mm I -

EXHIBIT NO.

b

r'»i

r*»»r !»•«« •« - * » W «ati«.iaeter* ia ••**
i.ir>c<ar peemfHlr - h e n 4 « f . a m | t n , p e W i c t ef
•**** * • • " *• * * H '»» the Uencnctarv. •« w . „ ,
shall in ftp e«ent Ve retpansiplc far t h * i»f (»r.**<r •» < • " " • * snbttanee el aer ne4*cv ei insurance, ee far tin
- n r * er tefftcicncr «4
an* .n*«,aftce eemeany , * j * , , ^ , l # the insneenet herein pre**ded. (a event ef less. Tnrsie* thail gt»c immediate naticr I * Beneficiar* » « * mav
mate pre*/ ef let*. ,„«< w h .mmrance twmi-m* em*€ttn»4 is bereW i v l H t f t i f ^ $*4 directed te mak» peemcnt («., m n (aas directly (• Brarfw*ery
mstetd ei <• Trastee «*4 S e w * * , , , * i m n i K »nd »he interanee prercedt. «r any part i M i w f . may be applied bf Bcnci*c»ery. at its eptme te t e redwtttea el the Maechteencas aereay N m M «r ' • I I M resaeeetien ee repair ef the preaerty damaccd.
The Plenef.eiarw „ heree* M l w n t » a ta settle all i « w r » » ^ C ! M M « M 4 eeileet alt .atneence fends aceremc «• the benefit W i W T n
end/ce Beneficiary, and t« fecihtaie t a t c f r f U r t M * e i sach i a « K M c « . the Tranter heresy aethertaaa the BcacfMnery
ta
» < » and «eit»re alt a r t v a r r aad preen* p r e . l t e i less, eieama. werveea and all ether deeaasenta necessary far er naeidemel t« the
ei •**>• M w i t t t . end .1 necessary «• .avoteie sach preeeedinee » l i » w canity at may be necessary far the cmlcctana mt each . _
•a r « w « t all ' R w n n r f p m u ^ « M J I * m a t e n r D cemeeem«aa and/cr •ettlements aa na«r be a u m a d m u u i f r anal edniahia. **4 * M C n .
« a a i m • • U caah, «« ita awn mmmm M M A |« M «aaT^*><aci (a# T r w i a r . • » r «»^ ail atofta. eaweka. «r aalMr nmn
I N I M €*««« I M T r » w a r «r •«»• N » M t w f N *****
a# M i c h a a c f W ««« a # M » « n » a i « rfannharf t k a a a M t r t f wfciinajn far i
w a i i f i f M I * C T a4 n w r w t , • pmi**r a i iMnraiat* %tamri br aawafcarjtft««Mftc« emmrr. tat 5 « » ^ K i a r r ««il M tm»Uc^ la d i a r f « ana5 carflact a
l a i m n a i i a a Im far **cA mttwirmMa) m a« i w f a m wan ! • rae*«4
|
. t « e a w p w i a i t tli« QcwWtciarr fav addm—>ai d « n r « i aa>a5 ravaa^ a«vt^
M | » r m t n X H » I M < bv w c k I ^ M I I M W A . I M Mial fc« shait bacwua a art «4 I R I makbtcalMai 4 w fraan Traa
aajal f w w i l a u i W »»U
W i a i n K#rrt>r M t w r t »r iktt Oraal W Tnrat a»4 «*U M W i a i t • » • * aWaaa»4 ««* thv Bcftcfioar*. Fatlar* » M y aaaal ( « • « M H MamaM
thai! c*«»»tiia)t« a a W a a i i mmdtf tbra irrnn. Att M a w m t d p a U i o « W ia»«ranr« akait M • • mck aaaawwta. ui tmck (mm* a*4 ««it M i a n < a r «ajca)
a n f m c a j earr»«n at o u r M laajiHiM by aaiai as m»j M aatia/actarr ta) i W
B*r*i*€i*ry.
1
T a ddJ»rT ta. M V far a*aj M a i m a i a « M ) I S s W t c i a r y m*tl ihm %m4tbt*4*rm
atc«rc4 W r r V r b pan! ia> fail, mtk trUtmet W m k aa Baaaafatjarr aaaf rtm,***. I M M M | atMtraca a4 ( H i * a# Miweica ni u t U u n a r M a i aMa t« r a i a i i M thrrrta, $mf o u n M i a t . m w i n ar aapaiaiajwa,
4. T a appear ia w*W oWcnaJ awr aciM« ar sraccc^iaic avrpartiiif ta affcei th« a r r a n t r HcraW, I M tttlc w »a«4 p i a p u n . ar H M rit>t« ar
f~m
a i BanciKtarr a* T n m r r ; a«U ti^via' B«nc<iciar7 •< Trvatct elect t t aiaa i w i r w ar M<««ai M y taxh actwn ar arac«««uitv ta par ail
c a n * an4 a a t n m , i M i » 4 t * f e«M •< ruaiaaca a i uU« aaa1 t t t a m c r i ( t t t anal a uaaawaala taaa lajOMTH by Bcaaianarr mr T n m a a .
5. T a par a< Iratt 10 d a w arfact «Wlia>a«n*rr all l a act **4 asanaanefit* affectinc saia] araaartr. iaclaajinf all la—niwiaii mmmm «•««• raiw.
fa*«« itack tmd all ranrv a i f c w w r m t aaal c h a c f n (ar «a««r. afaartcaant ta ar aaaa ia cawaactiaa m d i aata* p r a a a r t i ; ta prr. «a«i« aac. all r*>
caaiarancca. e h a r t r u aaal itens * « a l a i c m t . an aaiai praparty mt aav part thercal, ^ a i c a at aay tiaat aaaaar ta ba pnar ar laaanar aarcta: aaal ta
pay ail casta, f e n . aaal c i p a m e * a i lata T m a c
fa additiaa ia the ment.nir paymanta aa ?ra-»»^c«d m taia* nate. the T n u t a r afreet ta par ta the Bencnctary at the ttroa mt each refa)ar tattalU
m m payment, "reserre" payments ia saca aaaaamt at are •ntimatta! froat time la tuaa ay Beneficiary ta be nervtsary ta aracr ta accamalat^
aecotary f««ndi ta par taaev l a r u a w u . «ao tataraace preintaait p n a r ta daa date* thereat, tnaj taia^ "reaerve" pavmran art herray p t r d t r d
ta the B r n a h n a r y at aediiwMai «arar«iy far the full nvrfarmaare ai this deed af t n m ana1 the na»c ^acarea* hcrrhr. TKa "reaar^r* pavaarata «a
accvfiwiaiea may INT » i i n d r a » * i*y the Brmrfinary far the payment mi taaea. a t v u r a a a t a . mr lataraace prcmnwa* aaa aa the prrraiacs, TV*
Brnriirtary m»* at *n+ lime, • w h e a t aataec, aaply taid "rracrve" naymenta ta lhe payment e i aar aaaia dae mmdtt the ttrmt mi thit deed mi
tnr»t and the natc tcc«r*d Heretry ar cither a( them Truster % faiiare t a par M i d "reserve* pertacms shall caaamete a aeiaait mn4tt this tnrst.
!a rase • / default and lebseaacnt sale e l the premrsca ia aexardaaec h c r r * « t h . mr if beneficiary sceptres the prapartT ataer»«se titer mrfaait.
B r a r i i r t a r r . at the time el the cammenctmcat a i sach pracecdtntA, mr t t the time the prepcrty it e t h e r i s e acaaircd, shall appff at a credit
aa the ladcbtednna secared hrrcay, the beiaace then remaining sccamalated aa "rcaerre"* payment*.
6. S h a « U Tntstar fail ta make aay payment mr i e 4m any act at herein pramded. then Beneficiary mr Treatee. bat wtheec ealic,attea sa ta
dm and wttheet natire ta er demand apan Tnutmr »m4 wxheat r d e a a i a f Traster frara aar eaiifatiea hereai. muy Make ar da the same in * e r h
manner and ta sec* extent as cither may deem necessary ta pretext the see a m y hereaf. 3en«{iciary mr Trastee beiaf sathartard ta cater eean said
property far sach parpeacs: cammencc. appear m and defend aay settee e r proceedtne, parpentnt; ta affect the sccunry hereai er (he rights mr
pawrrt of Beneiinsrr mr Trastee: pay. perehase. cantest. er cam premise any encamnranre. charge mr lien which ia tile ;adement mi either
a p p e t n te be prter ar •eoener hereta: and ia e s c m t i n f anr sarh papers, incur any liability, expend whatever t m a a n u ia its aasetete discretian
tt may deem necessary S e t t l o r , inciuatnf bat net limited, ta cast ei e n d e n r e e i Utic, cmnieyment e i ceeasci. aad payment ei hit rcasanaale fees.
7. T a pa* immcdiatfly tnd •|iha«< drmana 1 alt rams ctpenned hereander try Bencficiarr er Trastee, with interest frem date mt etpeneUtwre
at the rate
rcfMiymcni ihercaf thail l*c iceared hereay: and te pay alt Traateea aad Attac<
arrs fee* aa te the maa*m«ja am corns mt sach fees pcrmtiied ta be esecsecd ta Trasiar wader applicable law.

set tczzn i n trie Noce -nut pe»a. and iw

8. At Benefieiar»"% cntiea. the Tntstar )e«ntly aad severally a trees tm pay a "Tate ehanfe'" a i f i V ^ e r cent ( 5 % I *i the lata! ameant e i
the manthly mstaiUacnt repaired ta be paid by the abe«c descnaed Pramissary Nate and ihe alercsaid menthly " i t j e n e " pat menc. »nen
said a c ( r c ( a i e manihtv pavment it paid more than fifteen (-1$) ears after the dae date thefcai. ia caver the estra expense laverved ia hand i m e delinquent payments, Tnrstat s faslarc ta pay said "lata charts * thail ceaatitetc a def aait aadcr the trast,

IT IS MUTUALLY ACRCSO THAT:
f . Shaeld said preaerty mr aay part theraai Uc taken mr dsmaced by reaaaa e i aay paulic tmpra»ement mr caaacmwanaa prarredinc. mr
da ma red by fire, er carthaaakc, er ta any ether manner. Bencficiarr shall ba entitled, ta all cnmpcnaatian. awards, and ether payments er relief
therrfer. and shall be entitled at its aetata ta cammence. appear in aad presccate in t o mwn name, aay actsaa er acaceedinft, er ta make aay
car*premise ar settlement, ta cenaeruea w n h tach U k i a f mr damafc,
t a appfymc the praceeda ml aay awarei an accaant mt the indebtedimaa sccared hereav. Beneficiary shall tax entitled ta cntlrct.aat mi the
araceeds ef the a » « r d a premtam mm the aaaaaat prepatd at the same rate as thaacn the Traatar had erected at the taaa e i sach eeoltcatrea ei
areceeds te prepay the ladeateoneaa i a aecardance wsa> the terma ei the note secared hereay. a* if the Traatar then has an seen cieetiaa. at the
first raccced»n« date en which the Traatar eaaid sa elect. Alt sach canspensatraa, ewerea. damafea. n t h t a ei acxaaa, aad araceeds. i M l a d i n c
the praceeds el any peWtea e i fire ana1 ether insarskca affecuat; said preaerty. are hereay aamenea1 ta Beneficiary, a n a , after dedecttnf iherefmm
ail its expenses avciadinf atserncy s feet, axay elect ctthcr ta reieaae any maniea sa recessed by iC ar apply the sasaa an aay laaWatedncse aacarad
hereay. T r a i l e r s f , m > ta execata sach farther asaipitaeais a i any c w p a w i a i w , award, dansafxav anal n g h a a i actian anal aeaaeada aa Bene*
H o a r y mr Trastee m a r reaaira.
10. A t any time and frem time ta tune nnea written reaaest a i Ben eficiary. paymem e i ita fees aad presematsaa e i this Treat Deed and tha
nate far rndarsemant ( t a case e i f a i l reenneeyanca. far canceilatien a n d m e n u a a * . vitheet aifecttag the Uamiuy a i any pcrsea far the p e y
aarm a i the tnneatedneaa secared hereay. Traatee may (a> cansent ta t h e making, a i any map ar plat ai saad preaerty: ( b ) jean as frta<tn«
any easement mr creatine, aay r c s i m u n a thereen: ( e ) jmnt ia any ranaraaaattaa ar ether tfTcesnent aifecuaf Una Trast Deed er the hen er
charce t h e r e e i : (d> grant an extensaaa mr aaaaifkanan mt the terms e f Una treat deed apen written reaaest e i the beeefieiarr: <c) raeanvey.
smheat warranrr, «Q er aar part mi said aeanerty. T h e grantee in any recanreyanca may be described at *»he perma ar persana entitled therrta,
and the recitals theretn e i aay matters mr I e c u thail be cmaJaan* t r a t f af the trathfeJncaa ihereai. Traatar a^reas ta pay faasanaaae Traateea
fees far aay a i the servscni mcananad in thai naragraph.
U . Aa edditieaal s e t a m y . Traatar herebe aaxecne * • Beajcfkiary, darsag the cantmaenca ml these orasu. aB rears* tarwea, rayahiea, and
• r a i i t a e i the peaaeny aifected by that Tnrat Deed »m4 mi aay peraenal preaerty lecated therean. Until Traatar snail deiaait m the paynaent a i any
aad»aicd»w*f - v e i r d herrhe mr m the prrfarmam*e mi aay u n i a t w harraadar. Traatar ahail hawe the nana sa aaal cat aM each raata, heme*,
raralties. and pralita earwed pr»«c te delawlt aa they became dae aad peyeetc. If Traatar shall eefeeit aa aiaaamia. Tramar a right ta eeileet any
e i tach mantes shall cease ana! Beneficiary shall have the right, wnh er wttheet taking pesacaaicn af the praparty affected hereay, ta eeiiect and
retain all rentt. raya»*>«*. imaex, aad p r a i i u . Fatlara ee diacaattnaancc a f Beneficiary at aay tune mr frees tanc ta tiase ta catlect aay sach maaies
shell net in say manner affect the snasevnem cniertemeat by Beneiictary e i the n g h l . pawer, and aathanty ta eeileet use same, Nathing u n t a m e d
herein, nm* the cttrcise e i the n K h t by Beneficiary ta eeileet, shall be, e r ba n i u t . f i d te be. aa affirmeuan by Beneiictary mt any tenancy, lease er
• * . . _ . . „ . « . ^ . ^ . . ^ . ^ ., u , * * 4 * f — j ^ , ,««. .
i „.» . , . — a fSm llmm mr rherca af una Trant Dead In any sach tenancy, leant er eptsen.

12. Should the Trustor s e l l , transfer or oonvey any portion of the
Property, or any building or iaprovenient now or hereafter located thereon, or
any interest what-ever therein to any person, firm, or corporationf or should
the Trustor permit or suffer the occupancy of any portion of the Property by
anyone for a term in excess of forty (40) years, whether as a tenant or otherwise, without, in each instance having first obtained the prior written ^consent
of Beneficiary, or its successors and assigns, to such sale, transfer or" conveyance, then each such occurrence shall be deemed a default by Trustor, and the
entire indebtedness secured by this Trust Deed, at the option of Beneficiary,
shall beoortn* ijimeaiately due and payable, and thereupon, the Beneficiary may
demand immediate payment in full of said indebtedness and may exercise all legal
limits to collect said indebtedness, including but not limited to foreclosure of
this Trust Deed, Beneficiary's consent to such sale, transfer or conveyance
shall not b* unreasonably withheld and shall be given only if the following ccndiLiun;* am ua.-L u> Ucncliciuiy's satisfaction:

Co) The proposed purchaser of the Property satisfies Beneficiary's tr.en
ixistmg credit requirements for loans of the nature and amount of the lnzectsdness
ividenced by the aoove-described Note; and
(c) Beneficiary shall have approved the terms of the proposed sal-2,
:ransfer or conveyance of the Property to the proposed transferee.
:eneficiary hereby consents to allcw Trustor to transfer, sell and convey Limited
'artnersmp interests provided that the Borrower provides sufficient evidence and
issurances that said transfers, sales or conveyances are being made in accordance witn
:he laws of the State of titan and the United States of America, where applicable.
* * fo— " ^ ^ / i * 1 1 ^ J « « « * trrwwmdtr. IfcW.ci.cy mmy •! «»r ri»n« wiitmmt M t « c mk*r \m ^ v w . W • « ! * . «r W • Tr*n*+r »• br
^ w . ** • tmmn ITrwnm hti.tiiy C W W N « | t* iW i f ^ M M m W Be*«<M*t«rr „ ••«* m m t r | , M * ^mkmmt rrtnrd t« tttc U*mrn*cr •! t«*
md
hw
! ! I ! 2 ! T TLii
*}**4**,m
^ r ! • « • • • * e ~ ~ < I M «*W u h « p H i r a M W » H J ptvtwrtr M « « T ^ *er«W. .• ,M — - m , « , f«, «r
* T T c * " m * r , • . r t , , , * • ' " " ^ •«* *•'»"• »•*'•*»« i » ^ r t»tf .*«« »m4 «*t»*4. •«< •»»'* «W — « , Ic» c*«i ..W t . » r ~ n W • , - * . . . • •
« * c^icctM.. , * r . « 4 » ( m w u M t attorfirr, f*^ • ( « • . » y , MjcUe4j.ru wr«r*4 ferefcy. w * m wmtk «r*« M B e ^ K u r y ««y 4eterm*~
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15. Ti^a is of the ecsence hereof. All sums secured hereby shall LTTweciaiely
:«ccme cue and payaale at the option of Beneficiary upon the occurrence of any of the
IcLLcwL-^ events: (a) Trustor defaults in the payment of any
indebtedness secured
•.ereby or Ln the perfornance of any agreement hereunder; (b)-Trustor generally faiLs
:o pay i t s dents as they tecome <5XIQ, admits in writing its inability to pay its
5ebts, or makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors so that it causes a
"aterial impairment of the security; (c) Trustor caraences any case, proceeding, or
other action seeking reorconizaticn, arrangement, adjustment/liquidation, dissolu:icn, or composition of i t or i t s debts under any l2w relating to bankruptcv,
Lnsolvency/ reorganization, or relief of debtors, or seeking appointment of"a receiver,
irustee, custodian, or ocr.er similar o f f i c i a l for it or for all oc any substantial
:art of its property; (d) Trustor takas any action to authorize any of the actions
set forth in (b) or (c) above; or (e) any case, proceeding, or other action against
Trustor is cennienced seeking to have an order for relief entered against Trustor as
:ebtor, or seeking reorganization, arrangement, adjustment, liquidation, dissolution,
)r ccnpcsition of Trustor or i t s deots under any law relating to bankruptcy,
Insolvency, reorganization, or relief of debtors, or seeking appointment of a
receiver, trustee, custodian, or other similar official for i t or for all or any
substantial part of its property, and such case, proceeding, or other action either
results in the entry of an order for relief against Trustor which is not fully stayed
;ithin seven (7) business days after the entry thereof, or remains undismissed for a
Period of sixty (60) days. In the event of any such default. Beneficiary may execute
3r cause Trustor to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause the
Property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall cause such
KJtice to be recorded in each county wherein the Property or some part or parcel
ihereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the above!escribed tote and a i l documents e/idencing expenditures secured hereby.
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20. Trustor shall not, without the prior written consent of Beneficiary, create,
permit, or suffer to exist, and, at Trustor's expense, will defend the Property and
take such other action as is necessary to remove any lien, claim, charge, security
interest, or encumbrance in or to the Property, or any portion of the Property. No
secondary financing will be permitted except the pre-approved secondary financing and
unless the arount and terms of said intended financing is revealed prior to the
acceptance of this 7cu£t Deed and is approved in writing by Lender.
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*set forth in tha JiDte
TRUSTOR:
BUILDMART MALL, a Utan liroitea

partnership by i t s Generai Partner
BUILDMART MALL INC-U7AH, a Dtan ccrpcrat:
3y:

Steven P,

STATS OF

Ucryr/Pribiaant

UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

d a ^ ^ f t ^&L0*1
X K ^ y ^ ^ f , before me personally
On t h i s n-h
r__wn^ta%me t o be the Presicent of
appeared STEVEN P. QJ
be-^orpo^atrbn that executed tne witnin
BUILDMART MALL INC-O'
MALLf a limitea p a r t instrxaaent as Genera, to/tnetfsiafcsaiLpMART
x
w
^° ^3c^<=^ted tne within
n e r s h i ? / known to me es fte^I^,E? r^^
"instrument on behalf ^ f fine corporation tnecein namea, and
acknowleaged to me th%; sux^h corppratfon executed the witnin
instrument pursuant to ^/S^^tawSoOc^a resolution or i t s boar a
of d i r e c t o r s .
tarv ^Fuoixc resTaing
re^Taing at
Notary^Fuoixc
My Commission Expires:

^LC.

Utah

EXHIBIT "A"
BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION
Begin on the Northerly line of Sandy Parkway at a oomt wnicr.
is North 0°02,25'' East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from
the Northwest corner of Section lf Township 3 South, Range 1
West, Salt 'Lake Base and Meridian and running thence Soutn
59°57 , 35 H East 522.115 feet along said street: to a point on a
440.471 foot radius curve to the right, tnence along said curve
for an arc distance of 361.372 feet (cnord bears South 37 0 22 , 4o M
East 351.322 feet); thence continuing along said street Soutn
12057,35,f East 204.761 feet; thence North 72°05'59" East 108.000
feet; thence South 18°09'27" East 170.000 feet; thence North
77°02 , 25 n East 263.450 feet to the Westerly line of the D6RG;;
Railroad rignt-of-way; thence North O B ^ S ^ l " West 859.000 feet
along said right-of-way; thence South 81°56*39" West 30.000 feet;
thence North >44°20'GO" West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency
witn a 80.00 foot radius curve to the eight; thence along said
curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet (chora bears North
22 o 40 , 00 ,, West 59.073 feet); thence North 01 o Q0 , 0Q M West 281.994
feet; thence South 89°01'27H West 638.790 feet; thence South
0 o 23'46 M East 41.171 feet; thence Nortn 89°50'46" West 11.724
feet to the proposed centeriine extended of Allen Street; thence
South 208.519 feet to a point of tangency with a 515.935 foot
radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc
distance of 270.506 feet; thence South 30°02,25" West 25.000 feet
to tne point of beginning. Contains 19.751 acres, more or less.
Sub]ect to an easement for joint use of parking and driveways, on, over and across the following described property:
Begin at tne Southwesterly corner of said property and a
point which is Nortn 198.544 feet and East 1506.434 feet from the
Northwest corner of Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian and cunning thence North 77°02,25''
East 100.00 feet; thence North^ 17°54'01* West 143.611 teet;
thence South 72°05 , 59" West 100.235 feet; thence South 18 o 09 , 27 w
East 135.000 feet to the point of beginning.
Contains 0.320
acres, more or less.
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ADDENDUM C

jQuryers line insurance vurpuiauua
National Headquarters
Richmond, Virginia
Policy Number

82-00-472531
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B ANO THE PROVISIONS OF
THE CONDITIONS ANO STIPULATIONS HEREOF, LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, a Virginia corporation, herein
called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A. against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount
of insurance stated in Schedule A. and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the ^Company may become obligated to
pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of:
1.

Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein;

2.

Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title;

3.

Lack of a right of access to and from the land;

4.

Unmarketabihty of such title;

5.

The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate nr interest extent fn the »Yfgnj
that such invalidity or unenfnrr 0 * h , i ? t v

nr

claim thereof, arises out of the transaction evidenced by the insured mortgage

and is based upon (a) usury, or (b) any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law;
6.

The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage;

7.

Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or hereafter may gain priority over the lien of the
insured

mortgage, except

any

^Hrh

l?

»n

art<m

Q

frwm

*n

tmrrm,«m«n» * n

th#»

^^

contr^^d

for

and

commenced subsequent to Date of Policy not financed m whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness
secured by the insured mortgage which at Date of Policy the insured has advanced or is obligated to advance;
or
8.

The invalidity or unenforceability of any assignment shown in Schedule A. of the insured mortgage or the
failure of said assignment to vest title to the insured mortgage in the named insured assignee free and dear of
all liens.

IN WITNESS WHEREur ine v-ompany nas causea inis roiicy to oe signeu ana seaiea, to oe vena wnen ^cneouie A is countersigned
by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws.

Igiuyers Title InaujShce (prporatton
President

EXHIBIT NO.
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Policy 32 Utho m U S A
035-0-082 0006/1

RECEIVED SE? I 6 1885

Secretary.

eCGOU

Cover Sheet
ALTA loan Policy - 1970 (R«y 10-17-701 Cooyrigm 1969

LOAN POLICY

uyers Title Insurance Corporation
Schedule A
GATE Of POUCY

CASE NUMBER

MARCH 20 f 1985
810:50 A.M.

191-S

AMOUNT Of IMSUIUMCS

$ 750,000.00

POUCY NUMBER
THE POLiOr NUM8ER SHOWN k
ON THIS SCHEDULE MUST mi
AGREE WITH THE PREPRINTED W]
NUMBER ON THE COVER SHEET f

82-00-472531

ame of Insured:

:0WER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION

J>># •**•*» «v> tntmrm*t rmtmrrmd to harmin i* at Date of Poliev vnsted im
BUILD MART MALL. A UTAH LIMITED FAKXTCKSaUP

The estate or interest in the land described in this Schedule and which is encumbered by the insured mortgage \s:

FEE SIMPLE
The mortgage, herein referred to as the insured mortaaoe. and the assignments thereof, if any, are described as follows:

Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents from Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership, as
Trustor to Richmond Title, a Utah Corporation, as Trustee and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage
Corp., a Utah Corporation, as Beneficiary, to secure $750,000.00, dated March 13. 1985 and
recorded March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 757 as Entry No. 4063300.
Assigned to Tower Federal Savings and Loan Association by Assignment of Trast Deed, dated
March 13, 1985 and recorded March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 762 as Entry No. 4063301.
Security Agreement by and between Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership and
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., a Utah Corporation, dated March 13, 1985 and recorded
March 20, 1985, in Book 5638, Page 764 as Entry No. 4063302.
Assignment of Rents and Leases by and between Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership,
as Assignor and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., a Utah Corporation, as Assignee, dated
March 13t 1985 and recorded March 20; 1985 in Book 5638, Page 793 as Entry No. 4063305.
The land rmfemd to in this policy is described as follows:
SEE EXHIBIT "A" LEGAL DESCRIPTION
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RICHMOND TITLE COMPANY
/
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Policy 82 (Rev 2/79) Utho m U S A .
035-0-082-0500/1

This Policy ts invalid unless the cover
sheet and Schaduie 8 are attecned.

Issued sttLocation}

ALTA Loan Policy 1970 (Rav. 10-17-70) Cooyr*M 1969
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION
BEGINNING on the Northerly line of Sandy Parkway at a point which is North
0*02'25H East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Corner of
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and
running thence South 59 # 57 f 35 ,, East 522.115 feet along said street to a point
on a 440.471 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc
distance of 361.372 feet (chord bears South 37#22,46ff East 351.322 feet; thence
continuing along said street South 12*57'35" East 204.761 feet; thence North
72*05' 59" East 108.000 feet; thenca South 18#09t27ff East 170.000 feat; thance
North 77 # 02 f 25 tf East 263.450 faet to the Westerly line of the D. & R.G.W.
Rail-road right-of-way; thence North 08*03,21,f West 859.000 feet along said
right-of-way; thence South 8I # 56 f 39" West 30.000 feet; thence North 44 # 20 , 00"
West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency with a 80.00 foot radius curve to the
right; thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet (chord bears
North 22*40 f 00" West 59.073 feet); thence North 01•00,00f, West 281.994 feet;
thence South 890Ol,27,t West 688.790 feet; thence South 0 # 28 f 46" East 41.171
feet; thence North S ^ S O ^ " West 11.724 feet to the proposed centerline
extended of Allen Street; thence South 208.519 feet to a point of tangency with
a 515.935 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc
distance of 270.506 feet; thence South 30•02,25,, West 25.000 feet to the Point
of BEGINNING.
Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways located on, over
and across the following described property:
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which
is North 198.544 feet and East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and
running thence North 77 # 02 f 25" East 100.00 feet; thence North H ^ ' O l " West
143.611 feet; thence South 72 # 05 , 59" West 100.235 feet; thence South 18 # 09 , 27 M
East 135.000 feet to the Point af BEGINNING.
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the aforedescribed property and
for the use of that property immediately abutting to the West.
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82-00-4725

Schedules —Parti

This policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following*
1. Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records.
2. Easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public records.
3. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, and any facts which a correct survey and insoecuon.
of the premises would disclose and which are not shown by the public records.
4 Any hen. or right to a lien, for services, labor, or material heretofore or hereafter iumtshed. imposed by law and not shown by the
public records.

5.

Taxes for the year 1985 now accruing, not yet due and payable. 1984 Taxes were paid
as to the following 1984 Sidwell Noa. part of 21-36-377-004; part of 21-36-304-016;
part of 21-36-304-017 and part of 21-36-304-020•

6.

Subject to an easement and r i g h t - o f - w a y ' I n favor of Utah Power and Light Company for
e l e c t r i c transmission and d i s t r i b u t i o n f a c i l i t i e s along a l i n e described as f o l l o w s :
Beginning 450 f e e t South and 760 f e e t West;-more or l e s s , from the North Quarter
Corner of Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
thence North 9*46 f West 660 f e e t , more-or l e s s , thence North 8*12' West 787 f e e t ; the
width of said easement i s not d i s c l o s e d . ' Contained in that c e r t a i n Easement dated
J u l y 1, 1980 and recorded November 13, 1980 i n Book 5176 Page 1132 as Entry No.
3501386.

7.

Subject to a perpetual easement over the North 20 f e e t of Lots 5B and 6A i n favor of
S a l t Lake County, to bring any and a l l machinery and equipment upon said property for
the purpose of widening, extending, operating, maintaining, repairing and keeping i n
s a t i s f a c t o r y condition, a waterway in S a l t Lake County Surveyor 1 • O f f i c e , Midvale
Storm Drain, aa contained i n that certain Easement recorded March 15, 1966 in Book
2439, Page 407, said Easement a f f e c t s the Northerly l i n e of that property described
in'Schedala HAW hereof which i s vested i n Buildmart Mall,"a Limited Partnership.

8.

Subject to an Easement for U t i l i t i e s , 14 f e e t in width along and immediately
adjoining e a s t e r l y Sandy Parkway, a dedicated s t r e e t , as reserved in the dedication
of said s t r e e t .

Exceptions numbered

1-4

inrlnaiv*

are hereby omitted.

SCHEDULE B - PART II
In addition to the matters set forth in Part I of this Schedule, the title to the estate or interest in the land described or referred to
in Schedule A is subject to the following matters, if any be shown, but the Company insures that sucn matters are subordinate
to the lien or charge of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest:
SEE EXHIBIT W B" ATTACHED HERETO

OC0014
ALTA Loan Poiicv-1 970 (R«v 10-17-70) CapvnQto 1969

Iatuyere Tllle Insurance Corporation
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
RICHMOND. VIRGINIA

SCHEDULE_5li_contd.

Trust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as Trustor to Jlirh^qnA
Title Company, AS Trustee and S.B.K. Partnership and H. Shirl Wright, as
Brteticiary to secure $175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and recorded June 28,
1984, in Book 5568, Page 2596, as Entry Mo. 3960987.
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded, July 18, 1984, in Book 5574, Page 1856, as
Entry No. 3969216.
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildmart Mall, a
Limited Partnership, to S.B.K., Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded
September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Book 5593 at Page 1977.
Subordination Agreement dated Kerch, 1985, executed by S.B.K. Partnership, H.
Shirl Wright and Foothill Thrift and Loan, recorded March 20, 1985 in Book
5638, Page 804 as Entry No. 4063306.
Subject to all unrecorded leases and to the terms and conditions thereof.
An Agreement dated July 10, 1984 by and between Buildmart Mall, a limited
partnership and Daw, Inc., Employees Pension and Profit Sharing Plan. Given to
create a temporary easement for ingress and egress for the use and benefit of
that property which lies to the North of and immediately adjoining subject
property described in Schedule "A" hereof. Said easement is 1 rod in width and
shall be located over and upon the Westerly portion of subject property. This
easement shall automatically terminate at such time as a road is dedicated to
the public use or improvements are made to establish a road.
suoiecc co right of way over the Westerly 25 feet of subject property described
in Schedule MAM hereof for the extension of Allen Street, being more
particularly described as follows. Said Extension is to be dedicated to the
public at a future date.
BEGIN on the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North
00 # 02 , 25" East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Corner of
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and
running thence South 59*57 f 35" Kaat 50.000 feet to a point of tangency with a
25.000 foot radius reverse curve to the right, thence along said curve for an
arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears North 14 # 57 , 35" West 35.355 feet) to a
point of tangency with a 540.935 foot radius curve to the left, thence along
said curve for an arc distance of 283.613 feet (chord bears North 15*01f12"
East 280.376 feet), thence North 225.312 feet to a point of tangency with a
25.000 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc
distance of 38.844 feet (chord bears North 44°30 , 43 M East 35.053 feet), thence
South 89°01f27,f West 38.201 feet, thence South O O ^ ^ " East 41.171 feet;
thence North 89#50,46,f West 36.724 feet; thence South 208.587 feet to a point
of tangency with a 490.935 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said
curve for an arc distance of 257.398 feet (chord bears South 15*01f 12,f West
254.460 feet) to a point of tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the
right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears
South 75°02,25" West 35.355 feet) to the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard,
thence South 59 a 57 , 35" East 50.000 feet along said Northerly line to the Point
of BEGINNING.

OC0915
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A non-exclusive Right of Way over the Easterly 30 feet and a Right of Way 30
feet ill Width, over ana through the parking lot in the Southerly portion of
subject property, being more particularly described as follows:
BEGIN on the Easterly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North
OO^Ol'lS'9 East 326.883 feet and East 1350.455 feet from the Northwest Corner of
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range I West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and
running thence North 72*05*59" East 350.000 feet to a point of tangeney with a
64.976 foot radius curve to the left, thence along said curve for an arc
distance of 90.900 feet (chord bears North 32 # 01 , 19 M East 83.667 feet) to the
Westerly right of way line of the D.&R.G.W* Railroad, thence North 08*03 f 21 H
West 517.185 feet along said right of"way to a point of tangeney with a 154.768
foot radius curve to the left, thence"along said curve for an arc distance of
97.993 feet (chord bears North 26#ll,4Qfi West 96.365 feet), thence North
44°20 , 0Q" West 234.704 feet to a point of* tangeney with an 80.000 foot radius
curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet
(chord bears North 22°40 , 00" West 59.073 feet), thence North 01°00,00,f West
257.017 feet to a point of tangeney with a 55.000 foot radius curve to the
left, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 86.370 feet (chord bears
North 45*59' 16" West 77.765 feet), thence South SrOl'lV9
West 663.540 feet,
thence South 00*28 , 40" East 30.001 feet, thence North 89<,01l27,, East 663.801
feet to a point of tangeney with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the right,
thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.259 feet (chord bears South
45*59 f 17" East 35.348 feet), thence South 01*00f00" East 257.017 feet to a
point of tangeney with a 110.000 foot radius curve to the left, thence along
said curve for an arc distance of 83.194 feet (chord bears South 22*40,00,f East
81.225 feet), thence South 44*20'00" East 234.704 feet to a point of tangeney
with a 124.768 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an
arc distance of 78.999 feet (chord bears South 26*11,40" East 77.686 feet),
thence South OS^OS^l" East 517.185 feet to a point of tangeney with a 34.976
foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of
48.931 feet (chord bears South 32*01 f 18" West 45.037 feet), thence South
72*05*59" West 347.407 feet to the Easterly line of Sandy Boulevard, thence
*<mth 12 # 57 , 35 w East. 30*112. fx5*t„aloa^e«ii> «Mt*rl*ai««.Urthm point of f

jffr/gK^ ttrvjjr gg«^»nt» 16-feet^fn width in favor of Mountain Fuel Supply
Company ^'corporation of tfce State'of Utah, it's successors and assigns, to
lay, maintain, operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace pipelines,
valves, valve boxes and other gas transaction and distribution facility through
and across subject property described in Schedule "A11 hereof along center lines
as shown on the plat attached thereof.
TOGETHER with all rights and privileges incident thereto, as recorded August
27, 1984, Entry No. 3985384, Book 5585, as Page 599.
Corrective Easement dated September 11, 1984 and recorded October 23, 1984 in
Book 5600, Page 934 as Entry No. 4007245.
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Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways on, over and
across the following described property:
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which
is North 198.544 feet and East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and
running thence North 77*02 , 25" East 100.00 feet; thence North 17#54,01ff West
143.611 feet; thence South 72*05 , 59" West 100.235 feet; thence South 18#09,27,f
East 135.000 feet to the Point of BEGINNING.
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the subject property aad J*JLS
the use of that property immediately 'ibuttin* to tbim ¥•*£'.

16.

Deed of Trust
from Buildmart Mall, a UtaH Limited Fartnera&ip, as Traator to
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., a National Banking Association authorised
and doing business in the State of Utah, as Trustee and First Security Bank of
Utah, N.A., the Trustee on behalf of the holders of Sandy City, Utah Industrial
•n^^7^pma^f» ^ ^ 3 . Series l?flAl uqder an Indenture of Trust dated ^a of July
15, iQftAflFirqr S»*»uritv Bank of Utah, N.A.,/as a letter of credit bank, as
Beneficiaries, to secure */, /3U,UUU.U0, uatred September 25, 1984 and recorded
September 26, 1984 in Book 5593, Page 1940 as Entry No. 3997400.

17.

UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, appears as Debtor and First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as Trustee under an Indenture of Trust dated as of
July 15, 1984, appears as Secured Party, recorded September 26, 1984 in Book
5593, Page 1974 as Entry No. 3997401.

18.

UCC-1 Financing Statementjvherein Buildmart Mall, appears as Debtor and Young
Electric Sign Company, appears as Secured Party, filed October 3, 1985 as
-Filing No. 989327.

19.

UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, a Ut. Ltd. Part. (General
Partner Buildmart Mall Inc.), appears as Debtor and First Security Bank of
Utah, National Association, appears as Secured Partyt filed January 11, 1985 aa
?ilin» No. 0G1921-

20.

UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Builmart Mall, a Ut Ltd. Part., appears aa
Debtor and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., appears as Secured Party, recorded
March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 787 as Entry No. 4063303.

21.

UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, a Ut Ltd, Part., appears as
Debtor and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., appears as Secured Party, recorded
March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 790 as Entry No. 4063304.

22.

Subject to terms, conditions and special assessments of the Special Improvement
District for the Southridge Industrial Development by and through Sandy City, a
Municipal corporation.

23.

Said property is located within the boundaries of Midvale City, Sandy City and
Sandy Suburban Improvement District and is subject to all assessments and
service charges levied thereunder.
B-l
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SCH60UL6_JbL_cont'd.
Trust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as Trustor to Richmond
Title Company, AS Trustee and S.B.2C. Partnership and H. Shirl Wright, AS
Beneficiairy, to secure $175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and recorded June 28,
1984 in Book 5568, Page 2596 as Entry No, 396098.
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded July 18, 1984 in Book 5574, Page 1856 as
Entry No. 3969216.
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildtaart **11, a
Limited Partnership, to S.B.K. Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded
September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Book 5593 at Page 1977,
Subordination Agreement dated March, 1985 executed by S.B.K. Partnership, H*
Shril Wright and Foothill Thrift and Loan, recorded March 20, 1985 in Book
5638, Page 804 as Entry No. 4063306.
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4. Notice of Losa—Limitation of Acmn
In addition to the nonces required under paragraph Jib} of these Condi
tions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any ioss or damage for
which it is ctaimed the Company <s liable under this policy shall be
furnished to the Company within 90 days after such ioss or damage shall
have been determined and no right of action shall accrue to an insured
claimant until 30 days after such statement snail have bmen furnished.
Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage shall terminate any
liability of the Company under this poncy as to such loss or damage.
5. Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle for or m
the name of an insured claimant any claim insured against or to terminate
ail liaoiiity and obligations of the Ccmoany hereunder by paying or
tendering payment of the amount of insurance under this policy together
with any costs, attorneys fees and exoenses incurred up to the time of
such payment or tender of payment by the insured claimant and
authorized by the Comoany. in case loss or damage ts claimed under this
policy by an insured, the Company snail have the further option to
purchase such indebtedness for the amount owing thereon together with
ail costs, attorneys fees and expenses which the Company is obligated
hereunder to pay if the Company oilers to purchase said indebtedness as
herein provided, the owner of such indebtedness snail transfer and
assign said indeoteoness and the mortgage and any collateral securing
the same to the Company upon payment tnerefor as herein provided.
6. Determination and Payment of Loss
(a) The liability of the Company under this poiicyshail in no case exceed
the least of*
(t) the actual ioss of :he insured claimant: or
(ii) the amount of insurance stated m Schedule A or if aopltcaoie
the amount of insurance as dehnea m paragraph 2{a) hereof, or
(in) the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage
as determined under paragraph 3 hereof, at the time the loss or
damage insured against nereunder occurs, together with interest
thereon
(b| The Company will pay. in addition to anv loss insured against by this
policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation earned on by the
Comoany for sucn insured and ail costs, attorneys fees and expenses m
litigation carried on b\ sucn insured with the written authorization of the
Company
(ci When liability, has been dennitefy fixed m accordance witn the
cpnditions of this policy, the loss or damage shall be pavaoie witnm 20
days thereafter
7. limitation of Liability
No claim shall arise or be maintainable under this policy (a| if the
Company, after having received notice of an alleged defect, lien or
encumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or otherwise,
removes such defect, lien or encumbrance or establishes the title, or the
lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, within a reasonable time after
receipt of such notice: (b) in the event of litigation until there has been a
final determination by a court of competent turtsdiction. and disposition of
tit aooeais therefrom adverse to the tttte or to the lien of the insured
0*009*90. a* *t»u##d. i t provided tn per agraoft 3 Hereof, or to for liability
votumat* *f*urned fry entfieuredin ttuawtg erry ctwoi or *t#tt wttftout

**^Sfl*v*fcJGits^jfiatfn<*<i5iu**e*^^
jraursraar afforded hereunder exceptw die mmtwnt that fuch peymontar
feducetne amount of tfte indebtedness secured by tne ensured rnartoeojeu

insured mortgage shall terminate ail liability ot tne ugm»«ny VM.<rw% «provided m paragraph 2(a) hereof.
|b) The liaoiiity of the Comoany shall not be increased by additional
principal indebtedness created subsequent to Oate of Policy, except as to
amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured mortgage and
secured thereoy.
No payment shall be made without producing this poicv for
endorsement of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, m
which case proof of loss or destruction shall bo furnished to the
satisfaction of the Company.
9. Liability Noncumuiative
If the insured acquires title to the estate or interest in satisfaction of the
indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or any part thereof, it is
exoresslv understood that the amount of insurance under this policy shall
be reduced bv any amount the Comoany may pav under any policy insuring
a mortgage hereafter executed bv an insured which is a charge or lien on
the estate or interest descnoed or reierreH to m Schedule A, ^nd the
amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy
10. Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement
Whenever the Comoany snail have seated a daim under this policy, ail
right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act oi the
insured claimant, exceot that the owner of the tndeotednesa secured by
the insured mortgage" mey release or substitute the personal liability ot
any deotor or guarantor, or extend or otherwise modify the terms o*
payment, or release a portion of the estate or interest from the lien of thf
insured mortgage, or release any collateral security for the indeotedness
provided sucn act occurs prior to receipt by the insured of nonce of an
claim of title or interest adverse to the title to the estate or interest or tn
priority of the lien of the insured mortgage and does not result in any los
of priority of the lien of the insured mortgage. The Company snail o
subrogated to and be entitled to ail rights and remedies wrnch sue
insured claimant would have had against any person or property >
resoect to such claim nad this policy not oeen issued, and if requested C
the Comoany. such insured claimant snail transfer to the Comoany a
ngnts and remedies against any person or property necessary in order
perfect such ngnt of suorogation and shall permit the Comoany to use t.
name of such insured claimant tn any transaction or litigation mvoivir
such rights or remedies. If the payment does not cover the ioss of sue
insured claimant, the Company shail be subrogated to such rights ar
remedies in the proportion wnicn said payment bears to the amount of sa
loss, but such subrogation shail be <n subordination to the insun
mortgage. If loss of priority should resuit from any act of such msur»
claimant, such act shall not void this policy, but the Company, tn tn
event, shall be required to pay only that part of any losses insured agair
hereunder which snail exceed the amount, if any. lost to the Company
reason of the impairment of the right of subrogation.
11. Liability Limited to this Policy
This instrument together with ail endorsements and ot*
instruments, if any. attached hereto by the Company is the entire pou
and contract between the insured and the Company.
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence. a<
which arises out of the status of the lien of the insured mortgage or of f
tttte to (he estate or interest covered hereby or any action asserting sue
Claim, inail be rmmtnamd to ttm nrawiMin*,end condition*mnd ototilmuor
-liereym. or-ettartedrftereto signed by either tr
?r*ck*erflL* Vice ftemtoent. the Secretary, en AsatMtam Secretary.
m&dsttr% oncer of authorized **an*tory of the Camoanv.
12. Nodes*. Where Sent
..Att notices required to be given the Company and any statement
writing required to oe furnished the Company shall include the numc
3f this policy and shail be addressed to its Corporate Headquane
5630 West Broad Street. Richmond. Virginia 23230, Mailing adcire
3
0 Box 27567. Richmond. Virginia 23261.

lau *ers Title Insurance (orDoratton
National Headquarters
Richmond, Virginia

A

STEVE URRY

A

University of Utah.

Q

Did you graduate?

A

No.

Q

How many years did you attend?

A

Three and three quarters.

Q

Did you major in any particular subject?

A

Yes.

Q

And that was undergraduate?

A

Right.

Q

Do you have any post-graduate education of any kind?

A

No.

Q

Are you familiar, Mr. Urry, with a limited

Marketing and business.

partnership entitled Buildmart Mall?
A

Yes.

Q

How are you familiar with that?

A

It was a limited partnership that was formed to

build the Buildmart project.
Q

How were you involved in the limited project

Buildmart Mall?
A

I was a limited partner.

Q

Who were the general partners in the limited

partnership?
A

The general partnership was Buildmart Mall,

Incorporated.

And in that the officers were myself as

president; Gregory Seal, I believe, was vice-president; and

9

I think, that yoi i n lade ti : ,e choice to go with Shirl Wright &
Associates rather than Peterson Enterprises; is that what you
said?
A

T.\. - : : . - . : .

Q

Okay,

Mall, Inc.

"War: ;: at at oat that time that Buildmart

'Jr.ai. wus termed w

A

We.

^i*a tti:;t. cor.et.iire lati-r?

•... .:dmart Mall, Incorporated was formed by

myself, whica wab ta reserve the name f because we r.ad spent the
money to put z~-\tc*-:-*
that nature.

- • -:*-.:-.-. r

A;,a, primarily,

^:;

::

:. ... . -^incs of

t-- \.- : z z:

tr.e na~e and

that was why ::; *aa incorporated and registered.
Thereafter
Inc. gave permission

J M . pnoi

to c I o a m a r

^ai^dr^art Y?.1?.

to Buildmart Mall, Ii: •

'z.

: * ase the

name, and that's why that corporation was --•"-• -•-*•.*
formed t»»i t: •.

, zs

.osinq of tne loan foe the partnership

purposes,
Q

Okay . {J \ • t i * i <* i r a n J t \i e r oor i "C i u 11'jn called

B u i1dma r t Mall, In c, •
A

That's right,

Q

Was th. *

-

. :ati^;i

limited partnership B a i i c - a r t
A

A

JIUHJ

in any way i n tl le

Mall?

No.

Q
corporation

iiii

. ...edge, is Buildmart Ma21

T-~

:n J ; X G standing presently?
Uo,

ii'a nut.

21
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165
finalizing it, and so I had to go by their office and pick it
up.

I can't remember which document it was.

it was like a UCC-1 or something.

It seemed to me

It was something of that

nature.
Q

It wasn't an attorney's letter, opinion letter?

A

It could have been.

Q

Maybe I should backtrack a little bit and tell me

I can't remember, I'm sorry.

when you first learned of the Tower transaction and then step
through your involvement with it that way.
A

Okay.

Steve Urry and Shirl had contacted me. I

can't remember which one first*

They indicated they were

arranging financing for a loan in the approximate amount of
$750,000.
Q
BuildMart

Okay?
Now, I take it they were doing it on behalf of
—

A

Yes.

Q

—

A

Yes, as BuildMart. Whatever entity, BuildMart.

Q

Whatever BuildMart entity it was?

A

Yeah, not individually, and that the transaction was

partnership?

being put together at Richards^Woodbury.

As I recall, August

Brand was the one that had originated the transaction.
Q

August Brand?

A

Yes. He's their commercial guy over there.

Q

Of Richards-Woodbury?

166
A

Y e s . We issued a commitment up to Richards-

Woodbury, to them, and, you know, the transaction proceeded
Does that j ; u r : •. ..<; ^,ei;r:on?

along those lines.
Q

Y e s , part of i;.

m e , t i f," t nt

j I i

::. issuing the commitment, tell

wb>

f

V-, u get these affidavits and

indemnification agreements?

Is it at the couui titmei it stage or

is it at r. ;>. policy stage?
t

, • pri c T , usual ] y either at the closing or

just prior to t:;- closing.
Q

So

:*

A

Year -

6i

Liie

L ::: *.- --••

?ojrp timer ^

get them maybe a w^e:. <* L
If you know th»- <
executed so that

*'
.•

about at closing.
:" '•

|>li

•

m

^ : u r , v^- _

.es, J . .:•;'

-

I w - .. • ^^pediiei:

•.-.
-

* J.1

a. n:-^ n in advance cf the closing.

- ^
-

-

out ui.

time, * d< r. ': kri1 v% , ;• seemed

LUWL

s

have it
, : • worry

tr,* entire
~uc ,

At that

¥r

> ™e that t;.*. I *•

transaction, that one we signed a few days earlier, and the
reason tor thai

j. , J:

! recall, Stcvo T'liy was going out of

town the day that was supposed to tile.
mat

Right at or around

tune he war qoinq out of town.
Q

^ou i:icjneu it a Im-v, iLv - trail j^r thai i it was

supposed to close?
A

Yeah.

He provided it to t is.

Q

Do you recall what :a^ ^r, - .. , : .-

:.*-:*.*:.:•• : f s

TIM KRUEGER VOL. II

GREAT DEAL WITH THEM, AS I RECALL.

THERE WAS ONE INSTANCE

THAT, I THINK I SPOKE WITH A DIANE UP THERE, AND THAT WAS
BECAUSE WE WERE TRYING TO DO DIFFERENT CLOSINGS.

BUT WHETHER

IT WAS ON THIS ONE OR SOME OTHER, I CAN'T REMEMBER.
Q

YOUR RECOLLECTION, THOUGH, IS THAT THE PR, THE

COMMITMENTS REQUESTED BY SHIRL WRIGHT WERE FOR THE TOWER
LOAN?
A

IT COULD HAVE COME DIRECTLY FROM

RICHARDS-WOODBURY, BUT ULTIMATELY SHIRL WOULD HAVE DIRECTED
IT, IF IT BE THROUGH THEM OR WHOEVER, TO COME TO ME, BECAUSE
I WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO WAS FAMILIAR WITH THIS MASS OF LAND
THAT WAS OUT THERE AT THAT TIME.
Q

SO IS IT FAIR TO SAY THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN

RICHARDS-WOODBURY?

IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN SHIRL WRIGHT THAT

REQUESTED IT?
A

YES.

Q

WHEN YOU SAY YOU ARE THE ONE WHO WAS MOST

FAMILIAR, DO YOU MEAN THE PERSON AT GUARDIAN AT THIS POINT
WAS MOST FAMILIAR?
A

NO, I WAS WITH RICHMOND.

Q

I'M SORRY, RICHMOND?

A

YES.

I HAD WORKED WITH THIS PROJECT FOR A NUMBER

OF YEARS, AND OF ALL TITLE COMPANIES, I PROBABLY HAD THE BEST
OVERALL KNOWLEDGE OF WHERE THE PROJECT WAS, BOTH BUILDMART
AND SOUTH RIDGE.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.

10

TO ME OF SOMEONE'S INTENT TO FILE A LIEN, I WOULD PASS THIS
ALONG.
3

I

Q

4

I THEN?

AND THE SAME IS NOT NECESSARILY TRUE OF GREG SEAL
YOUR TESTIMONY IS YOU MIGHT HAVE CONTACTED STEVE URRY

OR SHIRL WRIGHT AS OPPOSED TO MR. SEAL?
A

GREG AND I WERE NOT IN A DAY-TO-DAY COMMUNICATION

WITH EACH OTHER.

IF GREG NEEDED SOME PARTICULAR INFORMATION,

HE WOULD CALL ME AND ASK ME FOR IT.

IF I KNEW THERE WAS

SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY A PROBLEM FOR HIM, I
10

I WOULD PROVIDE IT WITH HIM.

BUT BARRING THAT, YOU KNOW, THERE

11

WAS NO REQUEST TO.

12

OR SHIRL WRIGHT, AND MOSTLY IT WAS SHIRL WRIGHT.

13

Q

AND SO NORMALLY I DEALT WITH STEVE URRY

OTHER THAN THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE HAVE

14

TALKED ABOUT, DID JEFF WOODBURY EVER MAKE AN EXPRESSED

15

REQUEST TO YOU ALONG THE LINES, WE WANT TO KNOW OF THE

16

EXISTENCE OF EVERY LIEN ON THIS PROPERTY?

17

A

NOT THAT I EVER RECALL.

18

Q

DID ANYBODY ON BEHALF OF RICHARDS-WOODBURY OR

19

TOWER MAKE A SIMILAR REQUEST TO YOU ALONG THE LINES THAT WE

20

WANT TO BE ADVISED OF EVERY LIEN THAT'S ON THIS PROPERTY

21

BEFORE WE CLOSE?

22

A

NO, NOT THAT I RECALL.

23

Q

HAVE YOU EVER SEEN GREG SEAL'S ATTORNEY'S OPINION

24
25

LETTER?
A

I MAY HAVE.

I DON'T RECALL IT.

IF YOU WANT TO

EARL AUTHENREITH

1

this Buildmart loan was made in November of 1984.

The loan

2

actually closed in March of 1985, if that helps you in terms

3

of chronology.

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

In response to the pressure that you told us about

6

in this move toward commercial loans, was Tower making a

7

similar kind of commercial loan on a nationwide basis?

8
9

A

Not really.

It had been involved

Pittsburgh area, partipating

in some in the

but not originating

loans and

10

not keeping the whole loans themselves.

11

on ones that had been generated by Richards-Woodbury.

12
13

Q

Pretty much relied

Do you know how Richards-Woodbury came to be

selected as the Tower local person?

14

A

No, I don't.

15

Q

Who would know at Tower?

16

A

Well, I think Mr. Spagnola would know.

17

Q

We have talked in terms of commercial loans. And,

18

again, to kind of get some common vernacular, how would you

19

describe the Buildmart Mall loan we have here described as

20

variously as the Buildmart loan, second mortgage.

21

terms are you comfortable with to describe that loan?

What

22

A

That is difficult to put a name on it or a label

23

on it.

24

Q

I am having difficulty with it.

25

A

It was a second mortgage, second deed of trust,

1

but it was treated, I think, by Tower as a bridge loan to

2

temporarily complete or at least to complete a project so

3

that it could be marketed. And it was not considered by

4

Tower, to my recollection, to be a long-term arrangement.

5

If you can use bridge terms, bridge loan to that extent.

6

Q

7

ground.

8

loan?

9

A

Well, I guess,you make sure we are on the same
Can you describe for me what you mean by bridge

Normally, bridge loan would be a temporary loan,

10

just until another loan came along.

11

look at it.

12

here.

13

Q

That is the way I would

That isn't really the term you would apply

Where I am headed to try to get to a sense of

14

other types of similar loans that Tower was making, I don't

15

want to foreclose in my question certain things by asking

16

about bridge loans, second mortages, whatever.

17

understand my difficulty.

So, you can

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

What I need to know, if Tower at about this point

20

in time, '83, '84, was making other bridge loans, second

21

mortgages of this type.

22
23

A

I can tell you that.

No.

And, maybe that is what

you're looking at.

24

Q

Yes.

25

A

No, Tower was not in the habit of making second

1

mortgages or second positions.

2

position all the time.

3

Q

So,

4

A

It would be unusual.

5
6

It was normally in first

—
It would be an unusual loan.

Buildmart would be an unusual loan for them.
Q

Do I understand, then, that the Buildmart loan

7

would be an unusual loan for you to make,where, at the time

8

it was made

9

experience thereafter, did that signify a change in their

10

—

would it also have been unusual in your

policy?

11

A

No.

12

Q

All right.

13

situation?

14

ever made?

15

A

It was still an unusual situation.
To your knowledge, was it a unique

Was it the only second mortgage that they had

Commercial second mortgage.

I think that is the

16

only one they ever made. Residential, they might have been

17

involved in, but small residential.

18

been unusual, too.

19
20
21

Q

Do you know whether there was a reluctance?

A

Because of the risk, second mortgages have a far greater

risk position then

23

position.

2

^

You

have not said why that was not their policy.

22

24

But that would have

Q

a first deed of trust or first mortgage

You will have to forgive me as I go through.

will ask you a lot of questions that may seem silly.

I
The

1
2

risk to which you refer is as a result of what?
A

Well, see, in your second position you are

3

dependent on the pay of the first loan position.

4

there is a default, you always have to be in the position of

5

paying off the first loan, and a sizable loan with an

6

institution the size of Tower ,that jeopardizes your loan.

7

Q

And, if

Do you know why the decision was made to make the

8

Buildmart loan, given that it was apparently a departure

9

from what Tower had been doing?

10

A

Well, you know, these are underwriting things that

11

Spagnola would have discussed with the Board. My

12

recollection is that it was pictured as an almost completed

13

project that needed some more money to complete the project.

14

It was ready, marketable, and, fact,

15

available, and was goingtobea short-term position, and that

16

that money was to complete the project.

17

Q

the buyers were

Is your answer based upon just a general sense of

18

what was taking place, or did you ever specifically discuss

19

the reasons why Tower made the loan with Mr. Spagnola?

20

A

It's my sense of it, listening to his discussion

21

and discussion with the Board, as I told you, it was an

22

unusual loan; and also concerned at that time: Are we

23

looking at the complete project?

24

be marketed?

25

Q

Does it look like it will

Is there enough money to complete it?

How would a loan like the Buildmart loan have been

1
2

of the project.
Q

For your benefit, those have been referred to as

3

the complex fabricators' lien, and the Bill Gibson

4

litigation.

5
6

Other than those two items, did you have any
knowledge of any liens of record?

7

A

No, I did not.

8

Q

To your knowledge, did anyone at Tower know about

9

any liens of record prior to the closing?

10

A

Not to my knowledge.

11

Q

You have had experience with mechanic's lien

12

coverage or extended coverage title insurance.

13

of used those terms interchangeably.

14

comfortable with?

We have kind

Which one are you more

15

A

Mechanic's lien insurance.

16

Q

You have been familiar with mechanic's liens and

17

title insurance in the past.

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

It was obtained for the Tower loan for the

20

Buildmart loan in this case. Was it not?

21

Q

To the best of my knowledge, it was.

22

Q

Did you ever see the final title policy for the

23

Buildmart loan?

24

A

Yes, I believe I did.

25

Q

Did you review it with a specific purpose in mind?

1

A

To make sure that was covered.

2

Q

Were you satisfied that adequate coverage for a

3

I believe so.

mechanic's lien was in place when the loan closed?

4

A

I was satisfied.

5

Q

Based upon your review of that policy and your

6

understanding of mechanic's lien title insurance coverage,

7

would you have understood that policy to have been paid or

8

satisfied or otherwise taken care of any intervening liens

9

that had arisen?

10

A

Well, I didn't have anything to be concerned about

11

at that point as far as I was concerned.

12

talking about mechanic's liens in the future.

13

Q

We are really

Well, my question was, we have been dealing now

14

with these intervening liens, between the time of the

15

commitment and the time of the closing, that mechanic's

16

liens had been filed and made a matter of public record,

17

other than the two we have talked about?

18

A

We didn't know there were any.

19

Q

I understand.

20

A

As far as I was concerned, we are talking about

21

mechanic's liens in the future. We were near the middle of

22

construction, and work done is following the recording of

23

our second deed of trust.

24

work done following that is not paid.

25

Q

Well

—

I am concerned at that point that

1
2
3
4

A

Then the mechanic's lien insurance should be

applied, is what I was assuming was being done.
Q

That was your thought process at the same time

this loan was closed then?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Do I understand you to say that the mechanic's

7

lien title insurance coverage was obtained by Tower to pay

8

for future liens that might

9

A

Future.

10

Q

—

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

After the close of this loan?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

The question is sometime,let's assume there was a

15

lien filed.

16

A

that might occur in the future?

After the closing of the loan.

I have no reason to believe there was one.

17

no report that says there was.

18

say, don't record if there is one.

I have

In fact, the instructions

19

Q

I understand that.

20

A

Okay.

21

Q

I am not trying to belabor this.

I need to draw

22

this distinction for my benefit.

I, at least, think I do.

23

Using that example of the commitment being made in November,

24

let's say the painter files his lien that you don't know

25

about, had no reason to suspect, whatever.

On January 10th,

1
2
3

he files it, the lien for his painting; the loan closes
March 20th of 1985; mechanic's lien title insurance is
obtained at that time.
Even though you didn't know about that lien, and

4
5
6
7
8

even though you had no reason to suspect it was there, was
it your understanding that the insurance that you obtained
would have paid or covered that intervening painter's lien?
A

Not something that I would have anticipated in

this transaction occurring because I didn't know it existed,
9
But, mechanic's lien,you've got a title insurance coverage
10
which insures everything, being a second lien.
11
Q

It should have insured over that intervening

12
painter's lien I have described?
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

A

I should know that it's there.

Q

I understand.

A

That is what troubles me.

I don't know that it's

there.
Q

I understand.

Taking that aside, I am interested

in just the actual legal operation, your understanding of
that mechanic's lien title insurance policy.

20
A

I guess I would be looking at it a little

21
differently.
22
(Whereupon, a conference between the Witness
23
and his counsel was held off the record.)
24
A
25

I guess I misunderstood your question.

1

Q

That

2

A

Yes, I guess you're right.

3

—
I would understand

that to be covered.

4

Q

I don't mean to argue with you.

5

A

Okay.

6

Q

I just couldn't get it across.

7

A

All right.

8

Q

Are we in agreement?

9

A

All right.

10

Q

That type of intervening painter's lien would have

11

been satisfied or taken care of by the mechanic's lien title

12

insurance?

13

A

I would hope that Lawyers Title would do that.

14

Q

In the escrow instructions that I have talked to

15

you about earlier in that language to the title company, to

16

take all steps necessary, and I am paraphrasing that, to

17

make sure that the Tower deed of trust was in a second

18

position.

19

relates to that type of lien that I have described to you.

20

I want to talk now about that language as it

Let's assume in the context of that closing of

21

this loan, that the title company had been made aware of, or

22

updating its search, as you mentioned earlier, it had

23

discovered that intervening painter's lien that was filed in

24

January of 1985; and it had taken steps to satisfy that lien

*D

in one of the ways that you have also discussed, payment into or
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2 II m a d e , t h e r e ' s m e n t i o n of a sale to third p a r t y o r g r o u p
2 II

2 II

c

I think I r e m e m b e r t h e d i s c u s s i o n

from

Mr. Spagnola at the time the loan was being considered.
Q

4

6

A

—

Do you know the extent of Mr. Spagnola1s or

Tower's knowledge about that other sale?
||

7
8

A

No, I don't

Q

Do you know if that was a consideration in making

the Buildmart loan?

9

A

Probably was a factor.

10

Q

So far as you know, was Mr. Spagnola at Tower

-Q II aware of the equity involved in the Buildmart property at
^2 n
23 ||
24
15
16

the time?
A

Well, they had an appraisal, as I recall.

That

would establish your equity.
Q

Do you know if they were satisfied there was

sufficient equity to make the type of loan that was made?

17

A

I would think so.

18

Q

Were there any concrete, if you will, lending or

2g

underwriting criteria about percentage of loan to equity or

20

thinos of that nature?

22

A

There were underwriting guidelines established by

22

the institution for commercial loans.

23

details of them.

I can't recall the

I wasn't involved in drafting them.

24

Q

Underwriting guidelines?

25

Q

There was a document?

93
1

Q

Mr. Autenreith, I take it from your earlier

2

testimony that you believe that the attorney's opinion,

3

Mr. Seal's letter, should have been a source of information

4

about the existence of mechanic's liens on the property.

5

that correct?

6

A

That is correct.

7

Q

Can you show me where or relate to me where,

8

either in the document or the record or history of this

9

transaction where Mr. Seal was advised that he had a

10

responsibility to report the existence of mechanic's liens

11

on the Buildmart Mall property?

12

A

I can't find

—

13

advised to do that.

14

he is rendering his opinion.

Is

I can't tell you anywhere he was

I am assuming he is doing that because

15

Q

Your assumption is based upon what?

16

A

Traditionally, what lawyers do and what lawyers do

17

in real estate transactions like this.

18

letter of assurance.

19

Q

He is giving a

And the letter of assurance deals with many

20

different areas with respect to the loan and the property.

21

Does it not?

22

A

It does.

23

Q

Do I understand your testimony to be that with

24
25

respect to the mechanic's lien or the state of the title of
t

^e property, that you believe an attorney's assurance

94
1
2

letter should report the state of title to the lender?
A

I think it should state if there are mechanic's

3

liens that are unreported.

4

After all, he did go into detail on the two reported

5

potential problems.

6

detail.

7

I think it should report it.

Sof I am assuming he went into that

He couldn't reveal the rest of the problems.

Q

Were you aware at the time that there were other

8

matters of record that were being dealt with prior to the

9

closing of the loan?

Let me be more specific.

There was a

10

deed of trust that related to an SBK loan of a significant

11

amount of money, about $175,000.

12

A

That was being subordinated.

13

Q

Yes.

14

A

I do recall that.

15
16
17

That was in the report from

Lawyers.
Q

You were aware that the subordination process was

occurring prior to the closing?

18

A

19

situation.

20

Q

Not unusual, probably, in a land and equity

I guess I am interested in where the line is drawn

21

between things that are of record that you would have been

22

concerned about, and things that were of record that you

23

were not concerned about.

24
25

A

Can you speak to that?

I'm not concerned about

—

I wouldn't have been

concerned about an encumbrance or lien, whichever you choose

1

them.

2

Q

All right.

3

A

But that title companies furnish them.

4 [I

Q

In your testimony earlier today, well, I suppose

5

counsel and you have been referred to the preliminary

6

commitment in November of f84. In the interrogatory

7

responses, the same document is referred to as an abstract.

8

That is why I am asking these questions.

9

difference?

10
11
12

A

Do you see a

It could be an abstract of the record, showing the

existence of liens and encumbrances from that term.
Q

In your experience, are there similar or different

13

legal obligations on the part of an abstract company and a

14

title insurance company or agency with regard to an abstract

15

of title, on the one hand, and preliminary commitment on the

16

other?

17

A

Well, you know, I think a preliminary commitment

18

is a recitation of what is of record.

That information may

19

have come from an abstract company who will do the title

20

search and —

21

Q

Would you say it is a fair statement to say this

22

title insurance policy is not a commitment but a policy

23

that reflects the risks that the title insurance company is

24

willing to insure and those that it isn't?

25

statement?

Is that a fair

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

And that an abstract of title is prepared to

3 II reflect the state of title and history of the title?
4

A

Well, an abstract does reflect that, that is true.

5

Q

Is that the purpose of the abstract of title as

g
7

g
g

opposed to the commitment or title insurance policy?
A

To me, an abstract, as I said, is a chain of title

showing ownership.
Q

Now, is Tower or First Federal used

2o

interchangeably in answer to Interrogatory No. 16, which

22

related to the allegations made in Paragraph 7 of the third

22

amended cross-claim?

23

for you, if I may.

24

Maybe I should

—

let me read that

"LTIC breached their contractual obligation with

25

Tower in that they failed to exercise the requisite skill

2g

and care under the circumstances by failing to either find

27

and slash report on all of the claims and slash liens

28

against the real estate securing the Tower loan."

29

And then, the interrogatory states the factual

20

basis for those allegations in Tower's answer.

22

reflects that, in fact, there are liens of record, and that

22

the Buildmart loan closed in March of 1985.

23

of any specific liens or Utah notices of lien that were on

24

file as of the closing of that loan?

25

A

The answer

Are you aware

The only liens or whatever I was aware of were the

1
2

for Tower at the closing?
A

Well, he had been, you know, before that point.

3

Clearly, there is

4

local counsel

—

we had been acting as co-counsel and

had been advising me.

5

Q

Before the closing?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Jeff Woodbury acted as local counsel for Tower and

8

co-counsel with you?

9

A

Right.

10

Q

Now, was it your testimony earlier,

11

Mr. Autenreith, that you did see a copy of that March 13th

12

letter from Greg Seal to Jeff Woodbury, discussing the

13

complex fabrication, and the Bill Gibson letter?

14

A

Yes, I did see that letter.

15

Q

Prior or at the closing?

16

A

Prior to the closing, yes.

17

Q

I think your earlier testimony was that you

18

weren't involved in any decision by Tower with regard to

19

whether or not to bid in at foreclosure on the project.

20

A

I don't recall that, no, I don't.

21

Q

But, you testified earlier, I believe, that one of

22

the risks Tower had to look at in taking on this loan, there

23

was a large prior lien ahead.

24

A

Clearly, yes.

25

Q

Do you think, Mr. Autenreith, that Tower's loss or

1

claimed loss in this litigation was caused by something

2

other than the First Security Bank foreclosure on the

3

project?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

What do you think it was caused by?

6

A

By the existence, you know

—

I don't think we

7

would have made the loan had there been evidence of a

g

problem with the initial construction.

g

would have been involved in the loan.

10

Q

I don't think Tower

But, when Tower made the loan, Tower assumed the

H

risk of the senior lienor foreclosing on the property.

12

Right?

13

A

14
15

But, if it's a viable project, that probably

doesn't occur.
Q

At the time that Tower made the decision to get

16

involved, Tower reviewed an appraisal on the property.

17

Right?

18

A

19

Q

20
21
22
23

Yes.
Tower would assume the risk that the appraisal

value of the property could be down in succeeding years?
A

Right.

That is an underwriting decision I

wouldn't make, but that is true.
Q

So, if the senior lienor
—

—

I'm now talking in

24

the general sense

if the senior lienor foreclosed on a

25

property, and the appraised value would have gone down so

1

the junior

—

there was no equity left that would be a

2

risk that Tower as junior lienor would take?

3

A

It's possible.

4

Q

Going back to the procedure, again,

5

Mr. Autenreith, of the loan package offered by Richards-Woodbury 1

6

Tower, Spagnola reviewing it, going to the loan

7

committee

—

have I so far characterized it correctly?

8

A

So far.

9

Q

You are not involved at this point?

10

A

Normally, not, no.

11

Q

There is, I think you said, usually a preliminary

12

positive determination by the loan committee, and maybe

13

Mr. Spagnola visits the project?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

When do you become involved; after the loan

16

committee approves but before it is presented to the Board?

17

A

Sometimes it depends.

I can't tell you how this

18

one should be characterized.

19

approved preliminarily by the loan committee, and there may

20

be a time lapse between the next Board meeting, and Spagnola

21

would go and look at the project and go back and report to

22

the Board.

23

me

24

a preliminary Board meeting, and the Board authorizing him

25

to go out and look at the project and come back and

'

or

But, sometime it would be

And, in that interim, documents might be sent to

it could have been possible for him to report back to

JEFFREY WOODBURY

6
Q

In your practice, have you had occasion to represent

a company known as Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Company?
A

I have.

Q

And for how many years have you represented that

entity?
A

They've been a client of my firm since the

inception, and I would guess that I probably worked —

began

working on various projects of theirs when I began work for
the firm I'm a member of.
Q

Have you represented them in the lending area?

A

I have.

Q

And you personally, what capacity has —

what form

has that taken?
A

In the lending area only?

Q

Yes.

A

Usually in that instance, I would be contacted to

prepare loan documents after a commitment letter has already
been signed and prepared by borrowers between the borrowers
and lenders directly there, and I would then act as attorney
both for Richards-Woodbury and a lender in preparing the loan
documents and coordinating, usually with lender's counsel
those loan document modifications, changes, negotiations
throughout the transaction until the actual closing of the
transaction.
Q

You stated that your involvement generally commences

1

following the issuance of a commitment letter.

2

A

Generally that is the case, yes.

3

Q

On occasion, have you also participated in the

4

drafting of the commitment letters?

5 J

A

I have.

6 1

Q

To the best of your recollection, how many loans do

7

you believe you've participated in on behalf of

8

Richards-Woodbury.

9

A

Total since —

oh, I'd say —

10 I more than 50. I don't know.

Easily more than 50. I have no

11

way of quantifying that, really.

12

two or three a month, I'd guess.

13

Q

I don't know, easily

Probably I participate in

You stated that you represent Richards-Woodbury

14 | Mortgage and then a lender also. Can you explain how a lender
15

becomes involved with Richards-Woodbury?

16 J

A

17 j broker.

Well, Richards-Woodbury primarily acts as a mortgage
They will find a loan and then attempt to sell that

i

18

loan to a lender, whether it be a lender in Salt Lake City or

19

a lender outside Salt Lake City. And basically what they do

20

is they prepare a loan package that is submitted to that

21

lender, the lender will examine the loan and make a

22

determination whether or not they want to make that loan.

23
24
25 j

Q

Do you participate or have you participated in

preparing the loan package which is forwarded to the lender?
A

Generally I do not, and I have not ever done so.

8
Q

Are you familiar with what information is forwarded

with the loan package?
A

I could guess, but I don't know firsthand.

Q

Once you become involved in the transaction, you

stated that your involvement is in drafting the loan
documents; is that correct?
A

That's right.

Q

At that point in time, do you engage in a line of

communication with the borrower's counsel?
A
process —

Not at that point in time, I do not, usually.

The

do you want me to state the process?

Q

Yes.

A

That's not really in answer to your question, but

the process, usually as I've worked with Richards-Woodbury, is
Richards-Woodbury will ask me to prepare the documents to send
to lender's counsel, lender's counsel will then comment on the
documents usually first, and then they're usually supplied to
borrower's counsel at this point in time, and at that point in
time, I will start communicating with borrower's counsel.
Q

When you prepare your initial draft of the loan

documents, what information is available to you from
Richards-Woodbury to assist you in the drafting process?
A

It primarily comes in over a period of time. The

initial piece of information that I obtain is the commitment
letters themselves, only.

Now, when I say it comes in over a

1

period of time, surveys, title reports, things like that are

2

usually obtained over —

3

requires some modification to the documents after that point

4

in time.

5 !

Q

during the process. And sometimes it

Relying on the information set forth in the

6 j commitment letter, you are generally, then, able to begin
7
8

drafting your loan documents?
A

Pretty much then I will put together a draft of the

9 I documents from the commitment, yes.
10
11
12
13

Q

After lender's counsel has reviewed and commented on

the loan documents, what is then the next general step?
A

The next general step is the documents are corrected

as to how the lender feels they need to be corrected, if they

14 i need to be corrected and then they're provided to the
15

borrower.

The borrower, then, will determine who their

16

counsel will be and provide the documents to whoever their

17

counsel will be at that point in time. And then usually I

18

will receive a call from an attorney, you know, that would be

19

representing a borrower, and we would begin discussing the

20 j terms of the loan documents.

I've yet to be able to work with

21

an attorney that hasn't wanted to make some changes in the

22

documents.

23

Q

24

Mr. Woodbury, I'd like to direct your attention to

November and early December 1984. Do you recall becoming

25 I involved in a loan with Richards-Woodbury which was being

10
placed with Tower Federal Savings and Loan?
A

You mean the loan transaction in this case?

Q

Yes.

A

I'm not sure that it was that early.

Q

To the best of your recollection, when did you first

become involved
A

To the best of my recollection, it was sometime in

January that I actually became involved, but it may have been
—

it may have been the end of December.

I vaguely remember

—

usually at the end of the year, everybody wants to get

their loans closed by the end of the year. And I do remember
a Diane Derr from Richards-Woodbury contacting me about this
loan before the end of the year, but I don't recall receiving
the commitment that early.
Q

To the best of your recollection, was the first

document you received for the Tower loan the commitment
letter?
A
letters.

It seems to me that I received two commitment
The way Richards-Woodbury does a transaction, they

have a commitment letter from a lender to them and then
Richards-Woodbury actually makes the loan to the borrower. We
do that because of the odd doing business statute in the State
of Utah to avoid the lender doing business in the State of
Utah and have a sale of the loan at interstate commerce,
instead of that.

So I received two commitment letters and it

11
1 I seems to me that I received a copy of a title report at the
2

same time that I received that. That's what I recall.

3

(Off-the-record discussion)

4 I

(Whereupon, Exhibit No. A
was marked
for identification.)

5 |
6 I

Q

(BY MR. KINCAID)

Mr. Woodbury, I have here what has

7 I been marked as Exhibit A, which appears to be a commitment
8 J letter on Richards-Woodbury's letterhead dated December 12,
9 j 1984. It's addressed to Mr. Steven Urry.

I hand you a copy

10 J of this and ask if you recognize that document?
11

A

Well, without having looked in my file and

12

determining whether it's the same one, my guess is that this

13

is a copy of the commitment letter that I received in this

14 I loan transaction.
15
16
17
18

Q

Mr. Woodbury, do you recall when the first time was

you saw this letter?
A

It seems to me it was sometime in January after I

had been contacted by Diane Derr.

I received it —

she would

19 I have probably brought it to my office personally.
20 j
21
22

Q

Did you have any input into the drafting of this

commitment letter?
A

I did not. Let me clarify that a little bit.

I at

23

one point in time had input in drafting a form commitment

24

letter for Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation, although

25 I it's pretty significantly different than this commitment

14
A

Yes.

Q

At the time of this loan transaction, was he counsel

to the borrower?
A

To my knowledge, he was, yes.

He represented he

Q

And did you have discussions with Mr. Seal in

was.

relation to the drafting of the loan documents generally?
A

I did.

Q

Did you have any specific discussions with Mr. Seal

regarding the requirement that he issue an opinion letter
which included an opinion that the mortgage or deed of trust
issued to Tower Federal Savings and Loan to secure this loan
would be a valid second lien?
A

I didn't ever speak with him specifically regarding

a valid second lien to the best of my recollection.

I did, on

various occasions, tell him that I needed an opinion letter
from him that conformed with the paragraph in the construction
loan or in the loan agreement, it wasn't a construction, loan
agreement, in the loan agreement which contained paragraph C.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. B
was marked
for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. KINCAID)

to a loan agreement.

Mr. Woodbury, you make reference

I have here what has been marked as

Exhibit B, a copy of a loan agreement between
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation and Buildmart Mall,
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Q

1
2

Do you recall approximately when you were provided

with them?

3

A

It seems to me that I was provided a report that was

4

dated before the transaction.

5

or late November or early December, I can't remember the date

It seems to me it was November

6 ! of that report, but I was provided a report and it seems to me
7

that I was supplied that by Diane Derr at the time I received

8

the commitment letters.

9

I asked for an update of that report, but I was verbally told

10

that everybody remained in the same condition and relied upon

11

that report in delivering my escrow instructions.

I did not obtain an update, although

12

Q

Whom did you ask for a follow-up report?

13

A

Probably both from Diane Derr and I talked to the

14

person at the title company.

15

Gregory Seal's deposition the name of Tim Krueger.

16

can't remember if I talked to a Tim Krueger or not.

17

talk to a male at the title company regarding the title

18

report.

19
20

Q

I heard a name mentioned last —
I honestly
But I did

Do you recall reviewing the policy of title

insurance, the final policy?

21

A

I did.

22

Q

Do you recall approximately when that would have

A

It was sometime after the transaction.

23
24
25

been?
I don't

remember exactly when, but it was after the transaction had
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closed and been funded.
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. D
was marked
for identification.)
THE WITNESS:
—

Let me say one thing in that I don't

as I think about that last answer —
(Off-the-record discussion)
THE WITNESS:

Let me just clarify that last answer.

I don't specifically remember looking at the title policy
after I received it.

I think that I did though, I usually do

on loan transactions and that's the reason why I answered
affirmatively that I had seen the title policy after the fact.
Q

(BY MR. KINCAID)

Mr. Woodbury, I have what has been

marked as Exhibit D, which is a preliminary title report dated
November 23, 1984.

I'll hand you a copy of this and ask you

if you have seen this?
A

I don't think I've seen the one with all of these

pen marks on it, but I've seen one that is similar to this in
my file.

It is similar to the one I received without the pen

markings on it.
Q

Would this have been the only preliminary report you

received prior to the March loan closing?
A

Written report, yes.

Q

Were there verbal reports?

A

Verbally, I talked to the title company at least on

two occasions.
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you have occasion to secure an opinion letter similar to the
one that's at issue in this case?
A

Grant Square, I did.

University Mall, I was —

our

firm was the attorney giving the opinion letter#
Q

Who was borrower's counsel for the Grant Square

project?
A

It fluctuated in Grant Square, but at the time it

was an attorney by the name of Scott King.
Q

Is he local?

A

Yes.

Q

Who ultimately issued the opinion letter?

A

He did.

Q

How would you compare the opinion letter in the

Grant Square matter to the one that Gregory Seal authored in
this case with respect to the substance of the language on
lien priority?
A

Well, I think he did make an opinion as to lien

priority, but he would —

he put in exceptions that were

ultimately approved by lender's counsel. First exception
being that he indicated that he was relying only on the title
company's report of title.

In addition, he made an exception

with respect to the law, the title law in Utah, and made some
specific representations with respect to subordination
agreements and their enforceability and those type of things.
Generally, there's a number of other exceptions that
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I see in lender's opinion letters with respect to bankruptcy,
with respect to laws of equity.

I mean, it's been my

experience that they give you an opinion and they take it
completely away and you have to fight tooth and nail to get,
you know, any substance back into the opinion.

In this case,

there was none of that, though,. Mr. Seal left —

did not

provide any exceptions. There are very few exceptions.
Q

When you received the first draft of Mr. Seal's

opinion in this case and you didn't see some of those
exceptiona that you customarily did, did you talk to him about
that?
A

No.

Q

Did it occur to you that those things were missing?

A

Did it occur to me?

Yes, I realized that they were

missing.
Q

What did you do about it, if anything?

A

Nothing.

Q

Why not?

A

Because the opinion provided what we needed to have

done.

In hindsight, maybe now I'd wish —

wish a more

knowledgeable opinion to come in with exceptions, in
hindsight, but at the time, I didn't feel that —

I mean, it

said exactly what I wanted it to say, so I didn't feel a need
for —

to educate him, because we were adversaries in the

transaction is the way I looked at it.
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Q

Why do you characterize yourself as adversaries in

A

That's probably an overcharacterization, poor choice

that?

of words, but I felt that he was representing his client.

He

had represented to me several times that he had been working
with this project for a long period of time and he understood
clearly the various business aspects and everything involved
with this project, as well as, you know, representing to me
that this was just going to be a real quick loan, because they
had a contract that was going to, you know, purchase the
property and pay off all the loans. He made a number of
representations like that. And he indicated to me he was
quite experienced and that he'd been working with the
contract, so I felt that maybe he didn't have some of these
other concerns that you see in a lot of other opinion letters.
See, I'm going a little too far, but there's two
different types of situations. You feel as an attorney, at
least myself personally, if you've been working with a project
19 | since its inception, it's a lot easier to give an opinion than
if somebody has just come in to you to hire you to give an
opinion on a transaction —

on a transaction that hasn't —

that you, you know, you haven't been involved in. And even
though you do a lot of leg work, you go to the planning
commission, go to all the various places to gather the
information for the opinion letter, you still feel a certain
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A

Yes, I did.

Q

The —
MR. KAY:

Are we talking about "You are instructed

to take all —
THE WITNESS:

That's what I understand.

Is that the

fourth paragraph?
Q

(BY MR. DRAKE)

I'm referring to the paragraph that

starts "You are instructed."
A

Right.

Q

And I'd like to refer you to the concluding language

of that sentence, "that the trust deed described in paragraph
No. 1."

By that you refer to paragraph No. 1 of your letter,

do you not, Exhibit E?
A

I think that's consistent.

Q

And you say, is second lien position behind the

exception set forth as paragraph 17. Do you see that
language?
A

Right.

Q

What do you mean by the language, "is in second lien

position"?
A

I mean that our trust deed is second only to the

exception set forth in the title policy in paragraph 17.
Q

In paragraph 17 of the title policy described

A

Well, not the title policy.

—

Let me clarify that.

The preliminary title report or whatever the term is to be
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used.
Q

I don't mean to mislead you, I believe we're talking

about the same PR to which we've referred many times?
A

Whatever the term is.

Q

Good enough.

But in any event, paragraph 17 refers

to the First Security first deed of trust, does it not?
A

Yes.

Q

In using the language to which we've referred "in a

second lien position," at what point in time did you intend
that that language to obtain?
A

At what point in time?

The time the loan closes at

least, but then I asked for endorsement to protect me against
liens that arise in the future that could claim they have
priority.
Q

What do you mean by that?

A

I'm not sure I understand your question.

Q

Nor I your answer and that's the nature of my

question.

You asked for endorsements to insure that liens

could not arise in the future. Could you explain what you
mean by that?
A

What I mean is to insure me against liens that may

or may not arise in the future, to provide me insurance to
protect my client against other possible liens that might be
missed by the title company or that may come up in the future.
Q

Where do mechanic's liens fit in?

70
A

That's one of those liens that could come up in the

future.
Q

Do you include in that mechanic's liens of record in

the title policy?
A

Shouldn't be.

If there are any mechanics lien of

record, they should have told me about them, in my opinion.
Q

Who is they?

A

The title company, or Greg Seal, depending on, you

know, who knew what.
Q

Who would you typically rely on to tell you about

those in the the course of a transaction?
A

You have to rely upon everybody in these

transactions, because very frequently a title company might
not know something about —
may know.

know something that an attorney

You know, a title company, might not be privileged

to some sort of title problem.
title company.

So I don't rely just on a

Now, if an attorney is telling me I only have

to rely on a title company, you know, that's another matter,
but in this case, no attorney was ever telling me I just have /
to rely on the title company.
Q

Are you aware on or about March 13 of 1985 that for

instance, there was a lien in favor of Staker Paving of public
record in this case?
A

I was not aware of it in any way.

Q

If that had been the case and assuming for the sake
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A

An encumbrance to me denotes some sort of money

obligation against a property, whereas a lien I don't think
necessarily has to be a money obligation.
something else. And probably that —

It may denote

if I were to put a

difference on there, that would probably be it, probably be
the difference.
record.

A lien is something that exists on the

Does a lien exist if it's not on the record?

know, potentially it can exist in the future.
pendens a lien?

You

Is a lis

It's not a lien, but for the sake of

discussion, I think everybody would consider it a type of
lien.

A lien is a type of instrument the same as an

encumbrance is a lien type of instrument.
Q

In your mind, does something have to be of record in

order to be a lien?
i
i
i

A

No, it does not.

Q

Why not?

]

i

A

If you have actual notice of something, of a lien or

an encumbrance on a property, then just because you don't have
record notice of it doesn't give you the right to lift
i yourself above i t in this state. Now in other states , that
isn't the case, but in this state.f that is the case.
Q

During the closing on or about March 13 of 1985, did

you have notice that construction was ongoing on the Buildmart
Mall project?
A

I knew that there were items that needed to be
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finished, yes. Whether —

whether it was tenant finish, you

know, the magnitude of that I did not know.
Q

Can tenant finish give rise to a mechanic's lien?

A

Sure it can.

Q

And it could have done so in this case?

A

Sure*

Q

You knew that was in existence at the time in March

of 1985?
A

I sure did.

Q

Did you tell Tower Federal or Mr. Autenreith that

that was the case?
A

Certainly did, we've discussed it.

Q

On how many occasions?

A

The nature of the second lien is that way in this

state and I'm sure we talked about it initially when the
transaction started, and —

the key to the thing was to make

sure we get mechanic's lien protection in your title insurance
as well as that we get an acceptable attorney's opinion
letter, and have acceptable loan documents to protect us from
the borrower.

I believe we were relying upon all the

documents in the transaction to protect us against that lien
in the future.
Q

You had knowledge, as did Tower, then, that

mechanics liens could arise that would be senior to either the
First Security first or the Tower trust deed at the time this
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Q

Yes, please.

A

Then you don't have to ask the next question.

Whether I told Mr. Autenreith about it or not, I don't know, I
don't remember.
Q

Did the existence of that first extended coverage

policy figure into your actions or anything you did about the
Tower loan at all?
A

It was one of the factors. How big at the time, I

don't know, but it was one of the factors that helped me close
the loan, yes.

s ^

Q

Why was it a factor?

A

Because it indicated to me that there was an ongoing

effort on the part of the title company to maintain the —

and

oversee the lien situation on the construction of the project.
Q

Did you work with Steve Urry at all personally in

the closing of this loan?
A

No, I've never met Mr. Urry.

Q

How about Shirl Wright?

A

I've never met Mr. Wright.

Q

Anyone from Culp Construction?

A

I've never worked with anybody from Culp

Construction, unless they've built something for one of my
family's projects, but I don't think I've ever worked
personally with them.
Q

At the time of the closing of this loan in March of

107
19 85, were you aware that there was a pending sale of the
Buildmart Mall?
A

Yes.

Q

Was Tower, as far as you know, aware of that?

A

Yes, very much so.

Q

Why do you say very much so?

A

Because it was one of the factors that Tower was

looking into to determine thg st;ahjlitv of this loan. And
that

Mr.
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basically a gap loan so that the salg could be closed.
Q

Do you recall any other specific things that he told

you about the pending sale?
A

We had conversations about it.

I don't recall

anything specifically, other than that was the general gist of
our conversation, that this is really just a loan to fill a
gap for the completion of the sale.
Q

Was anything said about the fact that that sale was

imminent and that the loan would probably be repaid in a very
short period of time?
J

A

Yes, that was said.

Q

To your knowledge was that material in the

consideration of Tower making that loan?
A
—

To my knowledge?

I think itwas_material. . Whether

I think it was material. Whether that really was to Tower

or not, you'd have to ask Tower.
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remember anything more specific.
Q

With regard to the assurances he gave you, did you

ask him for any written confirmation, any documentation?
A

I didn't.

It was foolish on my part.

Q

And you never received any subsequent to that

conversation?
A

Other than the title policy and the escrow

instructions, I didn't receive anything other than that. I
relied on the title policy and escrow letter signed on that.
Q

You testified —

you went on to testify you obtained

a preliminary report from the title company and that's the
document that has become an exhibit in this deposition?
A

Right.

Q

Just to be clear, that's Exhibit D, I believe?

A

Right.

Q

And to the best of your recollection, Mr. Woodbury,

that's the only preliminary report you recall receiving prior
to closing?
A

That's the only one I've ever received, other than

verbal reports, verbal confirmations, but the report is the
same, that report was the same.
Q

Now, you've indicated in your testimony that you

asked Mr. Seal to prepare a statement or a document regarding
the ongoing litigation?
A

That's right.
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(Whereupon, Exhibit No. G
was marked
for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. ORITT)

Mr. Woodbury, I've handed you what's

been marked as Exhibit G to this deposition, which I
understand is also Exhibit A to Greg Seal's deposition.

Do

you remember ever seeing this letter before?
A

Yes.

Q

Is this the statement that Mr. Seal prepared in

response to your request?
A

Yes.

Q

So this put you on notice about the outstanding

litigation on the project?
A

I was already on notice prior to that.

This

explained it for me, for my client.
Q

And subsequent to receiving this letter, you

discussed this with the title company?
A

I'm not sure whether I discussed —

I think I said

this before, I'm not sure whether I discussed it with the
title company before I received the letter or after I received
the letter, it may have come from a discussion I had with Greg
Seal and I discussed it with the title company.
it with the title company.

I did discuss

That was the reason for a very

heated conversation with the title company.
Q

And subsequent to —

and did you testify that you

received assurances from Mr. Seal and the title company
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regarding the litigation discussed in Exhibit G?
A

I definitely received it from the title company.

From Mr. Seal?

It seems to me when I discussed it with Mr.

Seal, Mr. Seal said, Well, call the title company, it seems to
me is what he said, and see how they've taken care of that.
It seems to me that's what happened.

I'm not so sure they

gave me an assurance that it was okay.

I guess I received

somewhat of an assurance when he gave me his opinion letter,
whatever assurance that is.
Q

Subsequent to this assurance you say you received

from the title company and your discussion with Mr. Seal, did
you discuss those conversations with Seal and the title
company with Diane Derr.
A

Probably not.

Q

Did you discuss —

A

Yes, I probably discussed them, but —

that —

I don't know

I don't have any specific recollection of that.

Q

And did you discuss them with Earl Autenreith?

A

Yes, I'm certain I did that.

Q

Was Earl satisfied with the oral assurances?

A

Yes.

It was our understanding that we were getting

a policy clear of all of those and that, you know, they had
indicated that they had taken care of that already.

And it

wasn't a matter on the title policy at this point in time, on
the title at this point in time. So that I didn't need to
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ones associated with the pending litigation against Buildmart
Mall.
Q

Do you recall anything specifically in conversation

with Greg Seal about indemnification agreements?
A

No, except with respect to the subordination

agreement, and except to the extent that indemnification
existed within the loan documents that we were negotiating.
Q

Other than the litigation problems you discussed

with the title company as evidenced in Exhibit G, the
subordination agreement, do you recall any other specific
title problems or concerns related to this transaction?
A

Any other title problems or concerns?

I think I

mentioned in my testimony yesterday that I did have a
discussion with Mr. Autenreith regarding the nature of a
second lien in this case, wherein we discussed generally the
nature of a second lien in this type of project and the
necessity that the only way for First Federal (sic) to protect
themselves, other than obtaining the insurance protection that
we were obtaining and documenting the way we were documenting
was to be willing to —

the only other area of protection that

they needed was that they would be willing to pay off the
underlying encumbrance should the underlying encumbrance feel
a need to foreclose at some time in the future, and we
discussed that issue with him, but that was the nature of the
transaction —

the risks of the transaction, rather than any
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s p e c i f i c prob3 e m .
MR . DRA K E i

Th< * w:i t i 1 es s sa i d F i rs t Fed e ra 1 .

I

assume you mean. Tower.
THE WITNESS:

I mean Tower.

If I said First

F e d e r a 1 , 1 a p o 1 o g i z e f o i t h a t.
MR. ROBSON:

Those are all the questions I have.

Thar i k y< :>i; i , M r . W o o d b u r y ,
MR. KING:

W e don't have a n y qu-;.:;tioi: is.
FURTHER E X A M I N A T I O N

BY M R . ORITTi
Q

I've just g o t o n e follow-up to M r . R o b s o n ' s

questions.
M r . Woodbuiy, you tt't-tj fled that you * ve h a d
e x p e r i e n c e in a p r i m a r y lender situation where a title c o m p a n y
w i I I n i"i a d i sb urs erne n t b y di sbu r s eme n t b a s i s , T think you
said, p r o v i d e date d o w n s to the lender V

Is

that, what, y o u r

t e s t i m o n y was?
A

W h e n T say" exf >er i ercc, I didn't say -- 1 airi a w a r e

—

I have never worked with those physically as an a t t o r n e y o n
that type of b a s i s .

1 have discussed those w i t h the title

company hefuii-

Ions transact ions and have al so d i s c u s s e d

'.MI VCIJ

them with R i c h a r d s - W o o d b u r y Mortgage as legal c o u n s e l for
R i c h a r d s - W o o d b u r y M o r t g a g e as beina = good Idea for them to
ob t a i i I .

No t oii «

t :i : a n s a c

. --

they do that on every transaction,. 1 don't know.
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gentlemen, Mr. Bettilyon or Mr. Jones?
A
—

I don't specifically remember reasons, other than we

other than it's my general recollection that we believe

that there were a significant number of unpaid bills and that
we felt Mr. Seal should have been generally aware of, and he
should have recognized those issues within his attorney's
opinion.
Q

You testified yesterday about a conversation —

going to try it one more time —

I'm

Mr. Autenreith, about

discussing the general law related to mechanic's liens and
what I refer to as relating back.
that description?
A

Are you comfortable with

That is —

Sure, I'm comfortable with that.

I understand what

you're saying.
Q

Did you ever provide Mr. Autenreith any Utah law on

that subject, copies of statutes, cases, anything like that?
A

No.

Q

Are you comfortable in your mind that based upon

your discussions that he understood that the law in the State
of Utah is that mechanic's liens could relate back in time?
A

I feel that he was aware of that. Yes.

Q

And he was aware of that prior to the Tower loan

closing and being consummated?
A

Yes, I feel that he was aware of that.
MR. DRAKE:

That's all, thank you.
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A

Yes.

Q

Do you recall how it was that you were contacted?

1
2
Who was it that contacted you?
3
A

I received a phone call from August Brand, and he

4
proceeded to tell me about the loan.
5
Q

Do you recall what he told you in the initial

6
conversation?
7
A

He had a request for a second mortgage, just as it

8
is broken down.

I don't remember the interest at this point,

9
There was some

—

basically, it was the overruns and all,

10
and it is here.

He mentioned, of course, it was a very

11
short time to complete the project.

It was his opinion that

12
he thought it might be sold off.

That was his opinion.

But

13
it was a short-term loan.

Just some miscellaneous facts.

14
He mentioned the appraisal of about
15
11-million-some-odd dollars.

He mentioned there was a first

16
deed of trust.

If I hadn't heard the words First Security,

17
I wouldn't have remembered it today.

There was a bank,

18
and our loan and the bank's position still had a very low
19
loan value ratio.
20
So, based on that conversation, his
21
recommendation, and the comments, I had him submit the loan.
22
We went through our procedures of analyzing it.
23
Q

I want to take you through that subsequent

24
procedure.
25

You mentioned that Mr. Brand said that part of

* *l

; : i; »r S , .

t .-

title *

• - . - : « - - - . .ns, Lhat the

thr F-ildir.art *J". . property

i s t .Vr r.-: 3r: . ' * ..-

.__.:.

.:- ~

. -

e v e r y o n e i? c o n c e r n e d • - - ^-> , - w i t h .

By t i t l t , the existence of loans or e n c j m b r a n c e s on the
p r o p e r t y a v t b ° tim*^ tr. : , + •

::•;-:. : ie B'jildmart Mall

"! oan •
WelZ , w ^ are c o n c e r n e d .

A
:-

:•--•*

.- -': ~- . to

••• , ab we w e r e t O i G f in a second pcsii-Lcn sc

we -would be concerned that in the
c

W e know -_..-.-. ^ —

fir.al a n a l y s i s 3

that is

n.
Q

In the initial c o n t a c t s with M r , B r a n d , he d i d

c o m m u n i c a t e that 1*. w ,13 be ..» :.-»cond nw>ri iaqr
A

, rli.i h** n : + ?

•' That is c o r r e c t .

Q

Di:; ho d i s c u s s the exii-'ten^r uf uther

Joai^ .-r

e n c u m b r a n c e s with y o u ?
A

I m e n t i o n e d , of c o u r s e , there w a s a first d e - d cf

trust.
Q ••

A n y t h i n g else communicated to y o u a b o u t the state

• 'f t i t] e I n that initial conversation?
A

Other than the amount of the first deed of trust.

Q

'

* u n d e r s tand it, you have the loan package,

you contacted Mr, Vnla
':.!" M j a p p 1 a i is a 1 ,

and dispatched him to go to Utah and

"1 . • hi .1 * 1 *«»r r f ~ f ?

A-

N o . He reviewed the appraisal

Q

Did he report back to you?

:- r - =• -ffice, v---

1

talking about the typical commercial loan situation

—

2

the Tower Board did authorize a foreclosure proceeding,

3

would that authorization be memorialized in the Tower

4

minutes?

if

5

A

Should be.

6

Q

In making the Buildmart Mall loan, you indicated

7

that, of course, you were aware, and Tower was aware, of the

8

first mortgagee.

Is that right?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And, in making that loan, did Tower assume the

H

risk of the first mortgagee for any reason initiating

12

foreclosure proceedings?

13

MR. O'KEEFE:

14

for a legal conclusion.

15

THE WITNESS:

16

19

I will have to ask you to

repeat it.

17
18

Objection to the form; it calls

MR. ORITT:

I will rephrase it.

BY MR. ORITT:
Q

Preliminarily, you indicated that Tower, in

20

reviewing this loan proposal, was aware there was a first

21

mortgagee on the project; and that the outstanding first

22

mortgage was for $7,750,000. Do you recall that?

23

A

Somewhere in that range.

24

Q

Was it your understanding that if Tower were to

2-

make the $750,000 loan, that there was a risk that the first

mortgagee could initiate foreclosure proceedings at some
point?
Mn. G'KEEFE:
A
:ouH

T y p i c a l of a l l
rni^Ia+M

understood
: - . -=!:

,-

Same o b j e c t i o n .

loans,

I was aware t h a t

anyone

i f o r n c 1 «~>sur • • r e g a r d l e s s of p o s i t i o n ,

that,

Naturally,

-.kei

: i <:

we know * l - ; ] - g a !
* *' ' >•'"

steps

so we
that

v ;r s-- 1 f . wridtever

position you might be I n.
PY MR, OR IT']" i
Q

Given the size of the first position of the

Puildmart M ~ 1 1 - r e j e c t , w a s there a risk that Tower could be
r

orecl osed

:y m t ; foreclosure p r o c e e d i n g s , if they

occurred, of :.ne first mortgagee?
,;: rrr

'

A

'

~^... 'ejection.

There is a-ways a r . c *- w;t.n every m o r t g a g e e .

: ev iew j. ny !JM

L r*'1 "" 1 * i ,ifc rmat l'">;,

(l

By

,nri(i ha^ed upr'n M i "

a p p r a i s a l , we felt our equity position was jn pretty good
shape by virtue

c i" Itit

aiicil.Lli. c 1' ih('

eJult, sirecic.

BY M R . O R I T T :
Q

L11 J "T'owe r ci : ± c u s s J a J -u' k i r w J e d <-j *. Hit" t i t l

say there is always a risk in a loan?

f

Did Tower acknowledge

the risk in this case, and then look at its equity pci-:.t.cn,
and make its decision L O anrrrove the loan?
MP. O'KEEFE:
A

W^ do thri f

in e< ~ *

Same objection. •
"

-t i

I d o n ' t know t h a t

this

r

c

GREGORY SEAL

EXAM BY HOWELL
Q

1

a
3
4
e

IN ADDITION TO THE LIENS THAT YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY

MENTIONED AND THE LAWSUITS THAT YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED
THAT YOU TALKED TO MR. WOODBURY ABOUT, DID YOU DISCUSS WITH
HIM ANY OTHER THREATENED CLAIMS THAT WERE BEING MADE BY
SUBCONTRACTORS OR GENERAL CONTRACTORS ON THE PROJECT?
A

e

WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY DISCUSSIONS ABOUT SPECIFIC

7

THREATENED PENDING LIENS.

e

POSSIBILITY OF LIENS BEING FILED.
Q

9
10

WE TALKED ABOUT GENERALLY THE

WHAT BROUGHT UP THE DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY

OF LIENS BEING FILED?

n

A

MY BEING ASKED TO WRITE AN OPINION SAYING THAT

12

RICHARDS-WOODBURY WAS GOING TO BE IN A SECOND POSITION AND

13

THERE WOULDN'T EVER BE ANY LIENS FILED.
Q

14

I THINK YOU'VE TESTIFIED AS TO WHAT YOU TOLD

IB

MR. WOODBURY GENERALLY.

16

CONCERNING THE LIENS AND HIS POSITION IN REGARD THERETO?
A

17

WHAT DID MR. WOODBURY TELL YOU

HIS WAS THAT THEY WERE NOT GOING TO RELY UPON MY

18

OPINION WITH RESPECT TO LIENS.

19

OTHER WAYS THAT THEY WOULD BE PROTECTED.

20
21

Q

THEY WOULD BE RELYING ON

WHAT WERE THE OTHER WAYS IN WHICH THEY WERE GOING

TO BE PROTECTED ACCORDING TO MR. WOODBURY?

22

A

WE DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A FIRST TRUST

23

DEED IN PLACE AND THE HOLDER OF A SUBSTANTIAL FIRST, TEN

24

TIMES THE SIZE OF THE PROPOSED SECOND, WOULD NOT ALLOW

26

MECHANICS' LIENS TO INTERFEREWITH THAT FIRST POSITION.
OENfKAI COURT *tPO»Te«s

ED
MIDGLEY
& ASSOCIATES

Sutlt 700
S*rt Ltk* City. Ut»* 04111
{•01) 363-2000

Edward P MidgteK RPR
PROPWfTO*

100

SO

AUGUST BRAND

abstained from voting.
Q

Okay.

How was a loan presented to the in-house loan

committee?
A

The committee is given a loan summary several days

before the loan meeting.

And then the loan officer goes

through a brief presentation of the loan and then answers any
questions that may come up.
Q

Did you prepare a loan summary on the Tower loan?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Do you recall what matters are addressed in that loan

summary?
A
loan.

Yes.

First of all the loan amount, the terms of the

In this case it was a three-year interest only loan.

The appraised value, in this case the first mortgage, first
trust deed, the equity in the loan, the financial statements,
net worth of the borrowers. We always have pictures of the
project, location, and then other pertinent factors, like in
this case a potential sale that was in the making.
Q

Would you have included any information about

leasing?
A

Oh yes, yes. That basically would be the rent roll.

And in this case if I recall the retail space was leased at 90
percent, the office warehouse space or the warehouse space was
leased at 60 percent.
Q

Okay.

Did you visit the site of Buildmart Mall prior

14

Q

Are you presently aware of any facts that cause you

! to believe that payments to the general contractors and
! subcontractors on the project were delinquent at the time of
j the closi.ng of the Tower loan?
A

Not at all.

Q

From the position of a loan officer what was the main

attraction or what were the attractions of this loan to
Richards--Woodbury?
A

That it was a good investment that we could recommend

without hesitation to our investor. And being a second
mortgage# that the interest rate at 14 and a half at that time
was an attractive return for the investor.
Q

Do you recall how many appraisals you looked at on

this property prior to submitting the loan package?
A

If I recall I think there were two appraisals.

One

that was made at the time of the construction loan with First
Security Bankf and another MAI appraisal that we used for our
underwriting.

And I donft recall right now who the appraiser

is. But I recall the figure of $14,500,000.
Q

The second appraisal that you mentioned, is that an

appraisal. that Richards-Woodbury obtained from someone else on
the property just for this loan?
A

No, it was part of the loan application.

Q

Did you do any independent appraisal for

Richards-•Woodbury on this property?

23

ADDENDUM E

REQUEST NO. 8

Admit that the Tower Policy, by inclusion in

Schedule B, Part I of Exception 16, excluded coverage of any loss
or damage suffered by Tower which might arise as a result of the
existence of FSB's first lien Trust Deed.

RESPONSE:

Admitted.

REQUEST NO. 9:

Admit that Jeffrey K. Woodbury and the law firm

of Woodbury, Bettilyon & Kesler acted as counsel for Tower and for
Richards-Woodbury in the closing of the Tower Loan transaction in
March, 1985.

RESPONSE:
Woodbury,

Denied.

Jeffrey K. Woodbury and the law firm of

Bettilyon

Richards-Woodbury.

& Kesler

acted

as

counsel

for

The fact that Richards-Woodbury contemplated

selling the loan to Tower did not cause Woodbury to act on behalf
of Tower.

REQUEST NO. 10: Admit

that Woodbury

and the law

firm of

Woodbury, Bettilyon & Kesler obtained from Richmond Title the Tower
Commitment and the Tower Policy.

RESPONSE:

Denied.

Tower objects to the use of the term

"obtained" in that it is unclear and ambiguous.

-22-

RESPONSE:

Admitted to the extent that on march 16, 1987 a

Trustee's Sale took place outside the Third District Courthouse and
that FSB bid the sum of $6,200,000,

REQUEST NO, 17: Admit that neither Tower nor any of its agents,
employees or counsel took any action to stop or seek to stop the
foreclosure sale,

RESPONSE:

Denied to the extent that Request No. 17 suggests or

implies that Tower had any duty or responsibility to stop the
foreclosure sale,

REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that neither Tower nor any of its agents,
employees, or counsel bid in any amount at FSB's foreclosure sale.

RESPONSE:

Denied to the extent that it implies or suggests

that Tower had a duty to bid in any amount at the foreclosure sale.

REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that Tower failed to take an appeal from
the

above-entitled

Court's Order, Judgment

Foreclosure dated March 27, 1987.

26-

and

Decree
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ADDENDUM F
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 - 4 1 1 7 - 5 0 5 0

AffCA COOC SOI

March 13, 1985

Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corporation
1935 East Vine Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Re:

Buildmart Mall

Gentlemen:
This letter is being submitted by way of a
clarification of Section • 2.1(C) of the Loan Agreement
regarding pending litigation. There are currently no
actions, suits or proceedings pending or threatened against
or directly involving Buildmart Mall or the Buildmart Mall
project in Sandy, Utah, or involving the validity or
enforceability of any of the loan documents or the priority
of the lien thereof except the following actions, which
actions are fully covered by insurance and which, if
adversely determined, would not substantially impair the
ability of Buildmart Mall to perform each and every one of
its obligations under the loan documents.
BILL GIBSON LITIGATION
On or about the 18th day of April, 1984, Bill
Gibson, Inc., a Utah corporation, filed a lawsuit in Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County against Steven
Urry, dba Urry & Company and Buildmart Mall, Inc. as Civil
No. C84-2349. It should be noted that Buildmart Mall, Inc.
is a Utah corporation owned by Steven Urry. However, the
said corporation has nothing whatsoever to do with the
Buildmart Mall project in Sandy, Utah. The Buildmart Mall
project in Sandy, Utah is owned by a limited partnership
known as "Buildmart Mall", which limited partnership has as
its general partner, Buildmart Mall, Inc.—Utah, an entirely
separate corporation.
Bill Gibson, Inc. is the alterego of Bill Gibson,
a Salt Lake real estate agent. The litigation asserts that
on or about June 13, 1983, Steven Urry entered into a
written agreement with the plaintiff wherein Mr. Urry agreed
to convey ten percent (10%) of his interest in a project to
construct a mall in Sandy, Utah in exchange for which
plaintiff was to provide certain services. The complaint
asks for specific performance of this agreement in the form

EXHIBIT NO.

Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corporation
March 13, 1985
Page 2
of a conveyance of ten percent of Steven Urry's interest in
the present Buildmart Mall project (5 percent of the overall
project because Mr. Urry only owns fifty percent) to Bill
Gibson, Inc. Mr. Urry's defense is that Mr. Gibson failed
to perform the obligations required of him in the written
agreement. Specifically, Mr. Gibson was required to assist
in obtaining financing for the project which he failed to
do. Also, he was to have the primary responsibility of
leasing the project. Mr. Gibson only obtained two or three
leases out of some sixty or seventy and Mr. Urry paid Mr.
Gibson over $20,000.00.
As the litigation proceeded, it became apparent to
Mr. Gibson that the wrong parties were involved and
plaintiff subsequently amended the complaint to include
Shirl Wright, Buildmart Mall Partnership and Buildmart Mall,
Inc.—Utah. Plaintiff also added a charge that there was a
conspiracy between Mr. Wright, Mr. Urry, Buildmart Mall
Partnership and Buildmart Mall, Inc.—Utah to exclude Mr.
Gibson.
Prior to closing the Industrial Revenue
Development Bond loan and placing the First Deed of Trust on
the property, a complete disclosure was made to First
Security Bank. Also a complete disclosure was made to
Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation of Richmond, Virginia.
Lawyers Title elected to treat the litigation as spurious
and insured over the Notice of Lis Pendens which had been
filed against the project. First Security Bank likewise
elected to treat the litigation as spurious and allowed the
Industrial Revenue Development Bonds to close.
This litigation would not appear to affect the
loan transaction presently being contemplated for two
reasons: First, the litigation has been insured over and
Lawyers Title is willing to continue to insure over this
action. Thus, the position of the lender in the instant
transaction can be fully protected by Lawyers Title
Insurance Corporation. Second, in the event that plaintiff
is ultimately successful (which is highly unlikely), the
relief sought would be a conveyance from Steven Urry to
plaintiff of ten percent of his interest, which conveyance
would be subject to the liens on the project and would not
affect the enforceability of the loan documents.

Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corporation
March 13, 1985
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COMPLEX FABRICATIONS, INC. LITIGATION
On or about December 20, 1984, Complex
Fabrications, Inc., a Utah corporation, .executed a Notice of
Lien and caused the same to be recorded against the
Buildmart Mall project in Sandy, Utah, asserting a claim for
$57,075.26 on a theory that Complex Fabrications, Inc. had
furnished equipment to Universal Concrete, Inc., having a
reasonable value of $185,977.34 and Universal Concrete, Inc.
had only paid $128,902.08.
By way of background, Universal Concrete, Inc.
originally contracted with Buildmart Mall and later
contracted with Culp Construction, the general contractor,
to provide the precast concrete panels for the Buildmart
Mall project in Sandy, Utah. Universal Concrete, Inc. in
turn contracted with Complex Fabrications, Inc. for the
construction of a concrete mold which would be adjustable so
that it could be suited to use in the construction of
concrete panels of many different sizes, shapes and designs.
The use in different applications, because the mold was
adjustable, would make the mold more cost effective for
Universal Concrete, Inc. because they could use it on many
different jobs.
Complex Fabrications, Inc. bid the mold on an
incomplete set of drawings, but both parties made provision
for changes that Universal Concrete, Inc. would make to the
plans as the work progressed. The initial bid was for
approximately $54,000. Universal Concrete anticipated that
with change orders, the total cost would probably be around
$70,000.
Universal Concrete has in fact paid Complex
Fabrications $132,679.05 for the mold to date. Universal
Concrete is refusing to pay any more and feels that they
have over paid by a substantial amount.
This dispute, which goes back over one year,
resulted in the filing of the lien and on or about January
18, 1985, Complex Fabrications, Inc. filed a law suit to
foreclose the lien. The lawsuit, filed as Civil No.
C85-0377, only names Buildmart Mall, Shirl Wright, and
Universal Concrete. It does not name Culp Construction or
make a claim against the project bond.

Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corporation
March 13, 1985
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This matter does not appear to affect the lender
in the contemplated transaction because it can be insured.
Lawyers Title has committed to insure over this lien and
litigation. Moreover, on the merits, it appears that there
is a viable defense on the basic claim and it appears highly
questionable that Complex Fabrications, Inc. would have the
right to enforce their lien when their contract was
basically one of constructing a "tool" to be used by a
subcontractor on this project and many other projects.
If you have any questions regarding these matters,
please feel free to contact us. Likewise, if you would like
any further information, we would be pleased to supplement
this letter with any information required.
Very truly yours,
SEAL, KENNEDY & FRANDSEN

^Gregory L. Seal
GLS:bb
cc:

Buildmart Mall

ADDENDUM G

4026095
NOTICE OF LIEN
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Nolle* ii hereby given that the underaigned

.JUisrx \'?\\rn

doin* buaineea aj
JLecrv Mr Urn
.
l.i.oi * cvv> g^.:»>i ma rating «/ ^ 1' ?/>*<» -

.—
and retidinf at
Statt of Utah, hereby claim—.

and ,'ntend_ to hold and claim a lien upon that ceruin land and premieea, owned and reputed to be
owned by
.."*«"* ' '* —' ^' *
aituate, lying and bein* in
lir^y, CI »,y.
State of Utah, described aa follows, to wit:

~

*B<*
. County of

SaLlLJLlilfi

P R O P E R T Y .
D E S C R I P T I O N
BEG N 1 2 6 1 . 4 1 3 FT 4 E 6 7 9 . 3 1 6 FT FR NW COR OF SEC 1, T 3 3 , * " _
IV. S L M; M 89 0 1 * 2 7 - E 9 4 2 . 1 5 3 FT; S 0 8 J 3 3 ' 2 1 " E 3 9 * . 6 9 4
FT; N 89 22'32-~W 4 1 3 . 3 6 FT TO E LINE OF SAND* PARKWAY; N
1 2 * 5 7 , 3 5 T W 1 3 1 . 4 3 8 FT; N W U ALC CURVE TO L 3 6 1 . 3 2 1 FT; N
5 9 ~ 5 7 ' 3 5 ~ W 5 5 2 . 5 8 1 FT; NV'LY ALC CURVE TO L 3 9 . 0 7 FT; NWLY
ALC CURVE TO L 1 1 6 . 3 9 2 FT; N 0 _ 5 8 , 3 3 " V 6 1 . 6 2 FT TO IZG.
1 3 . 9 3 AC M OR L. 5 4 9 6 - 7 5 9 THRU~762, 5 4 4 8 - 1 1 3 2

to secure the payment of the sum of
2ZS.2*££L
owing to the undersigned fnr
<~c -: ^ ^ • * -r- ~C.:. •• > -~ Vn.„

in, on and about th»

c

i h .if >v«».^/»-

Doilara,
_

mw,

0Q

^ ^ ^nd.

That the aaid indebtedness accrued and the undersigned fcrzianedMLidiaxttrbU.ti/Xox waa emPloyed b y )

*.<rhn T*A T ,^KT • /•> /V-,n» - a r» >r*r ) a rH J ^

.who waa tht
.
nwn*r tnd the reputed owner of laid premiaea aa
aforesaid, under a_a ar:iJ
contract made between the ««^ -Hrvvir* < ^ y ^ f ~~,M-V ~-^~\
— rinri ""ncM's Mir. Is futtagrj
and tht undersigned
-day of—PC 2w*r
19 tik , by the terma of which tht cnderiigned did agree
and thm «.,r|

OUK.,H

'/,fr| . ' I ^ „ „ , ~ - , r , „ , 0

---»

"£>vflp ' «

0-|-<pr*

frtM-r.n r \

did agree to pay the undersigned therefor aa foliowa, to wit:..
S7Hg t rn u r 9 n c^nple'-lorL.Qr.. 1 a«_'111 •» tian "f LlnalfMin

signed dld.-luaJLalL«i.

the «*•«*

«wMffn.

-^lYJ&kQSJC
J2W*
and did
irJLU.ll
—.t.?.lh
day of—ZavGabar.—IJX.I

__

.and under which aaid contract the underr _w
^ y cf
0B<&%
.
the lait__ ?*>•'* *r.
on tht
*,„..and on and between aaid laat mentioned

daya, did .li.c^ualIx.JlxaUil.llMi^ua>...^.lai^iL.^alx}
to \h% lum of
t7Li.. CQ (rv»ven h'.iP-<-^.fi-'y r Hn,'

i H ^n.Mnn)

amounting
Dollar*,

which waa the reaaonable value thereof, and on which the following paymenta have been made to wit:
LQJ QQJM

§•
^ r
.05

leaving a balance o w i n g to the undersigned oL-^V'JXJM
......
Dollars after deducting ail j u i t credita and offset*, and for w h i c h
demand the underaigned hold ... and claim.-, a lien by virtue of the proviaiona of Chapter I, of Title

^
£f
pi

88, of the Utah Code Annotated 1953.
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^
j -J. .—" -w°
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4060817 NOTICE OF LIEN
TO WHOM IT MA Y CONCERN:
%
. , it
, htrtby
u u firm
_a
.u
J —4— A ,.,. r.tr^
Mike Farnsworth P a i n t i n g~., I n c .
Nolict
thatL .i_
tht undtrilgntd
dolm builntu u
a-anus
»n<* residing at
Hidvale
County -' S a l t L a k o
StaUof Utah, htrtby daimJ?."
and intand^sto hold tnd data a lltn upon that carta In land ind prtmisti. owntd ind rtpuLed to bt
owntd
B u i l d Mart M a i l , I n c .
f||d
jtfciata. lying ind bting In ., MldVflle
State of Utah, docribtd n follow*, to wtt:

;

5.ai™™?„

. County of

See attached e x h i b i t

to secure tht payment of tht sura of.J^aJIb.Qu§an.^^
j. • , ,
cconstrue
o n s t r u c t i o n labor and materials
k 4.
owinj to tht undersigned for.
c o n s t r u c t i o n comoany

ii -

rrwDollars,

•

In. on ind tbout «..

" » ' • p r o p e r t y improvements and building,,", ^

™"

That tht ti id indebted net* accrued and tht undersigned furnished said materials to (or wis employed by)

B u i l d Mart M a l l , I n c .
.

who was the

._«_~
owner and tht reputed owner of said premises aa
aiortaaid. under a
oral
contract madt betwetn tht «»M B u i l d Mart M a l l , I n c .
—
»"d tht undersigned
on tht 8
day of.^JL o v e m b e .E.^ 1* J L i by tht ttrma of which tht underlined did agree
f
to r» 4n< * "P d o t h e r w i s e perform s e r v i c e s to c e r t a i n real property improvements fc
*nd tht said
BtHlrl .M^rf MfllK^Inc
I
did agrta to pay tht undersigned thtrtfor II followa, to wU:..whan lnyjolca^WAa^JieiLtA^.

limed did

Provide

^ f\nt

-and under which said contract tht under*
wor* »"<* material^ t h |
jj}^
d i y of

_ ^ a v a m h a x ^ . - O S . a . 4 . . a n d did P.rj2Y.i<te
tht laatJ^ElL^lJStPJLEiliff tht
« t h . _ d i y o f _ . ....?J?5.!!!^£.'....i^. 4
and on and bttwetn said last mtntioncd
days, did _PX9.yide j-orje J H l L £ ^ « L l ? i J L
amounting
to tht turn of.-JrfQ^TlIQUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE DollarSf
wmch wai tht reasonable value thereof, and on which tht following paymnnU havt bttn madt to wit:
4lon#
_
Itavint i baimct owint to tht understated of JWajltQUJSMPJISSJJU^^
——_~
Dollar! afUr daducting ill Juit crtdlti and offstti, and for which
dtmind tht undersigned hoid-a and daim-ft. a Hen by vlrtua of tht proviiioni of Chapttr I, af TUIt
St. of tht UUh Codt Annotated 1853.

/

* /

f/flj/

%

/?

Mike Farnavorth Paintinq~lnc. "*"
Byi Mirhaoi A. Neidor
Assistant Secretary
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STATE Or UTAH,

)
) ts.
County of Salt Lake|
Michael A. Neider being first duly sworn, says that he is
Assistant Secretary for claimant in the foreqoing Notice of Lien*
that he has heard read said notice and knows the contents thereof,
and that the same is true of his own knowledge.

>^X^4^
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

1"^

day of

i-TT 1985.

<"w
M^Xzy^rrstf^On .Expires x

Notary Puoixc

/

R e s i d i n g At:

fr\Oy^^^

t S . L . Ca^, -\—

. Vj^flQi^ ^

OCQJ'35

EXHIBIT

H
BEO N 0~02'25 E 1066.977 FT i E 638.748 FT FR NW COR SEC 1.
H
T 3S. R IW. 3 L HI 3 39~57'35 E 522.115 FTl S'LY ALO A
CURVE TO R 36 1.372 FTl S 12~5?'35" E 204.761 FTt N 72~03'39"
E 109 FTl S 1 9~09'27" E 170 FTf N 77~02'23" E 263.45 FT TO
W'LY LINE OF 0 U ROW RRf N 08~03'2I M W 959 FTf S 8t~56'39" W
30 FTl N 44~20' W 234.704 FVI N'LY ALO A CURVE TO R 60.505
FTl N O f W : 91.994 FTt S 8V~0i'27 M W 688.79 FTl S 0~28'46"
E 41.171 FTf N 89~50'46" W 11.724 FTt S 209.519 FTt S'LY ALO
A CURVE TO R 207.506 FTl S 30~02'23 M W 25 FT TO BEO. LESS
THAT PORTION LYINO INSIDE SANOY. 3.30 AC M OR L

DEO N 0~02'25" E 1066.977 FT l E 638.749 FT FR NU COR SEC 1.
T 3S. R 1U, S L Mt S 3?~57'35" E 522.115 FTl S'LY ALO A
CURVE TO R 361.372 FTl $ 12~57'35M E 204.761 FTl N 72~05'39"
E 109 FTt S 19*09'27" E 170 FTt N 77~02'25" E 263.45 FT TO
W'LY LINE OF D & ROW RRi N 0~03'21" W 859 FTt S 91 A 36'39" W
30 FTt N 44^20' W 234,704 FTt N'LY ALO A CURVE TO R 60.503
FTl N 1" W 281.994 FTl S 89~0i'27- W 688.79 FTl S 0 A 28'46 H
E 41.171 FTt N 39-50'46" W 11.724 FTl S 208.519 FTt S'LY ALO
A CURVE TO R 207.306 FTt S 30~02'25" W 25 FT TO £>E0. LESS
THAT PORTION LYINO INSIDE MXDVALE. 16.8 AC H OR L

•WWT*"^

™*u
WHEN RECORDED. MAIL TO:
YWlVm EXCAVATING, INC.
4655 West 5415 South
....Kearris.

_

.....Utah

4061418

8.4US

Space Above for Recorder's Use

NOTICE OF LIEN

_
. .
,
The und^.*3icned

\WIPHI EXCWATTNS. INC.
-..-.:.-

hereby fives notice of intention to hold a*id ciaim a lien upon the property and improvements
J

., ,

J

..

nunxwvRT MALL

thereon owned and reputed to be owned by —

—
and located in

~
5*iJ:..£3J<?

County,

Utah, more particularly descnbed as follows:
Sec Attached "Exhibit A"

The amount demnjided hereby is $...8.4^.0J(3..53
owing to *rJie unaersiirned for •furnishing:
materials used in 'performing- labor upon the 'construction •alteration 'addition to -repair of
a 'buiidins 'structure 'improvement upon the above descnbed property.
The undersigned •furnished said materials to 'was empioyed by ....
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Original Contractor

rho w u the
8Uch

^ ^

done by

^

undersigned under a contract made between . . _ J 5 ^ - . ^ * ^ A ^ £ t L C ^ J t f ^
~1

and tlie undersijrned by the terms and conditions of which th
the undersigned did agree to..

^

Furnish Material & Equipment

in consideration of payment to the undersigned therefore as follows:.
NET 10TH FOLLOWING MONTH

I
and under which contract the first •material was furnished 'labor was performed on the

=•

£

C«

p

.'..„., 19.JL _ and for ail of which •materials •labor the undersigned

g§

I

became entitled to %—..:..:..JJ_..? , which is the reasonable value thereof, and on which pay*

S

K

ments have hwen maiie and credits and offsets allowed amounting to t?.?.5L.i:LLJ.9

w

w

3

day of _J52^235E

. l§. $. .,. and the last was so furnished or performed oo the JLlttU
5

d&y of ...-.!5£E.

?3
-*"1

leaving a

balance owinr to the undersijrned of J..8.4.»JP.J.{L.?&...... after deducting* all juat credits and offsets,

g

and for which demand the under-signed hold., and claim., a lien by virtue of the provisions of
Chapter 1, Title 38. Utah Code Annotated 1963.

E
g

•3tni«« out uiui««.«ry » o H i
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INC.
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STATE OF UTAH,
County of
^JilkJ^SSL
DENNIS JONES

..being flnt duly aworn, aaya that ha la

Vice President of HAKPFH EXCAVATING, INC

3

1

fclaimant— In tht foregoing Notice of LJtn;
that he haj read laid notict and knowi tht content* thereof, and that tht ta/nt If true of hit
own knowledge.
}\Nlpm EXCAVATING. INC.

Subscribed and nworn to before m« this

M DcnniSyfenes
Z.x. .day
Noury Public.

J'«:»l«l I/rj AH
tvill i*\Vr> 'V*ifity
My CSrfrmi^Vjn K^plr*:*
1/20/86

>Xoy)i

0G0O7S

ECHIBIT NAM

Camence at a point which i s North 1261.413 feet and East 679.816
f e e t from the Northwest Corner of Section 1, Township 3 South. Range
1 West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence N89°0r27"E
942.153 feet to a point on the Westerly right-of-way l i n e of a railroad,
thence S08°03 , 21 ,, E 1030.00 f e e t along said Westerly right-of-way l i n e ,
thence S77°02,26,,W 390.572 feet to a point on the Easterly curb l i n e
of Sandy Parkway, a dedicated s t r e e t as recorded August 3. 1982 in Book
82-8 of p l a t s page 65, thence along said s t r e e t NX^357'35,,W 359.351 f e e t
to a point of tangency with a 440.472 foot radius curve t o the l e f t
(central angle = 47°00*00M chord bears N36°27' 35,,TW), thence along said
curve for an arc distance of 361.321 feet, thence N59°57'35MW 552.581
f e e t to a point on a 25.00 foot radius curve to the l e f t (central angle
= 90°00 , 00" chord bears N75 o 02'25 u E 35.355 f e e t ) , thence along said
curvwj for an arc distance of 39.070 f e e t to a point of tangency with
a 215.010 foot radius curve to the l e f t (central angle * 31°00'58" chord
bears N14031'56"E 114.976 f e e t ) , thence along said curve for an arc
distance of 116.392 f e e t , thence W00°58'33MW 61.621 f e e t t o the Point
of Cammencerrent.

7

'Oo

S*5

if

000079^
1
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w.q'.ffwvvj '..-PA-* ' »in
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4CW07ZZ
VHEN RECORDED, HAIL TO:
Eric C, Olaon
Van Cott, Baglay, Cornwall W McCarthy
P.O Box 45340
I Sa.'t U k t City, Utah 84145

ft l

S2li£-£-^
lnc..h.r«by
brtcacton«» in. 0 "

I!

- 679.81 6 £ " t C

337 feet; running thenca South 89° 01* 27" Vaat
902.343 feat to tha point of beginning.
Tha amount demanded hereby is $57,075.26 owing to tha
undersigned for furnishing equipment used in the construction
of buildings upon the above described property.
Tha undersigned furnished said equipment to Shirl
Wright & Associates and Universal Concrete, Inc., who owned a
limited partnership interest in the owner of said property and
were the agents of the owner of said property, such being dona
by the undersigned under a contract made between Shirl Wright: &
Associates and Universal Concrete, Inc. and the undersigned by
the terms and conditions o£ which tha undersigned did agree to
furnish the basic frame of a structural steel mold for
fabricating concrete walls together with headgatee, sidagates,
top haadgatas, endgatas, trusses and hydraulics for use with
the mold*

In consideration, Shirl Wright & Associates and

Universl Concrete, Inc. agreed to pay $57,687.96 for the baaic
frame mold and extra chargea ordered by Shirl Wright &
Associates and Universal Concrete, Inc. including, but not
limited to, haadgataa, sidagates, top headgataa, endgatas,
trusses, hydraulics and incidental rtnttl and assembly in a
total amount of $128,289.38.

Under the contract, the first

equipment was furnished on the 15th day of February, 1984 and
the last was so furnished on the 8th day of October, 1984 and
for all of which equipment the undersigned became entitled to

•!•

$185,977.34, which ia the reaeonable value thereof, and on
which paymenta have been mada and cradlta and offaeca allowed
amounting to (128,902.08 leaving a balance owing to the
underaigned of $57,075*26 after deducting all juat credita and
offaeta, and for which demand the underaigned holda and claima
a lian by virtue of the proviaiona of Chapcar 1, Title 38, Utah
Coda Annotated 1953 (aa amended).

Complex Fabricationa, Inc.

By:
STATE OF UTAH

L^^J^^^TT^

^yTZ^^r-t

1-

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

John A. Green being firat duly awoTO, aaya that he la
preaident of the claimant'Complex Fabricationa, Inc. in the
foregoing Notice of Lien and ia duly authorized by aaid
claimant to aign thia notice of lien; that he hea reed aeid
notice and knowa the contenta thereof, and that the aame ia
true of hia own knowledge*

\^^-^/7t/j^
%

/ *HG. C'l?*\

Subacribed and awom to before me thia *3fl"*^dav
, 1984.

f im}^

i. V RU~\-

"V. i

f $C* ,

otary Public
28600
•3r*jl u p mm^m^m^

m

^y^"9Sm^^pss"

-ji..aa"wn'.,..L^ii. u I I H I J I W J i

Jin

^36T27.

4032291
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
Eric C. Olson
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall fc McCarthy
'""4C
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Laka City, Utah 84145
NOTICE OF LIEN
Tha undersigned, Complex Fabricatione, Inc., hereby
givaa notica of intantlon to hold and claim a lian upon tha
proparty and improvements thareon owned and raputad to ba ovnad
by Buildmart Mall, a Utah linitad partnarahip, and locatad in
Salt Laka County, Utah, mora particularly daacribad AM follova:

Parcal No. 1:
Beginning North 1261.413 fact and Eaat 679.816 faat
from the Northwest corner of Section 1, Tovnahip 3
South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian;
running thence North 89* l1 27" Eaat 942,153 faat;
thqnce South 8* 3' 21" Eaat 898.694 feat; thonca North
89* 22* 32" Weat 413.36 feet to tha Eaat line of Sandy
Parkway; thence North 12* 37'-35".Weat 131.438 faat;
running thence Northwesterly alongT tha curve to L
361.321 feet; thence North 59° 37 33" Weat 532.581
_
foot; running thence Northwesterly along curve to L
g
39.07 feet; running thence Northwesterly along curve CJ*
to L 116.392 feet; thence North 0* 58' 33" Weat 61.62 «
feet to the point of beginning.
Jjj
Parcal No. 2:

3

Beginning North 1262.091 feot and East 719.62 feat . S
from tho Northwest c o m e r of Section 1, Tovnahip 3
*
South, Range 1 West.r Salt Laka Meridian; running
thence North 29° 55 34" Vest 82.243 feet; thence
North 0* 58• 33" West 222.231 feet; running thence
South
89° 50* 46" Eaat 58.233 feet; thence North 0*
28 # 46" Weat 41.171 feet; running thence North 89 01 •
27" East 840.386 faat; thence South 8* 20' 37" East

^0-g}
' II

y

•••

40U390Q

i l l

^A\
WHEN RECORDED! KAIL TO;

Erie C. Olson
Van Cottf Bagley, Cornwall fc McCarthy
P.O. Box 43350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84143
NOTICE OF LIS??
The undersigned, Coaplax ?abrlcationa9 Inc., hereby
•1

*4

glvee notice of intention to hold and claia a lien upon the
property and iaprovcaents thereon ovned and reputed to be ovned

F"

by Buildaart Mall, a Utah lialted pertnerahip9 and located ia
Salt Lake County, Utah, aore particularly deeeribed ae follows:

Parcel No. 1:
Beginning North 1261.413 foot and Eaac 679.816 feet
from the Northwest corner of Section 1, Town a hip 3
South, Range 1 Went, Salt Lako
Base and Meridian;
running thence North 89* lf 27" Eaat 942.133 feet;
thence South 8* 3' 21". Eaat 898.694 feet; thence North
89* 22' 32" Voat 413.36 feet to the Eaat line of Sandy
Parkway;
way; thence North 12* 37* 33" Weat 131.438 feet;
running thence Northwesterly along? the curve to L
361.321 feet; thence North 59° 37 33" Veet 332.381
feet; running thence Northwesterly along curve to L
39.07 feet; running thence Northwesterly elong curve \
to L 116.392 feet; thence North 0* 38' 33" Vest 61.62 ]
feet to the point of beginning.

P

Parcel No. 2:

4-

Beginning North 1262.091 foot and Eaat 719.62 feet
froa the Northwest eomer of Section 1, Township 3
South, Range 1 West,? 8aIt Lake Meridian; running
thence North 29* 33 34" Vest 02.243 feet; thence i
North 0 # #38' 33" Vest 222.231 feet; running thence
South 89 30' 46" East 38.233 fast; thence North 0 V
28' 46" Vest 41.171 feet; running thence North 89* IV
27" Eaac 840.386 feet; thence South 8* 20' 37" b a t

I

'.•m«±dWl.<19!!X*M.

4041077
VAN COT?t BACLEY, CORNWALL fc HcCARTHY
Stephen D» Swindle (3176)
John A. Snow (3025)
Eric C. Olson (4108)
Attorney! for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street
Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt U k e City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT UXl

COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
COMPLEX FABRICATORS, INC.,
Plaintiff,

LIS PENDENS
Civil No.

vs.
UNIVERSAL CONCRETE, INC.,
H. SHIRL VRICHT,
individually and d/b/a
SHIRL WRIGHT k ASSOCIATES,
and BUILDHART HALL, a Utah
limited partnership,
Dafaodantit

£
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that an action hat baan
commenced in tha Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, by tha above-named plaintiff againet tha
above-named defendants for tha foreclosure of a lian elaiaad by
tha plaintiff under that certain Notice of Lien recorded on
December 20, 1984 in-the Oftic^

of tha County Recorder of Salt

Lake County, Utah, in Book 5616, paga 2174 as amended at Book
3617, paga 2477 and Book 5618, paga 3232/ Tha real property '

^mwi'jv

••

m

tubjact to said Notica of Llan, dascrlbad in tha Complaint, and1
affactad by laid foracloiura action, ii tltuatad in Salt Laka
Countyi Utah and ia aora particularly daieribad in Exhibit "A"
harato*
Datad:

January /£

» 1985 •

VAN COTT, BACL2Y, CORNWALL fc MCCARTHY
Stephen D. Swindle
John A« Snow
Eric C. Olion

Aa€urn¥ya xor PlaincixT*^<-*
^50 South Malnf Suita 1600
,?. 0. Box 43340
-Salt Lake City. Utah 84145
Talaphonat (801) 532-3333
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

:

§§.

0° t h i i - L S l N * ? °* *J*ouary, 1985 * parionally
appaarad before aa Eric C. Olion, tha iignar of thia foragoing
inatruaant, vho duly acknowledged to aa that ha axacutad tha

omainion Expirn:
My CoaaiMion
Expirttt '
j."3>*3*US??A*,'"
ll'&lfi*
s

2
•2-

EXHIBIT "A"
Parcal Ho. 1;
Beginning North 1261.413 faat and Zaat 679.816 faat
froa tha Northwest corner of Section lf Townahip 3
South, Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
running thenca North 89J l1 27M East 942.153 feat;
thenca South 8 # 3' 21M East 898.694 feat; thanea North
89" 22' 32" Vaat 413.36 feet to tha Eaat line of Sandy
Parkway; thanea North 12° 57* 35" Veet 131.438 faat;
running thanea Northwesterly along tha curve to L
361.321 faat; thence North 39* 57 T 33" Vaat 332«581
faat; running thence Northwesterly along curve to L
39.07 faat; running thence Northwesterly along curve
to L 116.392 faat; thence North 0* 38' 33" Veet 61.62
faat.to tha point of beginning.
Parcal No. 2:
Beginning North 1262.091 U^t and Eaat 719.62 feet
froa tha Northweet corner of Section 1, Township 3
8outh, Range 1 Vest. Salt Lake Meridian; running
thenca North 29* 55'-34" Vast 82.243 faat; thenca
North 0° 58* 33" Vest 222.231 feet; running thenca
South 89° 50' 46" Zaat 58.235 feet; thanea North 0*
28* 46" Vest 41.171 feat; running thence North 89V01 f
27" East 840.396 fsat; thanea South 8' 20• 37" Eaat
337 feet; running thenca South 89* 01f 27" Vest
902.343 f9€t to tha point of beginning*
29330
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EXHIBIT -A-

LEGAL DESCRIPTION

Commence at a point which is North 1261.413 feet and East 679.816 feet frcthe Northwest Corner of Section 1, Township 3 South, kanga 1 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian and running thence N89°01 f 27 n E 942.153 feet to a
point on the Weste-iy rignt-af-way line of a railruad, thence S08o03,21,,E
1030.00 fet?t along said Westerly right-of-way line, thence S77°02'25,,W
390.572 feet to a point on the Easterly euro line or Sandy Parkway, a
dedicated street as recorded August 3, 1982 in Book 82-8 of plats page 65,
thence alo«g said street N12*57'35"W 359.351 feet to a point of tangency
with a 440.472 foot radius curve to the left (central angle » 47 o 00 , 03"
chord Dears N36 D 27'35"W), thence along said curve fcr an arc distance of
361.321 feet, thence N59a57»35,,W 552.581 feet to a point on a 25.00 font
radius curve to the left (central angle * 90°C0,00" chord bears N75°Q2,25"E
35.355 feet), thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.070 feet
to a point of tangency with a 215.010 frot radius curve to the left
(central angle - 3rC0'5S" chord bears N14 0 3r56 M E 114.976 feet), thence
along said curve for an arc distance of 116.392 feet, tijence N0C°58,33*W
61.620 feet co the Point of Cccnencement.
Contains 15.347 acres, more or less.
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4060817 NOTICE OF LIEN
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
. k 4.
, ,
,
Notict li htrtbr fiv«n thai tht undarsigned
doing butlntu n
Mldvale

Mike
Farnsworth P a i n t i n g , I n c .
"A ° •
*•'

*ama
Countr o f _ i * i J L i £ i i £

« d rtiidlng at
StaU of Utah, hereby claim.*'

and InUndJJto hold and dabn a lias upon that ctrtain land ind prtmises. owned and rtputed to bt
B u i l d Mart M a l l , I n c .
rf
owned by
,
_
•"—•• U'":'r'-r—r—~* • u
jitaata, lying and bting ln_J31dYale
:
• County of
*
tJL
SUU of Utah, described as follow*, to wit:
.
flVM(J1,¥

See a t t a c h e d

exhibit

Tr^r
to secure tht payment of tht aum of-TrfP^bPjisajn^^Two..I^njrjd^ a n d ^ f i f t;/__
Dollars,
, ,
c o n s t r u c t i o n l a o o r and m a t e r i a l s
owing to tht undersized for
,
construction
aa a
,
J u * «u
in, on and about tht

comoany
:
r e a \ p r o o e r t y imorovemenc3 and b u i l d i n g _ •, , ,
.
L :,.. ,.i
:
Zon said land.

That tht taid Indebtedneaa accrutd and tht underlined furnished said materials to (or was employed by)

3 u i l d Mart M a l l ,

Inc.

,
_
aforesaid, under a

—

,

,

who was the

owner and tht reputed owner of said premises aa
contract madt betwetn tht t»M B u i l d Mart M a l l , I n c .

aruJ

.
.
'"^ tht undersigned
on tht
L _ . d a y of. N o v e m b e r ^ 19 JL1. by tht terms of which tht undenigned did arret
to p»<nf *pd o t h e r w i s e p e r f o r m a e r v i c e a t o c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y i m p r o v e m e n t a
f nd tht said
guild-Mnrf MfllU-Inc^J
did arret to pay tht underaignsd thtrtfor as follows, to wit:.%when.JjxvJOicja-.WAa_jien.t^

simtd did

Provide

&, / i ^

..snd under which said contract tht under.
work and m a t e r i a l ^ t h f
lifcb
d l y of

—.Uo.uombax^-JL5.S.4..and did PXQYiStS
.?.? t h . _ d t y of
PJES£S£. # -...1111
days, did ~P.SP.Yile J i S ^

tht IMIJKSJLJULl.JtfJLEiil* the
and on and bttwttn snid last mentioned
amounting

to the sum a/.^MQ..!niDi;SAND.-raQ..HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE _

DoflftI%

wmch was tht reasonable value thereof, and on which tht following paymnnU have been made to wit:
——

—

Hon*

ltavint a balanct owing to tht undtrslgntd of JWQ_JZtQU3MBJi^
—
Dollars sfUr dtducting all Juat crtdlts and offstU, and for which
dtmand tht undersigned hold~a and claims, a Hen by virtue of the provlsjont of Chapter 1, of Title
31, of the Utah Code Annotated 1083.

'[If
'Mike Farnaworth Painting, Inc.
Byi Mirhaol A. Neidor
Aaaiatant Socratary
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